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Abstract 
Corruption and poor governance are well-documented problems in the management 
of forests around the world, and are widely cited to be contributing to deforestation 
and forest degradation. Whilst the link between corruption and poor governance and 
deforestation is widely assumed, few studies have analysed the mechanisms by which 
corruption and poor governance may be impacting forest management and 
contributing to deforestation and degradation. That is, there has been research that 
supports the claim that corruption contributes to deforestation, however many of 
these studies have utilised measures of corruption, such as nationally-aggregated 
corruption perceptions indexes, which hide a lot of the variation in types of corruption. 
Localised case studies of corruption and poor governance, which have identified many 
complexities in types of corruption, have often not focused on the impact on forest 
management. These two streams of research demonstrate that corruption and poor 
governance are multifaceted phenomena and may impact on forests in many diverse 
and context-specific ways. This thesis seeks therefore to integrate these two streams 
of research by addressing the questions 'Does corruption and poor governance 
contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea? And if so, how?' 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) were selected as case studies for this research 
due to the important forest reserves and the high prevalence of corruption and poor 
governance. Mixed methods were adopted in this thesis. Grounded theory 
methodology, which provides a systematic and rigorous approach to generating 
theories form the data, was used to analyse the process of forest governance and 
corruption. Based on the data collected from semi-structured interviews and 
government and media reports, two grounded theories were developed on forest 
governance and on corruption in the forests. The core process of forest governance 
that emerged from the data was one of a process of negotiation over if, and how, 
regulations were implemented. The grounded theory on corruption also highlights the 
complex systems and relationships that support, or demand, corrupt exchanges. The 
findings from the two grounded theories were then drawn on in the second part of this 
thesis which adopted a case-study approach to analyse if and how corruption and poor 
governance contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and PNG. 
This analysis focuses on four stages of forest management—being land-use planning, 
concession allocation, monitoring and enforcing and the distribution of benefits—to 
identify what types of corruption and poor governance is occurring, and how this may 
impact upon the forests. The findings point to some very complex relationships 
between corruption, poor governance and deforestation and forest degradation in the 
case study countries, and highlight how many other factors, such as regulatory quality, 
need to be understood in order to determine whether any specific corrupt exchange 
contributes to deforestation and degradation in the case study countries. My thesis is 
that whilst corruption and poor governance do not necessarily lead to more area of 
forestland being cleared and converted, corruption and poor governance do contribute 
to the wider problems associated with deforestation, such as unsustainable forest 
exploitation and environmental injustices. These findings have implications for current 
efforts to improve forest governance as a means to reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
High rates of deforestation and forest degradation are widely seen as one of the greatest 
environmental and developmental challenges facing the globe today (United Nations, 
2011). As forests are cut down and converted vital ecological services are lost, to the 
detriment of local, national and international communities (Sunderlin et al., 2005; Wood, 
1990). Poor governance, including corruption, illegal logging and lack of accountability, 
have been well-documented problems affecting the management of the world's forest 
resources (Colchester et al., 2006; GTZ, 2009; World Bank, 2006b). Indeed, corruption and 
poor governance are increasingly reported to be causing deforestation and forest 
degradation (Saunders and Nussbaum, 2008; Smith et al., 2003b; World Bank, 2006a, b). 
Poor governance is not only thought to cause deforestation and forest degradation, but to 
contribute to the wider problems of poor forest management, such as the failure of forest 
exploitation to contribute to development of communities in forested areas (CELCoR and 
ACF, 2006; Wollenberg et al., 2004), and more generally, lower economic growth of 
countries with significant natural resources (Kolstad and S0reide, 2009; Sachs and Warner, 
2001).' Yet despite widespread claims about the various impacts of corruption and poor 
governance on forests, the research that exists paints a more complicated picture. 
There has been research to support the claim that poor governance and higher levels of 
corruption may contribute to higher rates of deforestation and forest degradation (for 
example Barbier et al., 2005; Bulte et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2003b; Umemiya et al., 2010). 
Many of these studies have drawn their conclusions after comparing nationally 
aggregated governance or corruption indices, such as the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) or Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (Tl CPI), to 
'The study by Sachs and Warner (2001) does not refer to forests specifically. Their analysis is based on 
natural resources more generally. 
different amounts of land-use change in different regions. Whilst the results of these 
studies do provide some support for the claims above, there are nonetheless problems, 
particularly because of the use of these indices. That is, quantifying the quality of 
governance in any country is incredibly difficult, and there has been well-documented 
concern over the accuracy of perceptions of governance as a measure of 'true' quality of 
governance (OIken, 2009; Thomas, 2010). The difficulties associated with this data means 
that the results must be treated with caution. Secondly, being aggregated at a national 
level, these indices hide much of the variation in the nature and process of governance 
that may be occurring across different countries or in different regions within a country. 
This limits the ability of these studies to describe the internal, context-specific 
mechanisms by which different governance factors impact upon forest cover. In order to 
understand the potential ways in which different governance factors may be contributing 
to deforestation and forest degradation, more context-specific research is needed. 
A second stream of research has sought to understand these more context-specific 
aspects of forest governance. This literature describes complex and sometimes conflicting 
causes and consequences of corruption and poor governance. For example, research into 
the process of decentralisation has identified many different factors, including income, 
social capital, corruption, and distribution of authority, which all impact upon the nature 
and quality of the decentralisation process (Barr et al., 2006; Resosudarmo, 2004; Xu and 
Ribot, 2004). Corruption, as one particular feature of poor governance, has also been 
shown to be a multifaceted phenomenon. Research into corruption in forest areas has 
identified multiple aspects involving political, economic and cultural dimensions 
(Dauvergne, 1994; Gupta, 2005; Harris, 2003). And corruption is often described as the 
dominant institution of resource management in many countries involving complex formal 
and informal rules, relationships and negotiations (McCarthy, 2002a; Robbins, 2000). This 
research has provided nuance and depth for understanding what corruption and poor 
governance may be and how different governance features operate in different contexts. 
Such understanding mal<es it difficult to point to single general relationships between 
features of poor governance, corruption and deforestation and forest degradation. These 
studies have been far less focused on understanding the specific impacts of different 
aspects of forest governance and corruption on forest cover itself. 
There is a need to integrate these different streams of research, to not only build localised 
know/ledge of the governance context and corruption in different forest areas, but to 
investigate how/ this may be contributing to deforestation and forest degradation. In order 
to address this gap, therefore, the research I present in this thesis seeks to answer the 
question 'Does, and if so hovi/ does, corruption and poor governance contribute to 
deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and Papua New/ Guinea?' 
1.2 Background and statement of problem 
Deforestation and forest degradation' have attracted global concern because of the many 
wider environmental and social problems associated with forest loss, including 
biodiversity loss (Brooks et al., 2002; Turner, 1996), watershed damage and river pollution 
(Bruijnzeel, 2004; Cheng et al., 2002), and green-house gas emissions (van der Werf et al., 
2009). It Is these wider problems, and particularly the emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation and their contribution to global climate change that has brought 
renewed attention and enthusiasm towards reducing deforestation and forest 
degradation in many countries. Including in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
Increasingly, efforts to reduce deforestation and forest degradation have focused on the 
problem of poor governance, aspects of which have been well-documented in many 
countries with high rates of deforestation (Global Witness, 2007; Humphreys, 2006; 
Siebert and Elwert, 2004; Smith et al., 2003a; Wardell and Lund, 2006). Interest and 
concern over the problem of poor governance in the forests reflects a trend in the 
development agenda more broadly. In the development literature, the concept of 
governance emerged in recognition that a variety of actors, beyond the government, are 
^Whilst there are many variations in definitions, deforestation generally refers to 'the conversion of forest to 
another land use or the long-term reduction of the tree canopy cover below the minimum 10 per cent 
threshold' (FAO, 2011, p. 11). Forest degradation is the 'long term reduction of the overall potential supply 
of benefits from the forest, which includes wood, biodiversity and any other product or service' (FAO, 2011, 
p. 11). 
engaged in, and responsible for the development process (Nanda, 2006; Stoker, 1998). 
Governance itself is broadly understood to be 'about the rules of collective decision-
making in settings w/here there are a plurality of actors or organizations and where no 
formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationship betvi/een these actors and 
organizations' (Chhotray and Stoker, 2010, p. 3). Even though governance has become 
dominant in thinking about development, there are still criticisms of the governance 
concept. This criticism is mainly to do with the way in which the governance has been 
used, particularly by development agencies like the World Bank that have no mandate to 
interfere with political processes and yet have been able to force government reforms on 
developing countries as a form of conditionality for aid (Nanda, 2006). Despite such 
criticisms, governance has remained a ubiquitous part of the development literature and 
has received growing attention from researchers and practitioners seeking to improve 
forest management (Colchester etal., 2006; World Bank, 2002). 
Accompanying the interest in governance as part of the development agenda has been a 
growing body of research into different aspects of forest governance. Efforts to 
understand forest governance have typically focused on conceptualisations and practice 
of global environmental governance (Paterson et al., 2003), or have focused on a few key 
aspects of governance that are related to current issues in forest management. These 
include the governance of community-managed forests (Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; 
Ishihara and Pascual, 2009), or changes to the governance systems following the 
decentralisation of forest management (Andersson et al., 2006; Batterbury and Fernando, 
2006; McCarthy, 2002b). Issues to do with governance and illegal activities have also 
received considerable attention in many different countries (McCarthy, 2011; Richards et 
al., 2003; Smith et al., 2003a; Tacconi, 2007c). 
Some of these studies have also demonstrated a link between specific governance 
features and higher rates of deforestation and forest degradation (Palmer, 2001; Smith et 
al., 2006). However, more generally, this type of research has highlighted how complex 
and dynamic the process of governing forest resources can be in different contexts. Whilst 
this is vital to our understanding of governance in different contexts, much of this 
research has focused on several key aspects of forest governance, such as decentralisation 
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or illegal logging. There has been less attention towards Identifying the concepts that best 
describe the process of governance as local actors practice it. That Is, much of the 
research on governance has been directed by international concerns, for example, 
concerns over the global Illegal logging. How/ever, this top-dow/n approach may fall to 
Identify l<ey governance processes that are most relevant to explaining the governance 
process In the field. This is an important gap, because local actors are likely to have their 
ow/n perceptions about key governance features, and identifying local processes may 
provide new/ insights for governance research generally. 
This ground-up perspective is particularly lacking in research Into the normative aspects of 
good and poor governance. Generally, good governance is 'epitomized by predictable, 
open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued w/ith a professional ethos; an 
executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law' (World Bank, 1994, p. 
vli). Poor or weak governance is seen as the absence of these features. The World Bank 
has used these characteristics of good governance In their Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). The WGI are built on six dimensions of governance—voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption—and through the collection of 
multiple surveys, expert interviews and market data, the World Bank have sought to 
quantify and compare the quality of governance in different countries. These indicators, 
either as a whole 'quality of governance' score, or as rankings on the individual factors, for 
example rule of law or voice and accountability, are dominant concepts In governance 
research more broadly, and indicators such as the WGI have been widely used by 
researchers seeking to understand the causes and consequences of good (or poor) 
governance In different countries and contexts (Barbier, 2004; Bulte et al., 2007; Umemiya 
et al., 2010). 
Whilst poor governance generally, and specific indices like the WGI, are commonly 
referred to and used In forest governance research, there remain some gaps and criticisms 
of these Ideas and their application. Firstly, and practically, the notion of poor governance 
has been criticised for failing to give any guidance as to the relative Importance of 
different factors (Grindle, 2007). This is important, as forest governance research has 
typically focused on individual factors, w/ithout any clear idea of w/hich factors may be 
more or less important in any specific context. Secondly, the WGI have also come under 
some criticism for the high standard errors and more problematically for issues to do w/ith 
construct validity (Thomas, 2010). Specifically, Thomas has criticised the WGI for changing 
definitions of the indicators and for failing to create internal validity of these measures by 
appealing to theory. The result of this, according to Thomas, is that these indicators do 
not measure governance at all; rather, they represent 'complex atheoretical and as yet 
poorly articulated hypotheses for which no evidence has been advanced' (Thomas, 2010, 
p. 50).^ The implication of this is that the research pointing to the links between different 
governance features and deforestation and forest degradation, particularly those based 
on the WGI, must be treated with caution. 
Thirdly, and more generally, governance has been criticised because many of the features 
that are ascribed to well-governed systems are features that reflect ideals of the Western 
developed world in which they were created; these features might not be relevant to 
understanding the processes that occur in developing, non-Western countries (Nanda, 
2006). This highlights the fact that there remain some gaps in our understanding about 
the nature of poor governance. More research is needed to understand the context-
specific nature of the governance process, and what specific features may constitute poor 
governance in different contexts. 
The challenges and gaps in our understanding of the concepts of poor governance extend 
to research on specific features of poor governance, including corruption. As one 
particular feature of poor governance, corruption has been attracting growing concern 
(Williams et al., 2011; World Bank, 2006a; Wright et al., 2007). Corruption is not only 
prevalent in many forested countries, but is also widely reported to contribute to 
deforestation and forest degradation (Barnett, 1990a; GTZ, 2009; Urrunaga et al., 2012). 
However, corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon and considerable debate remains 
Several other authors have also challenged the use of WGI, for example see Christiane and Oman (2006) 
and Kurtz and Schrank (2007). 
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about what different types of corruption happen in any particular context, and how these 
may impact upon forests. 
Broadly, corruption is defined as the 'abuse of entrusted power for private gain' (Pope, 
1996)." This is the most common definition, but it is nonetheless problematic. There is 
some debate over what activities may constitute 'abuse', given that identifying an abuse 
will involve considerations of culture and context which vary greatly across space and time 
(for example see Larmour, 2008; Larmour and Wolanin, 2001b). Secondly, and in relation 
to criticisms above of the concept of poor governance, definitions lil<e this are often seen 
as reflective of Western bureaucratic ideals, in which the separation of public and private 
interests is clear. This separation is not necessarily the case in other contexts (Huntington, 
2002). Finally, this definition does little to describe the more complex range of activities 
that constitute corrupt behaviour, and how corruption may interact with other (often 
illegal) activities, such as fraud, nepotism and embezzlement. For example, corruption can 
include a small bribe paid for legally harvested timber to pass more swiftly through a 
police checkpoint. Corruption can also involve millions of dollars being paid to 
government officials to re-zone thousands of ha of forested lands for development. These 
are both corrupt exchanges, but they may have different drivers and impacts, differences 
not captured by such a broad definition as the one above. There have been attempts to 
further categorise types of corruption, such as petty, grand, bureaucratic or political 
corruption; however, these categories often add to the confusion over different types of 
corruption.® Whilst no single definition is likely to be sufficiently comprehensive or specific 
(Harris, 2003), such definitional challenges highlight the difficulty of investigating the 
nature of corruption in the forests and analysing its impacts. 
Despite these definitional complexities, there have been many studies seeking to identify 
the causes and consequences of corruption more generally and in the forests specifically. 
' This definition (and variations of it) are used by the World Bani(, the IMF and other international 
organisations. 
^ For example, the term grand corruption is often used to describe large payments to bureaucrats as well as 
referring to political corruption, which in other articles is used to refer to corruption aimed at changing the 
policies. 
Research on forests has shown that higher levels of corruption are associated with higher 
amounts of deforestation and forest degradation (Barbier et a!., 2005; Bulte et al., 2007; 
Burgess et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2003b to name a few). However, some of these findings 
have been contested due to methodological inconsistencies (Aisbett et al., 2012; Barrett 
et al., 2006). Importantly, there have been several different mechanisms by which 
different types of corruption have been shown to impact on forests. For example, Bulte 
and colleagues (2007) found that corrupt payments to politicians and legitimate lobbying 
(they did not distinguish between the two) led to higher deforestation by increasing 
subsidies for inefficient land uses. Burgess and colleagues(Burgess et al., 2012), on the 
other hand, focused on local-level political cycles to show that rates of deforestation 
increased in the lead-up to elections, which they argued was a response to the corrupt 
interests and campaign finance. 
These findings point towards a link between corruption and deforestation, and even 
highlight some of the potential mechanisms by which corruption is contributing to 
deforestation and forest degradation, but the results are nonetheless problematic. Firstly, 
the statistical studies mentioned above have reported relationships based on cross-
country comparisons, using data from various indices, such as the Transparency 
International's CPI. Like the WGI, there is some concern about the quality of these data 
and the extent to which perceptions of the prevalence of corruption actual match the 
reality of corruption. For example, in a study of the difference between perceived and 
actual corruption on a small infrastructure project in Indonesia, OIken (2009) found there 
was no reason to expect there to be a relationship between corruption and corruption 
perception. Secondly, many of these indices are aggregated nationally, which hides the 
great variation in types of corruption, which may be occurring across or within different 
countries. Although these problems do not necessarily negate the findings of all this 
research, they do highlight the fact that some gaps remain in our understanding about the 
potential mechanisms by which corruption may be contributing to deforestation and 
forest degradation. There is need to incorporate more detailed, locally specific 
understanding of corruption. 
The need for more locally specific efforts to understand the mechanisms of corruption is 
supported by the fact that a substantial amount of research into corruption has 
highlighted its complex and context-specific and multifaceted aspects. That is, in contrast 
to the nationally aggregated numbers, these studies have pointed to complex and 
multifaceted problems associated with corruption. For example, following 
decentralisation in Indonesia, the structures of formal and informal authority were 
negotiated between politicians, local communities, and local entrepreneurs, leading to 
what was described at the time as the emergence of volatile socio-legal networks that 
incorporated corrupt systems (McCarthy, 2002a, 2004). Research in PNG has documented 
the high-level collusion between national and provincial politicians and multinational 
logging and agricultural companies that enabled companies to get illegal logging licenses 
and to undervalue their timber and avoid paying millions of dollars in taxes. Indeed, 
corruption and the process of licensing forest exploitation has been documented and 
detailed in many different contexts (Kolstad and Soreide, 2009; Poffenberger, 1997; 
Soreide, 2007), involving local bureaucrats and national politicians. A study of the 
management of timber booms across four south-east Asian countries in the 1990s drew 
attention to the corrupt processes of rent-seizing, documenting how politicians and their 
associates were able to capture the authority of the forest bureaucracy, resulting in the 
breakdown of the institutions of government tasked with sustainably managing timber 
resources (Ross, 2001). These studies, and many more, all provide important and 
interrelated insights into different dimensions of the corruption phenomenon and its 
relationship to aspects of forest use. However, few of these studies have sought to relate 
these more complex and dynamic patterns of corruption to actual impacts on forest cover. 
Given that there is such a strong focus in the development agenda on improving 
governance, reducing corruption and reducing global rates of deforestation and forest 
degradation, there is a need for continued research into these topics. This involves further 
research into the context-specific nature of corruption and poor governance, and 
particularly how this may impact the management of forests. As stated above therefore, 
to contribute to this literature, the research presented in this thesis seeks, to answer the 
questions 'Do corruption and poor governance contribute to deforestation and forest 
degradation in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea?' 
1.3 Aim and scope 
The ultimate aim of this research is to contribute to an increased understanding about 
corruption and poor governance in the forest sectors of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, 
and the impact on forest management and I adopt a mixed-methods approach. There is 
already a considerable amount of research into various aspects of governance and 
corruption, some of w/hich I introduced earlier. After an initial scoping period in Indonesia, 
I saw that there was significant space for a more 'ground-up' approach to understanding 
what corruption and poor governance was to the people who are actually managing 
resources. To this end, I have adopted the methodology of grounded theory to examine 
the topic of governance and corruption. My specific focus and aim in adopting the 
grounded theory approach for this part of my research was not only to contribute broadly 
to a theory of governance, particularly poor governance, but specifically to understand the 
processes from the people involved. The other method adopted was that of the case-
study approach. The aim of this part of the research was to understand how the forests, 
and the issues surrounding forest management, influence and are influenced by 
governance processes. There are likely to be many context-specific and interrelated 
mechanisms by which corruption and poor governance affect forest management. By 
understanding more specifically how some of these mechanisms work, there will be 
potential to contribute to important research understanding the impact of corruption and 
poor governance. 
Along with the intention of contributing to the literature on corruption, another aim of 
this thesis is to contribute to the literature on the methodology of conducting qualitative 
research on sensitive topics like corruption. The sensitivity of any particular topic depends 
on the social context, but broadly, a topic is considered sensitive if the collection, holding 
or dissemination of research material poses a potential threat to either the researched or 
researcher (Leitao, 2010, p. 5). Sensitive research topics pose particular ethical, legal and 
practical methodological challenges. The considerable amount of literature dedicated to 
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the challenges of conducting sensitive research is dominated by topics from medical 
science, and in research on the traumatic impacts of natural disasters (Hinds, 1996; 
Klocker, 2012; van ZijII de Jong et al., 2011). Politically sensitive research topics, such as 
corruption and other forms of illegality, pose some different ethical and methodological 
challenges. These have not been well discussed in the literature. In addition, the 
implications of politically sensitive research for grounded theory have not been w/ell 
documented. By providing detailed description and continuous reflection on the research 
methodology and methods used in this research, I aim to contribute to a growing body of 
literature on how to conduct and evaluate sensitive research. 
In order to address the research gaps surrounding the concepts of governance and 
corruption, a research approach was needed that not only enabled the identification and 
development of concepts and process in a local context, but that was also able to 
accommodate the potential challenges of this sensitive topic. Partly for this reason I 
adopted the grounded theory approach. Grounded theory methodology, as 'discovered' 
by Glaser and Strauss (1967), was born out of what they saw as an embarrassing gap 
between existing 'grand' social theories and the reality they sought to describe. They 
developed a research methodology that could enable the analyst to develop theories that 
emerge from the specific context, making them relevant and explanatory in the real 
world. The research presented here involves the development of two grounded theories: 
one on forest governance and the other on corruption, both based on data collected in 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
Given the context-specific nature of this policy problem, I needed to get local country-
specific information. To do this, I followed the case-study approach, with Indonesia, 
particularly Central Kalimantan as my main case, and PNG as a secondary case. Case 
studies are a well-established research strategy where the focus Is on a case in 'its own 
right, and taking its context into account' (Robson, 2002). To some, the aim of case-study 
research is to be able to 'generalise across larger set of units' (Gerring, 2004, p. 341), but 
the ability to generalise findings is not a necessary aim of all case-study research. By 
comparison, a key figure in the revival of case-study as serious research approach, Yin, 
defines case-study as strategy for doing research when three conditions are met. Firstly, 
case-study is appropriate when the researcher has little control over events. Secondly, the 
research is attempting to understand a contemporary phenomenon in a real life context, 
and lastly, when the research seeks to determine how and why a phenomenon is 
occurring (Yin, 2009). That is, the case-study approach is a key approach when seeking to 
identify causal mechanisms, in detail, in a real life context. This research on the 
mechanisms by which corruption and poor governance lead to deforestation and forest 
degradation fulfils the above three conditions, which supports the use of the case-study 
approach. 
One of the key factors in case-study research is the criteria used for case selection. The 
criteria used for case selection depend on the type of research being conducted and have 
great implications for the quality of the case-study research. For this research, cases were 
selected as inherent or key case studies (Stake, 1995). This means they were selected 
because of interest in that case alone, rather than as representative of some larger group, 
or to test a specific hypothesis. 
That is, these countries were selected as case studies for this research because both 
countries have conditions of poor governance and significant forest resources. Indonesia 
has not only extensive forests—over 88 million hectares (ha)—but also incredibly diverse 
forests, and has been labelled one of Conservation International's Biodiversity mega-
countries (Conservation International, 2013; FAO, 2010). The remaining forests of Central 
Kalimantan are particularly the focus of this research because of the selection of Central 
Kalimantan as the pilot province for Indonesia's efforts to Reduce Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). Papua New Guinea, with far less forest 
cover—33 million ha—is also mega-diverse, with an estimate 6-7% of the world's known 
species on less than 1% of its land (Shearman et al., 2008). Estimates of forest-dependent 
peoples are difficult to come by,® however, for in Indonesia it is thought that (in 1995) 
between 80-95 million people were directly dependent on forest resources (no figures 
exist for Central Kalimantan); in Papua New Guinea approximately 80% of the population 
®Part of this difficulty is due to the varying definitions over what constitutes 'dependency'. See Fisher et al. 
(1997) for a full discussion of this term. 
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(4.16 million people) directly depend on forest lands (lame et a!., 2008). Despite this, both 
countries have also experienced high rates of deforestation and forest degradation, with 
Indonesia's being one of the highest in the world (FAO, 2011).' Finally, corruption and 
poor governance have been well-documented features of forest management in Indonesia 
(Barr, 2000; Barr et al., 2010b; Dauvergne, 1994; Poffenberger, 1997; Smith et al., 2003a) 
and PNG (Anon, 1990; ODI, 2007) for many decades. 
Even though these countries both have high-value forests, and high levels of corruption, 
they are nonetheless incredibly different countries with different environments, cultures 
and political structures. Opportunities for direct comparison were therefore limited. 
Rather, following the principles of grounded theory methodology, the aim of the 
comparison was to compare individual concepts in these different contexts rather than 
comparing the contexts themselves. This is part of the constant comparison method of 
grounded theory methodology, where comparison across different contexts is advocated 
to build nuance and depth into the theory (Glaser, 1978). I used several levels of 
comparison in this thesis, including within Indonesia by selecting different districts and 
then cross-country comparison to PNG. 
The final results presented in this thesis are based on ten months of fieldwork in Indonesia 
and almost four months in PNG. Interviews were semi-structured and lasted for between 
one and three hours. In Indonesia, the participants included representatives from local 
(three districts), provincial (Central Kalimantan) and national governments. 
Representatives from local and international non-government organisations (NGOs) and 
from mining, oil palm and forestry companies were also interviewed. In PNG, the majority 
of interviews were conducted with national level government representatives with a 
smaller contingent of local officials, NGOs and some company representatives. Overall, 89 
interviews were conducted; however, responses from several key informants provided 
most of the detailed data on corruption. Secondary sources were also used to guide 
interview questions and supplement information collected by the interviews. 
'The rate of deforestation in PNG-700 000 ha have been cleared between 2000 and 2010-has been far 
lower than the absolute amount (over four million ha) of deforestation in Indonesia. 
1.4 Outline 
After this introductory chapter, the focus of the next chapter is a more detailed 
description and justification for the nnethods used. This includes a justification for the use 
of mixed-methods, a description and justification for adopting grounded theory 
methodology; a description of the analysis used to address the main research question 
and a justification of the selection of the two case-study countries and areas. That chapter 
also focuses on drawing out the implications of politically sensitive research to grounded 
theory methodology. The sensitivity of the topic raised important practical and ethical 
considerations for gaining access to participants, interview techniques and analysis. I have 
included in that chapter a reflective consideration of how I think I overcame these 
challenges, and identified one remaining that may influence the results of this thesis. The 
purpose of this detail is to be as explicit about the process of conducting this research as 
possible, so that the content of the subsequent chapters can be assessed accordingly. I 
also describe the analysis process used to address the main research question. 
The third and forth chapters provide backgrounds to the two case-study countries. As I 
said above, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea were selected as inherent case studies. In 
both of these chapters I provide a brief history of forest use and provide evidence to 
support the choice of these countries for this research. I also describe several key pieces 
of legislation and the key administrative structures. These are not meant to be 
comprehensive descriptions of all relevant regulations. Rather, I focus on issues and 
regulations that provide important contextual information that is necessary to understand 
the subsequent chapters of this thesis. I also identify and describe several key governance 
challenges specific to each country. For Chapter 3 on Indonesia, this is primarily focused 
on the distribution of authority between a centralised Ministry and the decentralised 
district governments. I also detail several key pieces of regulations, focusing on the 
process of land use planning and licensing. In Chapter 4 I focus on the issue of 
landownership and administration of land and access to forest areas in PNG. 
Following from the country descriptions. Chapter 5 presents the results of the grounded 
theory of forest governance. I begin with a brief review of the development of and key 
ideas in tfie literature on forest governance. Following from the principles of grounded 
theory, this literature review provides a background theoretical context most relevant to 
the results of the grounded theory, rather than a more traditional literature review which 
identifies gaps in existing literature and establishes key concepts for further research. I 
then describe the results of the grounded theory, identifying the key concepts and 
processes that emerged out of the data. These key concepts and processes include 
ambiguity and making the best of the current situation, competing authorities, particularly 
the difference between formal and informal authority, legitimacy and the process of 
legitimacy building. One theme in this chapter has to do with analysing the balance and 
interaction associated with notions of legitimacy and legality, and the process of getting a 
semblance of legality for operations in forest areas. After describing these concepts and 
the links between them, in the final section I provide an analysis of the results of my 
grounded theory in the context of the broader literature on forest governance. I argue 
that the process of governance is about the negotiation over whether different laws will 
be implemented, a finding that challenges principles such as rule of law as key features of 
good governance. 
The sixth chapter follows a similar structure to the previous one on governance, 
presenting the results of the grounded theory of corruption. I begin by providing a review 
of current ideas about corruption. Again, rather than trying to cover the full literature, 
that section focuses on several ideas in the literature on corruption that are most related 
to the results of the grounded theory. Then I present five key concepts that emerged from 
the data that explain most of the variation in corruption and forest use in these cases. 
These include concepts of legitimacy, mutual dependency and positioning, which are key 
to understanding the system of corruption in the forest sector. I also integrate concepts 
from the previous chapter, to do with semblance of legality and legitimacy, which works 
to situate this theory of corruption in the broader governance context of the case-study 
countries. In the final section, I return to the existing theories of corruption to analyse the 
grounded theory in the context of this broader literature. I argue that it is the systems that 
support and demand corrupt exchanges that are crucial to understanding the different 
types and impacts of corruption in the forest sector. 
In Chapter 7,1 present the results and analysis of the case-study part of this research as I 
return to the key research question of this thesis. That is, do corruption and poor 
governance contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea? And if so, how? I begin again with a brief literature review on the main 
mechanisms by which different factors of governance and corruption have been shown to 
impact upon forests and forest cover. Then, I look at different stages of decision-making 
and planning about forests, and analyse the potential contribution of corruption and poor 
governance to deforestation and forest degradation at that stage. I focus on the impacts 
to decision-making around issues of sustainable forest management and environmental 
justice. I argue that rather than necessarily contributing to higher amounts of 
deforestation and forest degradation, corruption and poor governance affect the quality 
of the decision-making processes, exacerbating the wider problems associated with forest 
clearance. 
In Chapter 8,1 focus on identifying several key policy implications from this research. One 
of the key aims of this thesis is ultimately to contribute to the policy debate about how to 
improve governance, and reduce deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and 
PNG. I start the chapter with a brief review of current practices and programs aimed at 
improving governance as a means to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. I make 
the argument that improving governance and reducing corruption will not always lead to a 
reduction in deforestation and forest degradation. Ultimately, the current economic 
benefits of many activities, such as mining or commercial agriculture remain and will 
continue to drive some deforestation. However, there are some features of corruption 
and poor governance that may be targeted by programs aimed at improving governance 
in a way that helps to address some of the wider problems of deforestation and forest 
degradation. Given a recurring theme of this thesis is issues to do with legality and the 
appearance of legality, a key aspect of that chapter is also to present some important 
ideas in the literature associated with law enforcement in corrupt conditions. 
Following a brief summary of the main findings of this research, in the final chapter I also 
discuss the main challenges that I faced in conducting this research. I reflect on the 
challenges of writing about sensitive topics. As I described in the methods section, the 
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implications of sensitive research extend to affecting the write-up of sensitive 
information. In vi^ riting this thesis it was difficult to present the results in a way that was 
verifiable whilst protecting vital sources of information, such as company names or 
locations. These sorts of issues can greatly affect how sensitive research is conducted, 
presented and evaluated and therefore require attention and reflection. I also provide 
some final recommendations about potential future research, and how this may proceed. 
Chapter 2 
The challenges of sensitive research topics and grounded 
theory methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
There is no research topic that does not have specific methodological challenges, but 
sensitive topics, such as poor governance, corruption, and deforestation and forest 
degradation pose significant challenges to collecting and analysing data and presenting 
research results. Indeed, the challenges of doing sensitive research—when for example 
participants are 'not brave enough' to answ/er questions—are perhaps one reason w/hy 
there has been dominance in the corruption literature on the use of quantitative 
perception indices. This research therefore involves different methodologies. The later 
sections of this thesis, w/here I analyse the mechanisms by which corruption and poor 
governance contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in the two case-study 
countries, involves a case-study approach, which I detail later in this chapter. 
However, before analysing the impacts of corruption and poor governance, it was 
necessary to develop more contextual and nuanced information and analysis about 
corruption, poor governance in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (PNG). To do this, I 
required evolving and flexible methods of collecting data and an approach to data analysis 
that was systematic but accommodating enough to maximise the benefit of having 
multiple and often conflicting sources of information—a consequence of the sensitivity of 
the topic of corruption. Grounded theory (GT) methodology, as 'discovered' by Glaser and 
Strauss 1967, provided a systematic approach to collecting and analysing data to generate 
theory. This methodology has only rarely been used to address topics such as corruption 
and poor governance, and never in relation to forest management. GT methodology 
therefore had the potential to complement existing research on corruption and forest 
governance in these two countries 
This chapter details the research approach of my thesis. I outline the core ideas of GT 
methodology adopted for this research, focusing specifically on the work of one of its 
founders, Glaser. Whilst there is a vast amount of literature already written about the GT 
methodology, there has been less about the specific implications of sensitive topics such 
as corruption on GT methodology. A key theme of this chapter is therefore to detail the 
challenges of sensitive topics and the implications of these for generating GT. I focus most 
of this chapter on the GT methodology, because this formed the basis for two main 
chapters of this thesis and because it was in the preparation of the GT chapters that I 
encountered the main methodological challenges. However, as state above, this is a 
mixed-methods thesis. Following the description of the GT methodology, I outline the 
methodology used to address the key research question of this thesis. Finally I provide a 
brief introduction to case-study literature and why these two cases were selected, a 
theme I pursue in the following two chapters of my thesis. 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Understanding sensitive topics 
Broadly, a topic is considered sensitive if 'the collection, holding or dissemination of 
research material poses a potential threat to either the researched or researcher' (Lee, 
1993). Much of the literature on doing sensitive research comes from fields such as 
medicine and psychology and focuses on the ethical and legal implications for sensitive 
topics (Cowles, 1988; Zanjani and Rowles, 2012). There has been less discussion of other 
forms of sensitive research—such as politically sensitive research. This is important 
because politically sensitive topics are likely to face different ethical, legal and practical 
challenges. Whilst there are many important ethical and legal implications of this sensitive 
research, the focus in this chapter is more on the practical considerations, such as how to 
get people to talk about corruption, or how to analyse the biased and conflicting answers 
people give. These challenges have potentially major implications for how sensitive 
research is conducted and what results can be gained. 
Firstly, it is important to understand what specifically about this research topic makes it 
sensitive.® The sensitivity of the topic of corruption—in its potential impacts on the 
interests of political and economically powerful people—is perhaps clear. However, it is 
important to remember that sensitivity of a topic is highly context-specific. In the case of 
this research, the broader economic and political conditions in the two case-study 
countries increased the sensitivity of the topic of corruption and poor governance, 
particularly in relation to the forest sector. One factor behind selecting this research topic 
was the growing number of programs aimed at reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation (REDD+) in Indonesia and PNG. At the time this research commenced, 
several countries had committed large amounts of money to Indonesia,' and to a lesser 
extent to support REDD+ activities. However, in both countries, high rates of 
deforestation and documented governance challenges have led to widespread 
condemnation—particularly from vocal international environmental NGOs (CELCoR and 
ACF, 2006; Greenpeace, 2004). Corruption and poor governance have become important 
concerns for donors who are considering investing in REDD+ (Skutsch and McCall, 2010a; 
Williams et al., 2011). Improving governance and reducing deforestation and forest 
degradation, and improving the international reputation of Indonesia's and PNG's forest 
sector have become important political and economic issues. The potential risks to the 
national reputation from NGOs, journalists and researchers publishing critical reports 
meant that the topic of forest management was also politically and economically 
sensitive. The nature of this type of politically sensitive topic can have implications for 
whether and how this research can proceed. For example, the sensitivity of the topic to 
Indonesia caused considerable delays in getting the necessary permits to conduct this 
Lee (1993) identified three broad threats associated with sensitive research. The first 'intrusive threat' 
deals with private or stressful areas. The second 'threat of sanction' research 'may reveal information that is 
stigmatizing or incriminating in some way'- The final threat identified by Lee is 'political threat' and refers to 
situations where research has implications for the vested interests of the powerful in society. 
' Indonesia has agreements with Norway (US$lbillion); Australia (up to AUD 100 million); and various 
programs run by the UN, the World Bank and other bilateral programs. 
PNG received USD $6.4 million from UN REDD in 2011. 
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research. Without sufficient time and finances, barriers such as this could have resulted in 
changes to research topics or location. 
The nature of the topic ultimately has implications for the kind of research that is 
conducted and how this proceeds. That is, the sensitivity of a research topic must be 
considered from the earliest stages of research. This had two implications for the design 
of this research. Firstly, it was clear that the sensitivity and hidden nature of the topic 
would mean that testing pre-determined concepts was likely to be difficult, because it 
would be difficult to determine what types of information may be available and what 
types of concepts might be most relevant to the contexts I was studying. A research 
approach that was flexible and able to accommodate a variety of sources was needed. 
Secondly, after an initial scoping period in Indonesia, it became clear that many of the 
broad ideas about corruption and poor governance in the literature did not necessarily 
match with what seemed to be happening in Indonesia. That is, the reality that I 
encountered did not seem to be fully described by the existing theory, which is another 
reason to adopt GT methodology (Tacconi, 1998). It was these two broad factors that led 
me to apply GT methodology to investigate forest governance and corruption in the case-
study countries. 
2.2.2 The choice of grounded theory methodology 
Grounded theory methodology was borne out of what two sociologists, Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), saw as the 'embarrassing gap' between grand sociological theory and the real 
sociological world that it was trying to describe. The methodology they described 
elaborates a systematic and rigorous approach to generating theories that emerge from 
the data, rather than the traditional logically deduced theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
Based in theories of symbolic interactionism, grounded theorists 'aim to discover patterns 
and processes and understand how a group of people define, via their social interactions, 
their reality' (Cutcliffe, 2000, p. 1477). The results of this research approach, according to 
Glaser and Strauss, are theories that 'fit' with the empirical situation from which they 
emerge and 'work', in that the theories 'provide us with relevant predictions, 
explanations, interpretations and applications' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 61). 
GT has thus become a popular methodology, applied to such diverse topics as 
relationship-building strategies of milk delivery men (Bigus, 1972) and the appraisal of 
children's pain (Gawronski and Padrini, 2009). It is also well-suited to the particular 
challenges of politically sensitive topics. This is because several of the strategies described 
by Glaser and Strauss provide a systematic way to collect data from multiple, varying 
sources, and analyse these data in a systematic and integrated way. This makes these 
methods well suited to sensitive research where it is difficult to determine a priori what 
sort of data will be available, and to analyse these data and produce new insights. I discuss 
this issue in more detail throughout this chapter, particularly in the interviews, and data 
analysis sections. Overall, these two reasons—firstly to develop potentially new insights 
and contribute to research on these topics and secondly the suitability of this 
methodology for sensitive research—guided the selection of this methodology for the part 
of this research on corruption and forest governance. 
Whilst GT methodology has become very popular, criticisms over the nature and approach 
of GT are still prevalent. One of the key areas of discussion, and criticism, of GT 
methodology is that it is arguably impossible for theories to truly emerge from the data, 
rather than reflect the pre-conceived notions of the researcher. Indeed, this is not unique 
to GT methodology; much of the literature on qualitative inductive methodology warns 
against being too theoretically pre-determined as it 'may prematurely lock our analytical 
focus and blind us from imaginative theorising and from revealing new insights and 
theoretical breakthroughs...'(Andersen and Kragh, 2010, p. 49). However, the criticism of 
GT methodology is that firstly, by advocating for theories to emerge solely out of the data, 
there is the potential to waste or repeat existing research. Alternatively, that it is 
impossible for any analyst to be theoretically blank, meaning that pre-determined 
concepts necessarily influence the process and restrict the ability of the researcher to 
actually allow concepts to emerge freely from the data. 
In recognition of the difficulty and possible tensions over this issue, Glaser and Strauss 
have adopted different approaches about how they may incorporate existing theory 
without affecting the quality or goal of the GT." Strauss, particularly in later work with 
Corbin, saw specific reading of relevant existing literature as a tool to stimulate theoretical 
sensitivity and generate hypothesis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). To Glaser, specific reading 
of relevant literature and hypothesis-generating drew close to the theory-testing research. 
Indeed, Glaser has often been quoted as arguing against literature reviews, saying that 
'there is a need not to review any of the literature in the substantive area under study' 
(Glaser, 1992, p. 31). However, there is some debate, as Glaser (1978) also argued that 
prior and wide reading is important to understand the general problem area and to alert 
and sensitise one to a wide range of possibilities. Learning 'what not to l<now is crucial to 
maintaining sensitivity to data' (Glaser, 1978, p. 50). However, for both Glaser and Strauss, 
the methods of constant comparison and theoretical memoing, provided they are 
conducted systematically, are designed to ensure that the emergent theory is indeed 
grounded in the data collected and reflects an inductive research approach. In this 
research, I did conduct a broad review of the literature prior to fieldwork, much of which 
is presented in Chapters 3 and 4. During the stages of data collection, coding and analysis, 
I deliberately avoided existing literature, returning again in the final stages of writing this 
thesis. 
Indeed, the methods outlined by Glaser and Strauss provide a detailed plan to 
systematically develop theory from the data and to ensure that the analyst remains 
theoretically sensitive. Theoretical sensitivity is about making sure the researcher is 
sensitive to the data and building theory from the data, and avoids logically deducing 
theory. The mandate of the analyst is to remain open to what is actually happening 
(Glaser, 1978, p. 3). This is a key aspect of GT methodology, but it has nonetheless 
received considerable criticism, particularly in relation to the discussion above, that is, 
how to incorporate existing theoretical knowledge without interfering with the emerging 
concepts (Kelle, 2005). In response to this, Glaser and Strauss (in separate ways) sought to 
" The broad attraction of grounded theory nnethodology has resulted in many different versions and 
understandings of what grounded theories are and how to develop them, leading to some confusion. Even 
Glaser and Strauss have, since their original partnership, diverged considerably over their intentions for 
grounded theory (Heath and Cowley, 2004b) 
develop strategies that at once accepted the theoretical background knowledge of 
analysts, whilst ensuring that the results still emerge from the data (Corbin and Strauss, 
1990; Glaser, 1978). This is achieved through the careful and systemic coding and analysis 
of the data, the details of which I discuss below. 
Apart from the ideal of theoretical sensitivity, a second key criticism of grounded theories 
has come from grounded theorists themselves—that the broad attraction of GT 
methodology has resulted in many different versions and understandings of what 
grounded theories are and how to develop them, leading to some confusion. On one 
hand, this confusion has led to criticism, including from Glaser, who has argued that these 
variations have meant that the title GT has been applied, inappropriately, to include any 
sort of qualitative research (Simmons, 1995). The problem of methodological blurring such 
as this, is that it has implications for the practices of sampling, coding, and comparison 
which, when applied more haphazardly, potentially affect the resultant theory. 
Beyond this broad concern over GT methodology and methodological blurring, there are 
also many more internal criticisms—meaning criticisms by researchers who agree in 
principle with GT methodology, but have some problem with the way it is conducted. One 
of the main aspects of this criticism comes from researchers advocating a more 
constructivist approach to generating theory. That is, whilst Glaser's position is strictly 
positivist (Glaser, 2002), as GT methodology has evolved, several researchers (Charmaz, 
2000; Mills et al., 2006) have developed a constructivist approach to GT. From this 
constructivist approach, data is the result of an interaction between interviewee and 
interviewer. Charmaz, who has been a main proponent of constructivist GT, advocated 
'keeping the researcher close to the participants through keeping their words intact in the 
process of analysis,'(Mills et al., 2006, p. 7) as a means to reflect the interaction between 
participant and researcher in the process. Even though I recognise the attraction and 
argument of this more constructivist approach, the position I adopt in this thesis lies 
between these two extremes. In practice, however, to maintain the integrity of the two 
theories presented (Chapters 5 and 6), the methods that I describe here and applied in my 
research are based, as closely as possible, to the original text 'Discovering Grounded 
Theor/ by Glaser and Strauss and the subsequent 'TheoreticalSensitivit/ by Glaser. 
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Throughout this chapter I identify and justify any steps where the GT methods adopted 
reflect the work of Strauss and Corbin, or the more constructivist approach. 
2.3 Gaining access to participants 
The data used to generate the two grounded theories presented in this thesis is primarily 
based on semi-structured interviews with representatives from the private sector-
mining, forestry and plantations—from civil society (national and local NGOs, and 
communities) and from relevant government departments (Indonesia: district, provincial 
and national) and several local politicians in Indonesia.^^ Prior to fieldwork, I had 
conducted reviews of the governance condition in each country, focusing on the 
distribution of authority in the regulations. I used these reviews to identify key people and 
organisations that were the initial targets for the interviews. Subsequent participants 
were either identified following the snowball approach or later, by the process of 
theoretical sampling. Snowball sampling is used when the population is not well known 
and when the topic is sensitive (Robson, 2002, p. 266). Snowballing involved asking people 
to identify other individuals or organisations that might have information and be willing to 
contribute to my research. Colleagues and friends who had worked in relevant 
organisation also helped me get in touch with many people. Once potential participants 
were identified, there was a difficult process of gaining consent. I discuss theoretical 
sampling in section 2.5.4. 
There were several challenges to the process of identifying participants and gaining access 
to them. This was due to the normal challenges of the so-called gatekeeper and secondly 
to the specific sensitivities of this topic. Gatekeeper is the term used primarily in 
ethnographic fields to describe individuals or institutions whose permission may be 
required for a researcher to gain access to certain populations. The impact of a 
gatekeeper is not exclusively an issue for sensitive research (for example Reeves, 2010). 
Many ethnographic studies highlight the role of a gatekeeper in prohibiting or facilitating 
Interviews in indonesia were conducted between August and December 2010, iVIarch-IVlaY and July-
December, 2011. In PNG interviews were conducted between May and July 2011 and in February 2012. 
access to certain communities, such as gaining permission from the head of a village, 
organisation or company. Gatekeepers may be common and they can have significant 
implications for the type of data collected. In my research for example, several companies 
in Indonesia refused to meet, until I had letters of recommendation from the relevant 
district government departments. District governments, interested in protecting their 
reputations, only provided recommendations for larger, often international, companies, 
with better practice. Interviewing people from these larger companies did give me some 
information, but ideally, meeting staff from companies of various sizes and reputations 
could have yielded a broader data set. In order to attempt to overcome this challenge, it 
was important to draw on other contacts or friends who had a more direct line to these 
smaller companies. I was able to meet with people from several smaller timber 
companies; however, even this was difficult. In many cases simply being lucky, such as 
random conversations with strangers in cafes, sitting next to foresters on planes, and just 
arriving in villages and asking around for someone to meet with me, was often as 
necessary as pre-identified institutions and professional networks in getting access to 
people. 
In line with the procedures for ethical research and informed consent, when I met 
potential participants I provided them with a one-page summary of my research and 
contact details (See Appendix 1). The idea was that this would provide basic information, 
which participants could use to either ask me further questions or agree/disagree to an 
interview. In practice, this was made more difficult by the sensitivity of the research topic. 
Initially I focused on the sensitivity of the topic of corruption, and chose to represent my 
research by the more general (and less sensitive) topic of governance.^' However, it was 
clear in some circumstances that other words were also seen as sensitive. In meeting with 
the head of one mining company in Indonesia, for example, I noticed that he had 
underlined only three words of this introduction being 'deforestation and forest 
degradation' which I had written in the context of REDD+. He then insisted on contacting 
my university to ensure that I was indeed a researcher, and not a journalist or NGO. In 
"This was approved by the Human Ethics Research Committee of the Australian National University. 
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later drafts of this introductory information, I removed this reference to REDD+ in favour 
of 'forest management'." 
It took some time to learn which words might create barriers to people participating in my 
research in different contexts. Yet this process of rephrasing information in order to gain 
access to participants was vital to being able to conduct this research. Whilst this was 
potentially in breach of the principles of informed consent, it was reviewed and approved 
by the Ethics Committee of the Australian National University. It was approved on the 
grounds that firstly gaining access would be very difficult without this and secondly, given 
that people were consenting to be interviewed, participants could refuse to answer 
questions about these more sensitive topics during any interview.^^ 
2.4 Interviews and data 
Although gaining access to participants was sometimes challenging, with considerable 
amount of time 'in the field' I was nonetheless able to interview 87 different people (see 
Appendix 2 for participant breakdown). Participants who were open and informative were 
interviewed multiple times. Most interviews lasted between one and two hours, although 
several group interviews, such as those in communities, lasted up to four hours. In 
Indonesia a translator or guide accompanied me. The translator was female and from 
Central Kalimantan, but not from any of the focus districts in my research. As well as 
Indonesian, she could speak several Dayak languages. This was important, particularly to 
interview some people from communities. However, the majority of interviews were done 
in Indonesian. By the end of my time in Indonesia, I was confident enough in my 
Indonesian to conduct interviews myself. In these interviews, a guide often accompanied 
me. Having travelled with me to all of the study districts and helped me get contacts, he 
" Additional approval for this rephrasing was not sought. I judged that, in keeping with the principles of 
ethical research, this rephrasing was not an abuse. This was not a breach of principles of ethical research, 
because during the interviews, we did discuss forest management, rather than just deforestation. Secondly, 
when I did ask questions using sensitive words like deforestation, respondents could refuse to answer. 
" In the information provided to participants I explained that they were free to not answer any question or 
to finish the interview at any time. And at any time (prior to publishing/submitting my thesis) they could 
contact me and have the records of their interview destroyed. 
was also very familiar with my research and was able to assist during the interviews if 
required. Having another person present was also helpful so that after interviews I could 
confirm information to make sure I had not misinterpreted key points. Interviews in PNG 
were all conducted in English. 
There are many specific skills required to collect data in cross-cultural, cross-lingual 
environments. Many qualitative methods guidebooks stress the need to build rapport and 
employ other strategies to solicit information from participants (Silverman, 2004). This is 
partly why I used the more flexible semi-structured style of interviews. Initially, this meant 
allowing participants to pursue broader issues which were most relevant to them and 
allowed issues to emerge from the interview data, rather than focusing on getting 
answers to specific questions. This was useful to identify some of the key broader 
governance problems in Indonesia and PNG. A more informal, conversation-style 
interview worked well for several reasons. Firstly, from a cultural perspective, I am a 
younger female, interviewing older men, sometimes in high-level government and private 
sector positions. Being a respectful, passive listener was an appropriate way for me to 
interact with people and build rapport. Secondly, I was new to Indonesia and PNG and 
allowing people to speak freely ensured that I was able to identify topics that were 
important to people working in this sector. This was also important to ensure that the 
grounded theories were based on data emergent from those in the field. 
Despite the more general conversational style of the interviews, the main focus was 
generally to collect information about corruption and poor governance related to the 
following broad topics (See Appendix 3 for more detailed interview questions): 
1) The occurrence, nature and characteristics of poor governance and corrupt activities in 
the forest sector; 
2) The broader institutional and governance factors which explain how and why 
corruption is occurring; and 
3) The environmental outcomes of these particular institutional arrangements and 
corruption. 
Whilst corruption is not necessarily a secret phenomenon in Indonesia or PNG, 
interviewing people about corruption did require some experimentation with interview 
techniques. There were several different techniques that I used to either get people to 
talk about corruption, or to keep them talking if they started. Often, as people discussed 
more general governance challenges, the topic of corruption would enter the 
conversation freely. In these cases I obviously continued by asking more specific 
questions. If the participant did not mention or imply corruption, I would introduce it by 
asking people to make comparisons between the corruption that occurred in the past, or 
in other provinces, districts or departments. This way, participants could discuss the issue 
of corruption without necessarily incriminating themselves or other people directly. Often, 
while people were comfortable to speak generally about corruption, they were less 
comfortable when I asked more specific questions, and several times participants claimed 
they were 'not brave enough'; or they shook their head and smiling said, 'I don't know 
about that'. Some even insisted that corruption no longer existed in the forest sector. 
Depending on the person, sometimes I would push the issue, stressing that this 
information was to help me with my thesis and that I was not going to use any names or 
incriminate any companies for the information that I received. Sometimes this worked; 
sometimes it did not. This means that although over 82 different people were 
interviewed, some of the results presented are dependent on the responses of only a few 
key participants who were open about the topic of corruption. 
With more time in the field, interviews were more critical and focused. This was partly 
because I had a better grasp of the broader governance problems and because the 
simultaneous process of analysis and coding other interview data had identified key 
conceptual categories that I pursued more directly. That is, more specific questions were 
needed to generate the characteristics of these categories that had emerged from the 
data. In practice however, focusing on specific questions or even challenging people's 
statements was sometimes difficult. For people who I had met and interviewed several 
times it was possible to be more critical. For new people, even those that I interviewed 
towards the end of my fieldwork, it was still sometimes impossible for me to get more 
detailed or critical responses. This was dependent on the personality of the person I was 
interviewing. 
In Indonesia, collecting good quality information from interviews was very dependent on 
the work of the guide and the translator who were helping me. The translator and guide 
both had experience with foreign researchers and had experience working on the topics of 
natural resource management. As they became more familiar with my research, they were 
able to directly encourage people to be more specific in answering my questions and 
providing more detail. There was, however, a difference in responses and rapport with 
respondents between when a female translator accompanied me and when the male 
guide accompanied me. When respondents were avoiding answering my questions, the 
guide was in a much better position to be able to push those people to provide more 
details that were relevant to my research. In several interviews, even when I was speaking 
in Indonesian, people would often answer directly to the guide. When this happened, the 
fact that he was so familiar with my research meant that he was able to almost take over 
the interview. I would continue to take notes and prompt certain questions, but stayed 
out of the conversation as much as possible. 
Collecting data on corruption took a considerable amount of time and experimentation, 
learning how to build rapport, how to ask sensitive questions without causing participants 
discomfort and even to work out what sort of questions were sensitive in different 
cultural contexts. Collecting enough information was therefore dependent on being 
flexible about how I collected data and who from. As I already mentioned, planning the 
number of participants or the types of data that I would need prior to actually conducting 
interviews would have been impossible. This is one of the strengths of GT methodology in 
that, whilst generating GT is dependent on the systematic and rigorous collection and 
analysis of data, the focus on generating theoretical concepts means that the process is 
inherently flexible. Any sort of data that contributes to theoretical development is 
valuable. The methodology allows the generation of a theory from all types of data. The 
accuracy or comparability of any part of information was less relevant to the final result 
than the underlying conceptual explanation. This means that the quality of the final theory 
will not necessarily be affected by the sometimes accidental and haphazard way of 
collecting data on a sensitive topic. 
Although all types of data can contribute to generating GT, this does not mean that all 
data is of the same quality. The broader literature on qualitative data collection has many 
strategies to make sure that data is collected accurately (Silverman, 2004). Recording 
information accurately the first time is particularly important because of the scarcity of 
times when people are open about corruption. If I didn't record the information 
accurately at the time, it would be very difficult to ask people to repeat themselves. The 
moment would be lost. During all interviews I took notes. Initially, I experimented with not 
audio-recording the interviews, as I expected that without a recorder, participants would 
feel more open to speak about corruption or other problems, so I tried occasionally to 
conduct interviews without a recorder. However, in Indonesia, the language barrier meant 
that it was difficult to record enough information during the interviews without the audio 
recording that I could refer back to after the interview. That is, I found that an audio 
recording was very helpful to ensure that the data was recorded accurately. When asking 
permission to record interviews, I stressed to the people that any recording was for my 
benefit only and, like the other research material, it would remain, as far as the law 
allowed, anonymous. In most cases participants agreed to be recorded. If, during an 
interview I felt that people were not being open, or if I noticed them glancing at the 
recorder, I would turn it off and remove it from sight. In Indonesia, if interviews were 
done in English, I would not record because people did tend to be more open when they 
were not being recorded. These interviews were some of the most revealing. When 
people spoke specifically about corruption I would often stop writing because seeing me 
writing notes made some people uncomfortable. They would change the topic or become 
very general or non-committal in their answers to my questions. Once the topic changed 
again, I would continue writing notes. As soon as possible after every interview I would 
take time to write down all the information that the participants had discussed to ensure 
that the information was recorded as accurately as possible. When it was not possible to 
record the interviews, it was possible to check my notes with the notes from either the 
translator or the guide. I would also always ask for contact details from any participant 
and request that if I had further questions or needed clarification that I would be able to 
contact them again. 
Whilst these steps helped to ensure that the data was recorded as accurately as possible, 
this is different to determining the accuracy of any particular fact. This is potentially 
another challenge of doing research on topics like corruption, because vested interests 
may result in biased information and independently verifying facts can be difficult, 
particularly given the recognition that in social science at least, facts often change (Glaser, 
1978). This bias could lead to types of corruption that were seen as less sensitive to 
respondents, such as small payments to bureaucrats, as being easier to discuss. Types of 
corruption that were seen as more sensitive, such as payments to elected district heads, 
remained hidden. This was a challenge in Indonesia, where respondents appeared to 
speak much more freely about lower-level administrative bribery, but would not admit 
that there was anything involving higher-level politicians. Being able to understand such 
situations requires a considerable amount of understanding and awareness of the broader 
context of data collection, which can be used to assist in the analysis. Indeed, this reflects 
some of the ideas of the constructivist approach, where the data is seen as being a 
product of the interaction between researcher and interviewee, meaning a more 
reflective approach is needed (Charmaz, 2000). Finally, when generating theory, the 
accuracy of any 'fact' is less important because, through the process of constant 
comparison and writing memos, the underlying concepts from the data emerge. It is these 
concepts, not the specific facts, which form the final theory. That is, as Glaser and Strauss 
argue 'the evidence may not necessarily be accurate beyond a doubt (nor is it even in 
studies concerned only with accuracy), but the concept is undoubtedly a relevant 
theoretical abstraction about what is going on in the area studied' (1967, p. 23). This is 
particularly helpful in providing an analytical tool for sensitive research, such as corruption 
research, when the accuracy of any fact cannot often be determined. 
2.5 Analysing and sampling 
As well as identifying participants and collecting data, I was also coding and analysing this 
data to inform subsequent data collection. The integration of traditionally separate stages 
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of the research process is one of the core ideas of GT methodology, and is important to 
ensure that any emergent theory is grounded in the data—thus avoiding risks of logical 
deduction influencing the GT (Glaser, 1978). This is not to say that I was always integrating 
these stages to create the methodological 'whole' as Glaser describes. In practice, often 
particular types of research activities become dominant at different times. Initially, 
interviews and data collection were the dominant activity until a certain amount of data 
was available. The research then progressed and I spent more time coding and analysing 
data. Before I address some of the challenges of integrating these stages, I provide a 
description of the actual process used to code and analyse data and examples from my 
actual analysis. 
2.5.1 Coding 
'The essential relationship between data and theory is a conceptual code' (Glaser, 1978, 
p. 55). Coding essentially 'fractures' the data and then conceptually groups it again 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 3). The process of coding is not unique to GT methodology. 
However, unlike deductive coding of qualitative data, which uses pre-determined codes 
and concepts, for GT codes must emerge from the data. This has been criticised as being 
incredibly difficult and arguably impossible given the fact that no researcher can be 
theoretically blank (Kelle, 2005). In contrast, later works by Strauss and Corbin and Glaser 
have sought to be more specific about how this process can occur without the 
preconceived concepts being 'forced' onto the data. The steps they advocate involve 
several stages of coding. Initially, this involved a process of open coding, in which data was 
analysed line by line and coded in every way possible (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). That is, 
incidents from the data were coded into many categories, which particularly in the early 
stages were random ideas that seemed to occur to me as I was reading the data. For 
example, initial codes included 'problem with regulation', 'lack of coordination across 
levels of government' and 'building trust?'. According to Glaser this process of open 
coding is key to maintaining theoretical sensitivity as it assists to remove any pre-
conceived concepts (Glaser, 1978, p. 56). This initial coding served to guide subsequent 
thinking, and the categories from open coding were later refined or dropped as the 
research progressed. Indeed, throughout the early stages of data collection and analysis, 
the number of codes was very flexible. I tended to have many more codes at the 
beginning of my data collection and follow/ing periods of intensive data collection.'® The 
number of active codes then reduced as I consolidated codes and categories (see the 
constant comparison method below). 
Through the coding and analysis, categories began to emerge which were core to the 
process of governance and corruption. These were ideas that often came up in the way 
people were discussing corruption and governance. Initially I was working on 12 codes for 
the governance theory and nine codes for the corruption chapter. These included several 
sub-codes as I began to integrate ideas into more holistic categories. For example 'lack of 
coordination' had several as sub-codes 'vertical government', 'horizontal government' and 
'internal-external'. As these categories emerged, coding became more specific towards 
these categories—in a process which Strauss and Corbin called axial coding (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990). For example, as more data emerged that identified issues of legitimacy and 
maintaining relationships, I consolidated several of codes about different types of 
relationships into one larger category of 'managing relationships'. Through the constant 
comparison (which is described below) and coding of data, the categories became more 
conceptual and I began to see the specific theoretical properties of these concepts; these, 
more conceptual codes, included 'legitimacy' and 'negotiation'. Eventually, a 'core 
variable' emerged, which is a concept that explains the greatest amount of variation 
(Glaser, 1978, p. 61). Initially I was working with two potential core variables, one being 
'maintaining legitimacy' and the other being 'negotiating implementation', and it was only 
through the process of writing theoretical memos that it became clear how these two 
concepts were related and how 'negotiating implementation of regulations ' emerged as 
the core variable (See below for more details on theoretical memos). Coding could then 
focus on this variable, with the goal of 'saturating' the properties of the core variable and 
For example, due to the difficulty of traveling to the study districts in Indonesia, i would often go for a 
week or two of intensive data collection and then return to the capital city, Palangkaraya. In Palangkaraya, I 
would have more time to analyse the data and identify new ideas or target populations. I would then return 
to the districts to pursue this theoretical sampling. 
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those other variables that directly impact on the core variable, which Corbin and Strauss 
(1990) refer to as selective coding. In practice there were several variables that could be 
considered core variables, and selecting a key process was part of an ongoing analysis that 
occurred even into the writing stage of this thesis. 
2.5.2 Theoretical memos 
For Glaser and Strauss, the creative part of generating GT comes from writing theoretical 
memos. Memos are the write-up of ideas about categories and concepts and their 
relationships to each other, as they strike the analyst while coding (Glaser, 1978, p. 83). I 
wrote many memos at all stages of collecting, coding and analysing and even writing up 
the final chapters of this thesis (See Appendix 4 for more detail on these memos). Ideas 
for memos were always written in full and these were later transcribed into NVivo and 
linked to relevant data and codes. Ideas in memos were used to guide further analysis, 
and were always considered provisional until I was able to check them against current or 
new data. This meant that the ideas in memos were very fluid, and memos were often 
revised and even discarded as data collection and analysis continued. 
To Glaser and Strauss, theoretical memos are one of the core practices that distinguish GT 
methodology from other inductive data analysis. To me, one of the major benefits of 
writing memos was to keep track of ideas, and to force me to be methodical about 
recording these ideas. Memos became an important tool for maintaining control over the 
data because they provided a sort of synthesis of ideas from the data. Secondly, given the 
nature of the topic of corruption, memos were important to force me to be explicit about 
ideas. That is, because of the inherent scandal of corruption and the way that information 
about corruption (or potential corruption) is reported and discussed in general, it is 
possible for this type of information to become dominant. Getting ideas onto paper meant 
that I could then systematically compare these ideas with the rest of data. This ensures 
that the theoretical properties that were emerging were based on the data itself. 
2.5.3 The constant comparison method 
Analysis of data and generation of GT is based on tfie constant comparison method. The 
constant comparison method is 'an iterative interplay' between data collection, analysis 
and conceptualisation. The constant comparison method is used to generate and plausibly 
suggest (but not provisionally test) the relationships between incidents, categories and 
concepts." The first stage of comparison involved comparing incidents that had been 
coded into a single category (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 106). This comparison helped to 
identify underlying similarities and differences of incidents within each category. For 
example, in analysing the data for the grounded theory on corruption I had coded two 
sentences from different actors as 'dependency'. It was in comparing these incidents that I 
decided they were actually not reflecting the same category and instead re-coded one 
incident as 'strategy for control' and was able to better define what I meant by 
'dependency'. These similarities and differences helped me to begin to refine the 
categories. As I continued to collect and analyse data, I continuously checked each 
incident within each category, questioning how new pieces of data contributed to 
developing the theoretical properties of each category. The focus was on integrating 
categories and their properties. According to Glaser, the purpose of this comparison is 
'theoretical elaboration, saturation and verification of concepts, densification of concepts 
by developing their properties and generation of further concepts' (Glaser and Holton, 
2004). Comparing concepts—or the theoretical properties to the incidents—helped to 
identify what the characteristics of different incidents were and how these fit within and 
therefore define the different concepts. Building the concepts and going back to compare 
them with the data was also important to help me to identify some of the biases 
associated with talking about corruption and other sensitive issues. As these properties 
emerged and memos were recorded, more data was collected to help define these 
theoretical properties. Through the constant comparison of incidents and concepts, the 
concepts also became more integrated. 
" Incident refers to the instance in the data that is labeled or classified during the coding process. Incidents 
may be responses from individuals or observations and collectively they provide those characteristics that 
define the concept. 
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The third stage involved comparing concepts to other concepts. To Glaser and Strauss, the 
purpose of this comparison was to 'deliminate' theory because as it happens the analyst is 
integrating concepts into a hypothesis and reducing the categories and properties that are 
used to make the theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 110). The focus for me initially was 
to identify if and how the different concepts overlapped. When concepts overlapped, it 
was mainly a matter of being more specific about defining theoretical properties. For 
example, initially I had two concepts both related to the legitimacy, one about the 
legitimacy of legality and the other related to interests and creating legitimacy of different 
interests. However, it was through the process of constant comparison that I was able to 
identify the characteristics of the category of building legitimacy and how they differed 
from what became 'semblance for legality'. 
The fourth and final stage of comparison is actually writing the theory, the challenges of 
which I discuss in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis. This fourth stage was more 
discrete from the other processes of data collection and analysis as I had already returned 
to Australia and was not collecting or coding any new data. However, it was particularly 
during this last stage, that I began again to read the existing literature, and to compare 
concepts from my theory to ideas in the literature. 
2.5.4 Theoretical sampling 
In GT methodology, constant coding and writing memos guides further data collection — 
on theoretical grounds. It is not selective sampling, in that it is not predetermined. 
Theoretical sampling is the deductive part of GT methodology where ideas from previous 
coding and memos point to areas where new data might provide new insights. That is, 
there is some criticism of the inductivism of GT methodology, in that there is little space 
for including existing theory, orfor any type of verification. In several ways, I understood 
this process of theoretical sampling to be the deductive, verification aspect of this 
research. However, unlike sampling in traditional theory testing research, the goal of this 
sampling approach is not to find a representative random sample. The goal of collecting 
more data is to build nuance and depth into the emerging concepts, as such sampling is 
guided not by the representativeness of any particular group, but by theoretical purpose 
and potential relevance to the emerging theory. 
Sampling on theoretical grounds is also different to research that aims to verify existing 
theories, due to the ability to compare apparently non-comparable groups. In theoretical 
sampling, the apparent non-comparability of two groups is largely irrelevant, if the 
variable to be considered has a value in each group (Glaser, 1978, p. 42). It is the concepts 
w/ithin a group that are of comparative value—not the group itself. This means that the 
greater the diversity between groups, the better it is for comparison. Glaser describes this 
as the need to 'stretch' conceptual categories by seeking groups, which may provide 
significant variation. 
Within Indonesia, as well as national and provincial level interviews, I initially selected two 
districts within one province to collect data. I selected these districts primarily because of 
the difference in natural resources. One district still retained significant forest cover that 
was at risk to mining and timber harvesting; the other had been selectively logged for 
many decades and was in process of transformation towards alternative land cover, 
primarily oil palm plantations. Given the substantive topic for this theory, governance and 
corruption in the forest sector, I selected these two districts as a way to introduce 
diversity around the issue of the environment. I added a third district later that had a 
more established agricultural sector, again aiming to stretch concepts and see how they 
work in areas where the governance and environmental conditions were different. Within 
Indonesia interviewing people at the national and provincial political levels also provided 
different groups, showing how theoretical properties emerged across different political-
geographic scales. 
Again, conducting research in PNG also provided an opportunity to extend the emerging 
theory. I had always planned to collect data in PNG, as a way to conduct a cross-national 
comparative case-study. However, the vast difference in environmental, social, ecological, 
political and historical factors made many aspects of a comparative study difficult. In 
generating GT, however, being able to go to PNG and collect data in this completely 
different context was valuable for stretching concepts. Partly this was due to the 
differences in the two countries. I also found that, having been based in Indonesia for an 
extended period of time, I had become a little desensitised to several aspects of 
corruption and forestry. By placing the concepts in completely different context, some of 
these assumptions became more visible. Rather than disproving the emerging theory 
though, these sorts of contrasts just forced me to be more explicit in how I had defined 
the concepts and their properties. 
2.5.5 Challenges from sensitive research 
I have pointed to several challenges to conducting a GT on a sensitive topic, however, one 
of the main impacts of the sensitivity of the topic was that it impacted on my ability to 
reach theoretical saturation. The whole process of constant comparison, data collection, 
sampling and so on is meant to eventually lead to what Glaser and Strauss refer to as 
theoretical saturation. Saturation refers to the point where 'no additional data are being 
found whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the category' (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967, p. 61). Whilst the idea of 'saturation' is not unique to GT methodology, it is still a 
difficult concept to assess. Glaser and Strauss provide few keys or criteria, except to say 
that '[a]s he sees similar instances over and over again, the researcher becomes 
empirically confident that a category is saturated' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 61). I 
found this to be a difficult concept to apply and remained unsure about what constituted 
saturation for this research. 
Part of the challenge is that, for example, it was not always possible to get key people or 
representatives of key institutions to meet with me. As some concepts emerged, it was 
very difficult to find information or people who were willing or able to elaborate on these 
topics. This is partly a consequence of closed populations. These are groups of people to 
whom, for many reasons, a researcher may find difficulties in gaining access. One of the 
most relevant closed populations for this research was the police. Police, including 
forestry police, are obviously a key group involved in monitoring and enforcing regulation 
and governing resources. Interviewing police could have generated new characteristics, 
particularly for concepts relating to how regulations are monitored. Despite many 
attempts to interview them, however, I was unable to find anyone who would speak to 
me. There is always the chance that key data was missed because of the sensitivity of this 
topic. This does not necessarily mean that the concepts, which may have benefited from 
data from police interviews, remained unsaturated. Secondary sources, newspaper 
articles, and presentations at workshops by informed people supplemented the interview 
data and helped to provide depth to the findings from the interview data. 
The use of secondary data to support the potentially limited information of interviews is 
important and helped me ensure that the type of information I was receiving broadly 
matched information published by other researchers or journalists, as a way of ensuring 
that I had depth of information. A second way that I used to evaluate the depth of 
different concepts was to, in part, trial different concepts with informed participants. As I 
progressed with the analysis, I re-interviewed three key participants who were open about 
corruption, and was able to test several of these concepts with them. Whilst I cannot be 
entirely certain that all these concepts are theoretically saturated, this process of 
evaluation has given me confidence that the theoretical aspects are sufficiently developed 
for integration in these theories. 
2.6 The results and evaluation of grounded theory 
The description I provided in this chapter treats different components of GT methodology 
as fairly discrete. In reality, the process of generating GT was more cyclical than described 
here. This makes keeping control of the data and progress of the theory generation 
difficult. Indeed, this is one of the criticisms of GT, particularly for novice researchers, that 
in trying to maintain theoretical sensitivity, the novice researcher tries too hard to stay 
away from theoretical concepts, resulting in many substantive codes that fail to reach 
conceptual status. Indeed, this trend has been noted by other researchers (Kelle, 2005). 
To Kelle, this process reflects the challenge of GT methodology and the risk of 'forcing 
data', however, it does not necessarily detract from the validity of the ultimate theory, 
provided that eventually the researcher accepts and adopts some aspects of background 
theoretical knowledge. 
A second challenge, which is recognised by Glaser and Strauss as a problem with the way 
GT is conducted, is the lack of teachers specifically trained in and practicing GT 
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methodology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 33). Without a trained GT methodologist on 
hand, I instead had to rely on the texts quoted throughout this chapter. These texts 
provided the key 'dos and don'ts' of GT, but they cannot be prescriptive about specific 
topic-related methodological challenges. The consequence for my research was that I 
perhaps collected data beyond what was necessary for some concepts, and perhaps was 
not able to integrate other parts of the theory as much as is desirable for a GT. 
In saying that, however, all research methodologies have some challenges, such as in 
collecting data, or knowing when to stop, and these can impact on the final results of the 
research. This raises the important issue of how to evaluate GT and how any challenges 
such as these are overcome and dealt with, to ensure integrity in the research process and 
the product of the research. This is relevant because I have argued in parts of this chapter 
that GT methodology is suitable for researching sensitive topics—because the logic of 
theory generation means that many of the challenges associated with doing sensitive 
research are less likely to affect the final product. This would not be the case if I was 
attempting to empirically verify aspects of a theory on corruption. In order to understand 
the impact of the challenges of doing sensitive research, there is a need to be clearer 
about how I sought to evaluate the quality of a GT. 
There are two aspects to evaluating a GT. The first is based on the methodology used. As I 
stated above, one of the main challenges and criticisms of GT methodology has been 
methodological blurring, where any type of inductive qualitative data analysis has been 
labelled as GT (Glaser and Holton, 2004). The problem with this is that it erodes the 
conceptual power of GT as other forms of qualitative data analysis may impose external 
concepts, problems and frameworks onto data, rather than letting concepts emerge from 
the data (Glaser and Holton, 2004). Blending methodology could reduce the value of the 
GT. In order to avoid this methodological blurring and maintain methodological integrity, 
the methods that I used, and have described in this chapter, adhere as much as possible 
exclusively to the classical GT by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Glaser (1978). Whilst these 
texts are now quite old, they remain authoritative and have since been referred to as 
being more traditional GT, rather than the evolved GT methodology of Strauss's later w/ork 
and of others.'® The extensive description I have provided in this chapter is also an effort 
to expose any potential mistakes that may impact on the interpretation of the final 
theory. This does not mean that I did not also utilise other approaches for other parts of 
my thesis, rather that the information presented in the tw/o GT chapters are the results of 
strict (as possible) application of the traditional GT methodology. 
The second aspect to evaluating a GT is evaluating the quality of the theory itself. To 
Glaser and Strauss, the criteria used to evaluate a theory are the things they prize most in 
sociological theory and w/hy they came up with GT methodology in the first place. That is, 
that it should fit and work. Firstly, as I described above, one of my strategies to overcome 
the problem of knowing when saturation had been reached was to present aspects of 
these grounded theories to key participants from my research. Through this process I was 
able to get some feedback about how these concepts were (and were not) applicable to 
these people. This was not a formal review process; rather, it was the result of informal 
meetings and discussions about my research with informed people. Secondly, and I reflect 
on this further in the GT chapters themselves, some aspects of the grounded theories 
presented here do provide novel insights to better explain how governance and 
corruption work in practice. This helps to satisfy the criteria that grounded theories fit and 
work in the world that they seek to explain. 
2.7 Case-study methodology 
The majority of this chapter has focused on the GT methodology and issues to do with 
data collection and analysis for the grounded theories presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
However, as I stated in the Introduction, the main research question of my thesis is 'does 
The variations between traditional, or Glaserian, GT and the approach to GT promoted by Strauss and 
Corbin are arguably subtle; however, I have adhered to the traditional GT in this thesis for two reasons. 
Firstly, I focus on the traditional GT in order to avoid methodological blurring. Secondly, several of the 
features of Strauss and Corbin's GT approach contradict the original underlying principle of GT particularly in 
relation to the deductive processes described by Strauss and Corbin, which arguably could affect the 
emergence of concepts from the data. Some variations to the traditional GT approach come in from the 
constructivist perspective. 
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corruption and poor governance contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea? And if so, how?' In Chapter 7,1 seek to answer this 
question—however, none of the methods I have described above are used in that chapter. 
Rather, I treated the results presented in that chapter as more closely resembling the 
results of a case-study analysis, with Indonesia and Papua New Guinea as the case-study 
countries. 
Case-study is a well-established research strategy where the focus is on a case in 'its own 
right, and taking its context into account' (Robson, 2002). There are several different aims 
for doing case-study research. To some, the aim of case-study is to be able to 'generalise 
across larger set of units' (Gerring, 2004, p. 341). However, the ability to generalise 
findings is not a necessary aim of all case-study research. By comparison, a key figure in 
the revival of case-study as serious research approach, Yin, defines case-study as strategy 
for doing research when three conditions are met. Firstly, case-study is appropriate when 
the researcher has little control over events. Secondly, the research is attempting to 
understand a contemporary phenomenon in a real life context and lastly, when the 
research seeks to determine how and why a phenomenon is occurring (Yin, 2009). That is, 
the case-study approach is a key approach when seeking to identify causal mechanisms, in 
detail, in a real life context. These three factors and particularly the second, support the 
use of the case-study approach for this part of my research. 
There are limitations to using this approach. Firstly, there is a perceived trade-off between 
achieving high internal validity and generalisations that apply to broader populations 
(Alexander and Bennett, 2005). According to Flyvbjerg (2006), it is possible to generalise 
from a single case, depending on how the case was selected in relation to this research, 
but the lack of generalisability was an unnecessary concern because the aim of the 
research is to specifically understand the cases in question. As I described in the first 
section of this chapter, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea were selected because of the 
current concern over high rates of deforestation and the potential of corruption and poor 
governance to impede efforts to address REDD+. That is, these cases were selected based 
on an inherent interest in them (Stake, 1995). In this research, understanding the specific 
conditions in these two countries will be the primary focus. 
Following the grounded theory methodology, the approach then shifted to understanding 
the potential links between corruption and poor governance and deforestation and forest 
degradation. This analysis focused firstly on understanding the process of deforestation 
and forest degradation in these two countries (some of which I introduce in the next two 
chapters of this thesis). I then divided the process of forest management into several key 
stages—being land use planning, awarding licenses, monitoring and enforcing activities 
and the distribution of benefits. At each stage, I drew on the findings from the grounded 
theories and the literature on drivers of deforestation to describe the conditions under 
which different types of corruption and poor governance could contribute to 
deforestation and forest degradation in the case-study countries. 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to firstly provide detailed description of the methods used to 
collect and analyse data for this thesis. This includes detailing the methodology of GT 
developed by Glaser and Strauss. I have sought to detail as much as possible the actual 
practice of collecting, coding and analysing data as a means to ensure that the results 
presented in subsequent chapters can be evaluated appropriately. I have also focused on 
the implications of the sensitive topic for the practice of this research. I described why 
these topics are so sensitive in these two countries and the practical implications for 
this—including gaining access to participants and the potential ethical implications of 
'rephrasing' research proposals. I also described the difficulty of getting people to discuss 
corruption and some of the interview techniques I used to do this. Importantly, these 
factors influence the type of information collected and how the analysis proceeded, so I 
sought also to identify the potential implications of this for the analysis and results of this 
thesis. I reflect more on this in the final chapter of this thesis, where I discuss some of the 
challenges to writing and publishing material about sensitive topics. 
In this chapter, I also detailed the approach adopted to analyse the key research questions 
about the potential impact of corruption and poor governance on the forests in the two 
case-study countries. I introduced aspects of the study countries and provided some 
justification for why these countries were selected. In the next two chapters I provide a 
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more detailed description of the history and the current issues to do with forest 
management in Indonesia and PNG. The detail in these chapters further justifies their 
selection and provides important background information from which to understand the 
subsequent grounded theories and case-study analysis. 
Chapter 3 
The Indonesian case 
3.1 Introduction 
The forests of the Indonesian archipelago are internationally renowned not only for their 
sheer size and high endemic biodiversity but also for the significant rate of deforestation 
and forest degradation. The Indonesian forest sector has also had well-documented 
history of corruption and poor governance (Barr et al., 2010a; Dauvergne, 1994; Smith et 
a!., 2003a). This chapter provides a background to the issues of corruption, poor 
governance and deforestation in Indonesia. Following a description of forest resources 
and the pattern of deforestation, I document the history of forest management. I begin 
with the arrival and occupation of Indonesian territory by the Dutch East-India Company 
{Vereenigde Oost- Indische Compagnie, hereafter VOC) in the early l?'*" century and 
describe the evolution of forest policy to the current era. In doing so, I describe the 
evolution of several key regulations and provide an analysis of the ongoing drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation. In the final section of this chapter I detail several 
key remaining governance challenges, firstly focusing on the tension between the 
centralised forestry ministry and the district governments and secondly, the challenges 
posed by the expanding oil palm industry. 
3.2 Physical environment 
3.2.1 Environment and people 
The Republic of Indonesia covers a total territory of 1 904 569 km^ which is spread over 17 
508 islands(Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2010). Situated between the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans, the Indonesian archipelago includes five main islands, three of which 
are shared with other countries, two main archipelagos and over 6000 uninhabited 
islands, which combine to make it one of the most diverse natural environments in the 
world. Beyond the diverse natural environment, the over 246 billion Indonesians 
represent diverse religious, cultural and ethnic groups (World Bank, 2012). With about 
80% of Indonesians living on Java, the Javanese are the largest ethnic group in terms of 
number and political povv(er, but every island has its ow/n complex set of ethnic groups, 
many of which also have independent languages and cultural practices. Politically, there 
are four key levels of government in Indonesia, which in descending scale include national 
{pusat), province {provinsi), district {kabupaten/kota) and local {kacamaten) government. 
Whilst Indonesia's GDP has been relatively well-performing and contributed to poverty 
reduction (Asra, 2000), there has historically been high economic disparity across the 
archipelago (Booth, 2000; Booth, 2003), with the outer islands in the east experiencing 
lower levels of socio-economic development. 
Central Kalimantan, which was the focus of my research, is one of five Indonesian 
provinces on the island of Borneo." The island of Borneo covers 743 330 km^ and is 
shared between Indonesian Kalimantan, Malaysia and Brunei. Across the island are 
diverse natural environments including some of the world's most important peat-swamp 
lands^° and forests, lowland dipterocarp forests, extensive mangrove swamps and high 
mountain ranges, with the highest mountain. Mount Kinabalu in Malaysian Sarawak, 
reaching over 4000 m. 
As the second largest province in Indonesia, Central Kalimantan covers over 15 million ha 
of Borneo divided into 15 districts. The capital of the province is Palangka Raya, which is 
home to approximately 148 000 of the 2.21 million people in Central Kalimantan (Badan 
Pusat Statistik, 2010). The main ethnic group is the Dayaks, but this is a broad category 
and includes a great deal of ethnic diversity. Central Kalimantan has also been the 
destination for many Indonesian immigrants, who were relocated from the more densely 
populated regions of Java and Bali and provided with land in the southern regions of 
Kalimantan, under the national government's Transmigration Project. Since the original 
The other provinces are East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and the newly annexed 
North Kalimantan. 
^°The peat-lands of Kalimantan are renowned not only for the expanse and depth, but are very important as 
carbon sinks (Page et al., 2002). 
transmigration project, there have been several waves of transmigrants arriving in Central 
Kalimantan" and these transmigrant communities now represent some of the poorest 
communities in Central Kalimantan. 
In terms of natural environment, many of the key environmental features of Borneo are 
evident in different regions of Central Kalimantan. The northern areas of the province are 
mountainous and dominated by low-mountain forest ranges. This area also forms key 
watersheds for the many river systems of Central Kalimantan including the Kapuas and 
Barito rivers. The communities in these northern areas tend to be quite isolated, as the 
infrastructure in these remote areas is limited. The main livelihood strategies of these 
communities are subsistence shifting agricultural systems {ladangj, fishing, rubber 
production and mining (including artisanal and, more recently, paid employment with 
large mines). Peat-land forests and river systems dominate the landscape in the southern 
districts. Once home to vast native forests and many iconic native species, including the 
orangutan and proboscis monkey, these areas are now dominated by oil palm plantations 
(Galudra et al., 2010). As well as some shifting agriculture, the livelihoods of communities 
in these regions include rubber and rattan production," and smallholder oil palm 
plantations and employment with commercial oil palm plantations. 
3.2.2 Forest resources and the problem of deforestation 
Across all of Indonesia, it is estimated that currently over 94 million ha is forested (FAO, 
2010). These diverse forest types include mangroves, high alpine, peat-land and dense 
lowland rainforests. Indonesia's forests are also renowned global biodiversity hotspots 
(Conservation International, 2013), providing habitat for many iconic and endemic species 
including the Orang-utan (Pongo sp.j, Javan Rhino {Rhinoceros sondaicus), Sumatran Tiger 
(Panthera tigris sumatroej and many more. As well as the renowned biodiversity, 
Indonesia's forests have attracted high-level international attention due to the high rates 
Communities were moved to Central Kalimantan to help provide labor for the Ex-mega rice project, and 
there has been a more recent vi/ave of migrants from Java and other areas in order to support the expanding 
oil palm industry. 
" Rattan is the product of palms used traditionally for furniture, construction and ropes (Weinstock, 1983) 
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of deforestation and forest degradation. Indeed over the last two decades, Indonesia has 
consistently been rated as having one of the highest rates of global deforestation. 
In the 1900s, Indonesia's forests reportedly covered up to 84% of the territory (Holmes, 
2000 cited in Broich et al., 2011). How/ever, deforestation and forest degradation has 
resulted in the loss of the majority of forests in some regions, particularly the inner islands 
of Java and Bali (Peluso, 1991). The rate of forest loss on the outer islands of Sumatra, 
Kalimantan and Papua is also high, with an estimated 2 million ha lost annually since 1997 
(from MoF cited in Scotland et al., 2000). Of the provinces of Kalimantan, Central 
Kalimantan is thought to have the highest rate of deforestation and over the period of 
1997-2007 an average of 12 000 ha was cleared annually (Broich et al., 2011). There is no 
available figure on the amount of forest that has been degraded. 
The high rates of forest loss have attracted international and domestic attention in 
Indonesia for several reasons. Firstly, given the fact that an estimate 70 million 
Indonesians depend on forests directly and indirectly (Scotland et al., 2000), high rates of 
deforestation and forest degradation potentially jeopardise the livelihoods of many 
Indonesians. Forest loss also poses wider problems for biodiversity as the ICUN has 
classified 67 endemic birds, 184 mammals, 33 amphibians and 386 plant species as 
'threatened' (Vie et al., 2009). Finally, deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia is 
considered to be a key source of global carbon emissions. This is particularly from 
deforestation and the degradation of peat-lands, as peat-lands are important carbon 
sinks. As peat forests are degraded, peat soils can be dried out, increasing the risk of fire. 
Indeed, the clearing and degradation of peat forest and the resultant burning of peat-
lands during the 1997 El Nino in Central Kalimantan alone resulted in 0.19-0.23 Gt of 
carbon released from peat combustion (Page et al., 2002). Despite these widely cited 
problems, high rates of deforestation and forest degradation continue. In order to 
understand why this is the case, the next section describes the history of forest use and 
the evolution of the political economy of forest use. 
3.3 The management of forest resources 
3.3.1 Colonial 
Although Europeans had arrived in Indonesia in the 16* century, it was not until 1602 that 
the Dutch established the VOC as a formal colonial power. The VOC were heavily involved 
in the exploitation of the vast teak forests of Java and Bali.^' The occupation of Java by the 
VOC marked the beginning of commercial exploitation and the first widespread 
degradation and conversion of Indonesia's forests. This degradation occurred because 
during this colonial period, rather than investing in forest management, the VOC adopted 
a strategy of expanding harvesting operations as supplies in each area were exhausted 
(Peluso, 1991). As operations expanded into regions beyond the official administrative 
land of the VOC, access to timber was negotiated through traditional leaders and the 
regional sovereignty (Peluso, 1991). In each of these regions, locally specific institutions 
had traditionally managed the forests communally under a system known as Adat}'^ 
Whilst many of these regions were technically ruled by Susuhunan, or Sultans, diverse 
social institutions limited and legitimated the control and rule by these traditional leaders 
(Peluso, 1991). The early attempts by the VOC to gain access to the timber were fraught 
with difficulties, as Javanese sovereigns withheld the rights to exploit timber. Formal 
letters accompanied by expensive silks, diamond rings, Spanish wines and elephants 
enabled the VOC to win the support of the Javanese Sultans and allowed the VOC to 
access the timber, land and labour across Java (Peluso, 1991). By 1705 the relationships 
between the VOC and regional sovereignty had developed into formalised contracts 
granting the VOC almost complete access to forests in certain regions of Java (Peluso, 
1991, p. 66). 
timber is well suited to ship construction and access to Indonesia's forests provided the raw material 
for the Dutch naval empire, as well as providing construction material for the new urban centres across Java 
(Boomgaard, 1992; Peluso, 1991). 
^'Adat is a complicated term used to describe traditional legal systems. However, there is no one single adat 
system and these traditions vary greatly across Indonesia. 
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The deforestation and forest degradation that occurred during the VOC administration 
(mid-l?'" century to 1799), and the subsequent Dutch colonial administration (1800 
onwards), was a result of harvests in accordance with formal VOC contracts and extensive 
illegal harvesting. Although records are scarce, Peluso, an expert on colonial forest 
administration in Indonesia, argues that over 95% of the harvest was illegal during this 
period (Peluso, 1991, p. 67). This additional, illegal, logging involved complicity by VOC 
officials in the field who were thought to not only take commissions on legally logged 
timber, but also sponsored private illegal woodcutting (Peluso, 1991, p. 67). 
The perceived limitlessness of Java's teal< forests, and the ability to expand into more 
remote areas meant the VOC had no incentive to reduce the impact of harvesting 
practices or to attempt to rehabilitate native forests. Even though investigations by the 
VOC into timber supply in 1796 recommended ending logging in some regions and cutting 
the harvest by up to 50% in other regions, these recommendation were not followed. By 
the late 18"' century the majority of Java's teak forests had been exhausted and by 1925 it 
was estimated that in some districts, over 75% of original forest cover had already been 
lost (Boomgaard, 1992; Peluso, 1991, p. 67)." 
The informal arrangements between the VOC and regional sovereignty led to the 
establishment of more formal state ownership of forest lands when the Dutch 
government officially took control from the VOC in 1800. When the governor-general 
Marshall Daendels was appointed, there was a transformation of forest management to a 
far more state-centered and bureaucratic system (Boomgaard, 1992). Under Daendels' 
governorship and a system called Domein, the Dutch state took ownership over all forests 
(Peluso, 1991).^® Domein was accompanied by extensive expansion of the forest 
bureaucracy and widespread adoption of the principles of scientific management. For 
^^his calculation is rough because it was based on measurement in the units of time taken to walk, so it is a 
little difficult to determine exact distances. But the figures stand: some 5000 ha were logged and converted 
to alternative uses between 1775-1925 (Peluso 1991, p. 67; Bloomgaard 1992, p. 12). 
^^The Agrarian Law 1870 included a Domain Declaration {Domein verklaring), which stated that all land not 
under clear ownership was considered State land. Communities' rights over land were not recognised, as 
these were based on customary law, which was not recognised as proof of ownership in Dutch law. 
example, in 1948, German forest technicians employed to manage the forests of Java 
recommended establishing rotation harvests and replanting measures (Peluso, 1991, p. 
69). Daendels also implemented policies to address illegal logging, establishing strict 
penalties for anyone engaged in 'high-level corruption, slackness or breaking oaths of 
office' (Peluso, 1991, p. 68). Maximum penalties included 10 years imprisonment and 
substantial fines; how/ever, the lack of personnel to monitor forest activities meant that 
enforcement remained w/eak (Peluso, 1991). 
As w/ell as attempting to secure sustainable timber supplies, the focus on scientific 
principles of forest management enabled the Dutch (and subsequent governments) to 
justify state ownership of resources. This perpetuated a political system w/hich 
subordinated local rights and ignored traditional management practices, as was common 
in many colonial practices of forest management (Larson and Ribot, 2007; Peluso, 1991). 
Despite a period of occupation by the British (1811-1815), the Japanese (1941-1945) and 
the passing of almost two centuries, several elements of Daednels' system remain central 
to forest management in Indonesia today. These include the consolidation of all forested 
lands under state ownership, to be managed for the benefits of the state, and the 
establishment of a powerful forest service bureaucracy (Peluso, 1991, p. 68). 
3.3.2 Independence 
Indonesia gained independence from the Japanese in 1945. This period of early 
independence was marked by conflicts between the military and the communist party 
(PKI), who supported then President Sukarno. As a result Sukarno's presidency was 
dominated by negotiations and consensus-building between the competing interest of the 
PKI and the military (Liddle, 1996). During his 20 years as president (1949-1967), the left-
leaning Sukarno attempted to establish state enterprises to harvest timber, particularly on 
the outer islands. The impact of Sukarno's presidency on forest management is also 
marked by the passing of Law 5 (1960), the Basic Agrarian Law {Undang-Undang Pkok 
Agraria, BAL). The BAL reaffirmed state ownership of forest resources, although this took 
a slightly different form to the Dutch Domein. Instead of outright state ownership of the 
forest under the Domein system, under the BAL the state is defined as the managing 
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authority over Indonesian 'soil, water and airspace'. Despite this distinction, the change, in 
terms of who controlled forests, from colonial to post-colonial Indonesia was minimal. The 
state largely retained full control over the ability to regulate land use and to determine 
resource access. 
Article three of the BAL did go some way to restoring the rights of customary owners. 
However, this was restricted to only those rights that do not conflict with other 
government regulations over forest use. The underlying theme of this regulation reflects 
the socialist tendencies of the then President and of the political support of the PKI. That 
is, Indonesian resources are for the benefit of all Indonesians, not just for those with 
traditional ownership and use rights. This provided justification for the exploitation of the 
outer islands and for the appropriation of all of the financial benefits of this exploitation 
by the state. The assassination of leading military figures, followed by the resignation of 
Sukarno in 1967, left the BAL largely unenforced (Tjondronegoro, 1991 cited in McCarthy, 
2000a). However, several features of the BAL, particularly state ownership and Javanese-
centric decision-making, continued into the post-Sukarno period. 
3.3.3 Suharto era forest management 
In 1967 Suharto was sworn in as Indonesia's second president. During the 32 years (1967-
1998) of Suharto's rule, the process of government in Indonesian shifted from the more 
consensus-based system developed under Sukarno to a far more centralised and 
autocratic political system. Whilst the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) was 
technically the nation's highest authority, during this period the MPR was largely 
powerless, Suharto had the power to appoint Ministers and governors, had full control 
over the military, and policy was determined at the executive level by Suharto and a select 
inner circle. Golkar, the major political party led by Suharto, was also directly linked to the 
military and controlled district, provincial and national level assemblies (Dauvergne, 
1994). Suharto's almost complete control of the military is important in understanding his 
presidency. Suharto's political manoeuvring ensured the loyalty of the military, by 
providing key military figures with economic stakes in the political survival of Suharto 
(Barber and Talbott, 2003; Ross, 2001). The military's impact on the bureaucracy was also 
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strong, with around 60% of senior Jakarta officials having significant military ties in the 
late 1980s (Dauvergne, 1994). 
The policy approach of Suharto, and his close advisors, was dominated by traditional 
Western notions of development, which are centred on economic growth. This highly 
centralised and development-focused system contributed to the economic growth that 
Indonesia experienced over much of Suharto's rule and added to the legitimacy of 
Suharto's regime (Liddle, 1995)." However, this economic growrth arguably came at a high 
price. Politically, there was limited accountability. The two formal competing political 
parties were strictly controlled (Dauvergne, 1994; Liddle, 1996) and members of the civil 
society who attempted to challenge Suharto were immediately blacklisted (Moeliono et 
al., 2009, p. 14).^® Official poverty levels declined dramatically during Suharto's rule; 
however, the distribution of income wealth varied considerably, with many of the benefits 
being distributed towards the upper and middle classes (Booth, 2000; Dauvergne, 1994). 
The benefits of the economic growth were also concentrated geographically. In the forest 
sector, this meant that despite significant wealth being drawn from the exploitation of 
forests in the newly 'opened' outer islands, the Java-centred elite appropriated these 
profits with limited distribution to regional areas (Dauvergne, 1994; Sunderlin and 
Resosudarmo, 1996). With benefits accruing to the Java-based elite, who were not 
accountable to districts, there was little incentive to reduce negative environmental 
impacts or manage the resources, a fact which is evident in the regulations governing 
forest use at the time. 
Suharto and his New Order government passed two new laws to manage the state 
resources. These were the Basic Forestry Law (Undang-Undang Kehutanan, BFL) no. 5, and 
Foreign Investment Law (Undang-Undang Modal Asing, FIL) no. 1, both from 1967. These 
two regulations drew details from the only specific forestry regulation, created by the 
Dutch in 1929, and were designed to stimulate foreign investment and export earnings in 
Over 25 years of Suharto's rule, growth in Indonesia averaged 6% or better each year (Liddle, 1996). 
1994, several NGOs who brought legal allegations against Suharto for misuse of the reforestation fund, 
were formally blacklisted. This meant that that the NGOs were not allowed to receive foreign funds 
(IVIoeliono et al., 2009). 
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Indonesia (Resosudarmo, 2002, p. 162). The BFL and the amended Forestry Act 41/1999 
[Undang Undang Kehutanan UU 41/1999, hereafter Forestry Act) identified the area 
considered legal forest estate, which at the time was 76% of the entire area of Indonesia, 
to be managed by the Ministry of Forestry (hereafter, the IVlinistry). The formal forest 
estate was designated in the 1984 forestry land-use plan {tata guna kesepakatan hutan, 
TGHK), which remains the basis of the forest estate in the current era. Within this estate, 
forests are defined according to three functions: production forests (hutan produksi, HP), 
protection forests {hutan proteksij and conservation forest (Hutan konservasi). Areas 
within the forest estate can also be zoned as convertible production forest (Hutan 
produksi konversi, HPK)}^ Importantly, the Forestry Act also provided a legal basis for the 
central government to grant permits and allocate timber concessions. In line with the 
development approach taken by Suharto, the FIL focused on encouraging foreign 
investment and provided very favourable conditions for firms including low taxes and 
long-term licenses (Dauvergne, 1997; Poffenberger, 1997). 
According to the Forestry Act, access to timber was exclusively granted through a process 
run by the centralised Ministry. Large-scale commercial logging concessions [Hak 
Pengusahaan Hutan, HPH), which are still in operation today, are 20-year, selective 
logging concessions. In the early Suharto period, the HPH concessions were incredibly 
popular, and quickly covered one-third (65.4 million ha) of all forest land in Indonesia 
(Poffenberger, 1997) and by 1996, approximately 40 million m^ of timber was being 
logged annually . Whilst the contribution of this logging industry to deforestation is not 
well-known (Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1996), this period of logging and the operation 
of the HPH licenses did contribute significantly to forest degradation. It was found in 1990 
that up to 40% of standing stock was damaged in logged areas (World Bank, 1990 cited in 
Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1996). 
' ' Land-uses within the forest estate are determined by these zones. Logging and some mining can only 
occur in production forests. Protection forests include river buffer zones and forests on slopes and cannot 
legally be cleared. Conservation forests include national and provincial parks and wildlife reserves and 
cannot be converted; however, some non-timber forest products can be harvested within conservation 
forests. 
The rapid exploitation of forests under HPH is partly due to the high-level political capture 
in the distribution of these licenses and the lack of political incentive to monitor and 
punish illegal logging. Technically, the Ministry had legal responsibilities over the nation's 
forest estate. However, Suharto and his close political associates were able to influence 
the distribution of logging licences. This was particularly facilitated by placing close allies 
(initially family of Mrs Suharto) in key positions within the Ministry (Barr, 1998, p. 4). The 
use of timber concessions to support patronage networks has been well documented in 
many countries, Indonesia being no exception (Dauvergne, 1994; Ross, 2001; Smith et al., 
2003a; Soreide, 2007). In Indonesia, the majority of these lucrative timber concessions 
were given to important politico-business associates of Suharto (Poffenberger, 1997). In 
the 1970s, this meant that 65.4 million ha was under concessions held by a few hundred 
concessionaires (Repetto, 1988, p. 20). By 1993 it was estimated that over 30% of the 
concessions were controlled by five or six companies and the politically astute distribution 
of logging licences enabled Suharto to create personal financial ties to lucrative 
concession contracts (Poffenberger, 1997). 
There were many features of the regulations that governed these HPH licenses that 
contributed to their value as patronage and also contributed to the negative 
environmental impacts caused by logging operations. The first feature was low rent 
capture by the government. Between 1979 and 1985, only 38% of the rent from forest 
exploitation was appropriated by the Government, which given the rate of exploitation 
and the value of logs, represented a windfall profit to firms of US$2.8 billion between the 
years 1979-1982 (Repetto, 1988, p. 17). Firstly, low rent capture increases the value of 
concessions to private firms, which in turn increases the value of the concession in terms 
of patronage for the political elite (Ascher, 1999; Dauvergne, 1994). The political 
dependency of Suharto and the New Order government on patronage supports this 
rationale. Secondly, it enables commercial operations to remain profitable, despite 
potentially considerable political kickbacks (Poffenberger, 1997, p. 456). Whilst low rent 
capture is designed to attract investment and develop industries, these conditions 
continue long after industries have been established. For example, income taxes were 
rarely collected by government, even after companies had been established for over six 
years (Ross, 2001).^° 
The harvesting procedures of the HPH also contributed to the environmental impact of 
these logging operations. Legally, harvesting procedures followed the framework provided 
by Indonesia's selective cutting and replanting systems {Tebang Pilih Tanam Indonesia, 
TPTI) (Iskandar et al., 2006). The TPTI follows the system of forest management 
introduced by the German forest technicians during the colonial period. It allows for all 
commercial trees under 50-60 cm diameter at breast height^^ to be removed within a 
felling cycle of 35 years. Companies were also required to replant in logged areas. Where 
applied, these measures should reduce the negative environmental impact of logging 
activities and ensure a long-term supply of timber. However, even under the TPTI, 
between 28-40% of remaining trees were damaged during logging operations, with long-
term implications for rehabilitation and sustainable timber supply (Iskandar et al., 2006). 
In many cases also, logging operations ignored the conditions of TPTI and engaged in 
behaviours like high-grading, over-harvesting and ignoring fallow periods.^^ All of the 
above behaviours have been documented in the operation of many of the HPH licenses 
(Iskandar et al., 2006; Poffenberger, 1997; Repetto, 1988). 
Not only did these activities increase the negative impacts of logging operations, this type 
of illegal harvesting went unpunished. Collusion between companies and the military and 
police provided immunity from enforcement of forestry regulations (Dudley, 2002, p. 359; 
Poffenberger, 1997).^ ^ Whilst over-harvesting by concessionaires went unpunished, the 
police and military did restrict access to local communities. Given the fact that many 
forest areas were under the formal control of the state, many community areas, which 
^ Establishing companies were exennpt from paying income tax for the first six years of operation. 
' ' Diameter at breast height is a standard unit to measure tree size. 50-60cm depends on production forest 
type (Guritno and IViauro 1996:79). 
^^  High-grading refers to the selective removal of only the most valuable species. This is thought to affect the 
sustainability of the timber production of the forests, as it promotes reseeding by smaller or lesser quality 
trees. 
" The collusion also created a strong financial dependency by the police and military on the income 
generated by legal and illegal forestry operations (Dudley, 2002). 
had not been legally recognised, were subsumed under HPH concessions, a fact which 
arguably contributed to a degree of resentment by communities towards Jakarta and the 
Ministry (McCarthy, 2006). 
The legal restrictions forced many local community members to become complicit in 
illegal operations, either by helping concessionaires log outside concession boundaries, or 
illegal harvesting of timber from protected, conservation and reserve forests (Casson and 
Obidzinski, 2007). During the late 1980s, harvesting from within these protected forests 
was estimated to be about 2 million m^ of harvested timber (Swartz, 1990). As the 
military-bureaucracies were increasingly able to benefit at the local level from illegal 
logging, their control and power expanded (Casson and Obidzinski, 2007). 
Plywood, pulp and paper and industrial timber plantations 
Another factor contributing to the unsustainable exploitation of native forests in 
Indonesia was the 1980 restriction on raw log exports, which was expanded to full export 
bans in 1985. The regulation for this ban was established by the Ministries of Forestry, 
Industry, Home Affairs and Foreign Trade, and had several objectives, including to improve 
the export value of timber and to increase labour opportunities (Guritno and Murao, 
1999). The ban was accompanied by generous subsidies, including significant income tax 
holidays and export tax exemptions, in order to encourage investment in downstream 
processing (Repetto, 1988, p. 25). As a result, there was a rapid expansion of the plywood 
and later the pulp and paper industries, with the number of plywood processing mills 
increasing from 21 to 114 units before 1988 (Guritno and Murao, 1999). 
In order to make Indonesian plywood more competitive in the international markets, 
Suharto and the New Order began working with the wood panel association of Indonesia, 
Apkindo. Under the lead of Bob Hasan, a prominent figure in Suharto's inner circle, 
Apkindo were able to ensure that the Indonesian plywood consistently undercut 
competitors from other plywood-exporting countries (Barr, 1998, p. 16). By 1987, 
Indonesia had become the dominant international supplier of plywood, accounting for 
67% of the international market (Barr, 1998, p. 18), which grew to 85% by 1989 (Guritno 
and Murao, 1999). Pulp and paper production also increased during Suharto's 
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government. By 1999, pulp and paper products accounted for over 50% of Indonesia's 
forest-related export earnings, a total of $US 2.65 billion (Barr, 2000). Furthermore, even 
though these bans were ostensibly designed to improve the conditions for Indonesia, the 
financial support provided to the processing mills and the loss of export revenue from the 
ban on timber exports meant that the state effectively lost money through these reforms 
(Repetto, 1988, p. 25). Also there w/ere widespread abuses of funds earmarked for 
developing this industry (see section on the reforestation fund below). 
Beyond the negative economic impacts of the regulations that banned raw log exports, 
the rise of the pulp and paper industry also had environmental impacts. As the number of 
processing mills expanded, extreme pressure was put on natural forests to meet the raw 
timber demands (Poffenberger, 1997).^" Many of these mills were meant to be supplied 
by timber from native forests that were under HPH concessions; however, demand soon 
outweighed the legal supply of timber from these concessions. By 1998, the installed 
capacity of the processing industries (plywood, pulp and paper) was just over 116 million 
m^ of raw material and by comparison, the total legal timber supply from HPH in 1998 was 
43 million m' (Palmer, 2001). This shortfall was largely met with illegally harvested timber 
from native forests and forests zoned as permanent forests (Barr, 2000). 
The shortfall in the supply of raw timber from native forests was to be supplied by timber 
from plantations, which were regulated under the Timber Estate and Exploitation Right 
{Hak Pengusahaan Hutan Tanaman Industri, HTI). Whilst expectations were high, by 1995, 
only 520 000 ha of timber plantations had been established (Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 
1996). Beyond the sheer lack of area developed under HTI, there were several features of 
the HTI license which affected the ability of the HTI to reduce pressure on native forests. 
Firstly, the easy availability of cheap raw material from native forests has made many 
companies hesitant to commit to developing timber plantations (Barr, 2000). Secondly, 
the HTI licenses gave the owner the right to cut and sell the timber within the boundaries 
of their plantations. Technically, HTI were to be located in HPK, that is, in degraded 
forested land. However, the considerable financial benefits of harvesting native timber 
' In five years, over 110 processing mills were established (Poffenberger, 1997, p. 459). 
encouraged HTI owners to locate their plantation sites on areas with significant forest 
cover (Barr et al., 2010a; Poffenberger, 1997). In some cases this even meant that no 
plantations were developed, as the main interests of the HTI holder was to gain access to 
cheap timber by clearing the native forests (Barr et al., 2010a). Even where plantations 
have been established, the conditions of the license stated that only 60% of areas must be 
established under plantation. This allowed 40% of concession area to be cleared without 
subsequent use (Poffenberger, 1997). Lastly, many HTI plantations were established with 
favourable government subsidies. Interest-free loans, funded through the reforestation 
fund and income tax holidays were provided to HTI licensees, many of who were close 
associates of Suharto. These subsidies encouraged inefficient and risky management 
strategies, such as developing large processing facilities without securing legal or 
sustainable timber supply (Barr, 2000). Yet despite these problems and the fact that so 
little timber was coming from plantations,^^ the government continued to establish new 
processing mills (Resosudarmo, 2002). The overcapacity of the processing industry 
remains an ongoing concern in some parts of Indonesia, as policy makers are faced with 
strong pressures to maintain the supply of raw materials to the processing facilities (Barr, 
2002, p. 195). 
Reforestation fund 
Implicit recognition of forest depletion led to the development of a performance-based 
forest rehabilitation fund, which was restructured into the reforestation fund {Dana 
reboisasi) in 1989 (Barr et al., 2010a). The reforestation fund was a non-refundable 
volume-based levy kept in an off-budget account, administered solely by the Ministry. 
Beginning at USS7.00 per cubic meter of timber over the period between 1989 and 1993, 
the reforestation fund grew to an average of US$16.00/m'.'® The collective contributions 
to the fund totalled US$5.8 billion over the two decades of operation, making it the most 
Between 1988 and 1999 less than 8 million m of the estimated 100 million m^ of timber required by 
processing mills came from timber plantations (Barr, 2000). 
^'ihis was averaged, because different species have different rates. 
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significant fund for the forestry sector and contributing between 65-70% of revenue from 
forest activities betvi/een 1993 and 1998 (Barr et al., 2010a)." 
By placing control of this fund vi/ithin the IVIinistry, the political elite of the time were able 
to manipulate the use of the money, without the oversight of the Ministry of Finance. This 
facilitated a high degree of abuse and corruption in the distribution of the reforestation 
funds. That is, rather than providing funds to rehabilitate native forests, this fund was 
directed at developing processing facilities and timber plantations. Over US$1 billion was 
provided, in low-interest loans, to firms establishing HTI, many of which have since gone 
bankrupt or failed to establish sustainable timber supplies (Barr et al., 2010a). As 
described above, large sums, US$ 109 million, were also paid to develop processing 
facilities and timber mills (Barr et al., 2010a). Substantial amounts of the fund also went to 
support politically motivated operations, including $10 million to a helicopter company 
owned by Suharto's youngest son, Tommy (Barr et al., 2010b, p. 19). Although there have 
been some changes to the management of the reforestation fund^®—it is now managed 
by the Ministry of Finance and more of the fund is distributed to the area from which it 
was collected—arguably much of the damage has already occurred as many of the areas 
previously degraded during the logging boom have not been rehabilitated, which has 
increased the demand for alternative land uses (Barr et al. 2010). 
3.4 Reformasi and the rise of the district 
In 1998, the combination of the Asian financial crisis (1997/98) and widespread student 
protests led to the resignation of President Suharto. The political hole caused by the 
resignation of Suharto, as well as the economic impact of the Asian financial crisis, led to a 
rapid transformation of the entire governance structure of Indonesia as the spirit of 
" At the time, the payments to the reforestation fund were large compared to the two other revenue 
sources: royalty and the concession payment fees. 
^ Under Law 22, 60% of the reforestation fund is controlled by the Central government and 40% is 
distributed to the region where it was collected. However, that 40% is usually distributed to the province 
and then distributed equally to all districts within the province (IVloeliono et al., 2009, p. 273). 
reformasi^^ spread across the archipelago. During this period of reformation, a process of 
formal decentralisation of many government responsibilities to the district 
{kabupaten/kota) level began."" Formally, decentralisation in Indonesia was achieved 
through the passing of Law 22 on regional governance [Undang-undang Permerintahan 
Daerah, UU 22/1999) and Law 25 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and 
the Regions (Undang-Undang Perimbangan Keuangan Antara Pemerintah Pusat dan 
Daerah, UU 25/1999). UU 22/1999 devolved authority to district and municipalities for 
many administrative functions'" so that, in 2001 when the laws were formally 
implemented, district governments assumed control over areas including health, 
education, environment, land and manpower (Article 11). UU 25/1999 established the 
provisions for distributing finances between various levels of government. 
There are several implications of the decentralisation in Indonesia that have affected 
forest governance. Firstly, more generally, decentralisation reforms established some 
conditions to strengthen political participation, including establishing district-level 
elections and a higher degree of participation for different political parties than had 
occurred during Suharto's rule. However, the structure of the electoral system and the 
provision of finances to district governments outlined in Laws 22 and 25 had the effect of 
reducing the direct accountability of local politicians to the electorate. This was because 
citizens voted for political parties represented in the local administrative assembly {Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD),and the district head (Bupati) was determined by 
elections held by the members of that local administrative assembly. This meant that the 
Bupati are directly accountable to the local administrative assembly, rather than to 
citizens. It also meant that the election process for the Bupati became dependent on the 
system of distribution of favors, resulting in the development of strong systems of 
^Reformasi refers to the political changes that were brought about with the fall of Suharto—the term also 
implies a spirit of local empowerment and a greater distribution of benefits to regional areas (IVIcCarthy, 
2000a). 
'"Kabupaten and kota represent the same level of government, however the former refers to district-level 
government in regional areas and the later refers to district-level government in urban areas. 
Exceptions include security, defense, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and religious 
affairs (Article 7,1). 
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patronage at the local level in many districts (McCarthy, 2002a, b). This suggests that 
rather than relieving the political system of patronage, decentralisation in Indonesia 
resulted in a decentralisation of corruption and contributed to the strengthening of local-
level patronage networks."^ 
Implementation of these decentralisation regulations at the district level was also difficult 
because they w/ere not being implemented on a clear political landscape. That is, in local 
areas, the era of reformasi represented an opportunity for self-determination and 
particularly an opportunity to reclaim some of the benefits of resource exploitation 
(McCarthy, 2004). This meant that prior to formal decentralisation, many district 
governments had already begun issuing regulations and asserting their authority in 
different sectors (McCarthy, 2004; Moeliono et al., 2009). 
Despite the enthusiasm of the district governments to embrace their new-found 
authority, there were some disputes over the actual degree of decentralisation of forest 
management (Ribot et al., 2006). Despite the fact that neither Law 22 nor 25 refer to 
forest operations directly, the message of regional autonomy led the district heads to 
assume that the principles applied to forestry also. However, whilst districts sought to 
extend their control of forest lands, they came into conflict with the powers of the 
Ministry, who in turn claimed that districts did not have the capacity to manage the 
nation's forest resources (Dermawan et al., 2006; Ribot et al., 2006). As a result, the 
Ministry sought to re-establish its authority over forest resources, as evident in the 
introduction of the New Forestry Law (UU 41/1999) in the early era of reformasi. Law 
41/1999 does not mention the transfer of authority to districts. Instead, it outlined the 
broader authorities and function of the Ministry, which included classifying forest areas 
and changing the status and function of forests, setting criteria and standards for royalties 
and licensing activities in forest areas (Resosudarmo, 2004). Therefore, even though 
decentralisation of some sectors has occurred, in relation to forest management, regional 
and provincial governments had little formal control over the management of areas within 
the forest estate, which arguably contributed to ongoing tensions between the newly 
" Since reformasi, electoral reforms mean that district heads are directly elected. 
empowered district heads and the Ministry. One area where this conflict was particularly 
apparent was in conflict over the authority to issue small-scale timber harvesting permits 
(IPPK). 
In the early post-Suharto period, the Ministry established regulations to allocate small 
timber concessions (Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, HPHHj and the controversial small-
scale timber harvesting permits {Izin Pemungutan dan Pemanfaatan Kayu, IPPK), which 
were to be distributed by provincial and district governments respectively. The former, 
HPHH, were designed to enable communities to harvest non-timber forest products. The 
latter followed the Timber Utilization Permit {Izin Pemanfaatan Kayu, IPK) and allowed 
communities to clear 100 ha of forests to establish plantations (Palmer and Obidzinski, 
2003). 
Within weeks of the IPPK concession being available, district officers were flooded with 
applications. Across one district in East Kalimantan, in the first half of 2000 alone, the land 
under IPPK went from almost nothing to covering 11 000 ha (Casson and Obidzinski, 
2007). Part of the explanation for the rapid release of IPPK licenses was the political and 
economic importance of these licenses for district governments. Economically, the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, as well as decentralisation reforms, had significant impact on the 
financial capacity of many district governments. With the majority of funds distributed 
under Law 25 involving pre-determined expenses such as public service wages, the IPPK 
licenses offered an independent revenue stream. This was not only in terms of timber 
royalties and licensing fees but also in the variety of new taxes and fees which were 
established at the district level (Barr et al., 2006). Politically, there was also a desire to 
establish revenue streams independent of Jakarta (World Bank, 2003), which added to the 
incentive for district officials to distribute IPPK licenses. On an individual level the ability to 
attract investment and distribute patronage was seen as an important legitimating factor 
for district heads (McCarthy, 2000b, 2004) and allowed them to collect personal benefits 
which had been denied during Suharto's era (Barr et al., 2006, p. 27). 
The IPPK licenses differed from HPH licenses in several ways, which contributed to the 
controversy surrounding these licenses. Firstly, no reforestation or selective logging 
requirements are outlined in the legislation. Secondly, unlike the 20-year rotation system 
of the HPH licenses, IPPK licenses only granted access for 6-12 months. This short time 
creates no incentives to manage the forests for future harvests."^ In terms of cutting 
operations there has also been poor harvesting practices documented in IPPK, including 
higher harvest rate and increased residual stand damage than occurred under HPH 
licenses (Iskandar et a!., 2006). Also, legally, the IPPK licenses were to be granted only in 
community forests, and not to be granted for land under the HPH. However, many of 
these licenses were allocated within areas under HPH concessions licenses (Barr et al., 
2006; Casson and Obidzinski, 2007). This contributed to over-harvest within these areas. 
Under decentralisation, there also were no incentives for districts to seek to conserve 
forested lands as they were financially dependent on royalties collected from extraction 
(Moeliono et al., 2009, p. 273). 
There were also widespread allegations of corruption in the distribution of IPPK licenses 
(see Smith et al., 2003). These allegations include conflicts of interest between forestry 
officials, military and regional members of parliament, all reportedly having stakes in IPPK 
operations (Barr et al., 2006). Collusion between IPPK operators and provincial and district 
forest officers enabled IPPK operators to overstate available timber (Smith et al., 2003a). 
Smith and colleagues also found that concessionaires were under-harvesting within their 
concession boundaries; for example, where the authorised harvest was 49mVha, the 
average actual harvest within the concession was only 20mVha, which meant that 
concessionaires were logging beyond the prescribed 100 ha, in order to reach the 
maximum 49 m^ harvest (2003a, p. 297). 
Even though IPPK were also initially designed to enable community participation and 
benefits from logging operations, the operation of these concessions in many districts was 
quickly captured by the local elite and outside business interests (Casson and Obidzinski, 
2007; McCarthy, 2000a). One study of Malinau district in East Kalimantan found that these 
concessions were often in the hands of local entrepreneurs, who had extensive political 
" This reflects the aim of these licenses to promote small-scale agriculture, rather than a long-term timber 
industry. 
ties. Some even had histories of trading in illegally harvested timber during the Suharto 
era (Limberg, 2009). For villages in these areas, volume-based royalty payments meant 
that they had little incentive to report any irregularities in the IPPK operations (Smith et 
al., 2003). 
The various problems associated w/ith the IPPK licenses led to Ministerial decree no 
084/200, which w/ithdrew the authority of district heads to distribute IPPK licenses. 
How/ever, this was disputed by many district governments, and IPPK continued to be 
awarded (Ribot et al., 2006), which gave some level of legal support for logging activities 
that were, according to the Ministry, illegal. 
Indeed, illegal logging during the early post-Suharto period is widely reported to have 
been very widespread. This was due to factors such as the limited capacity to enforce rule 
of law because of the weakened state, but also ambiguities in regulation which enabled a 
variety of different activities to be legalised under competing regulations (McCarthy, 
2002a). By 2001, illegal logging was thought to be one of the most critical threats to 
Indonesia's forest cover, accounting for 50-70% of total log production in some districts 
(ITTO, 2001). However, ambiguities in the regulation surrounding forest use mean that 
what is illegal at the national level may be legal according to district regulations. That is, 
conflicting regulation enabled different actors to defend a variety of activities on the bases 
of competing national and regional regulations (Ribot et al., 2006, p. 1873). In practice this 
has contributed to a situation where the Ministry remains the legal authority regarding 
forest use within the forest estate (which accounts for 76% of the territory of Indonesia), 
but district government have retained significant de facto control over resources within 
their territories. This means that the accuracy of any figures on the amount of illegal 
logging during this period are questionable and in some cases may significantly over-
estimate the illegal harvest (Casson and Obidzinski, 2007; Tacconi et al., 2004). 
Nonetheless, illegal forest operations have remained a significant ongoing challenge for 
the sustainable management of Indonesia's forests. 
3.5 Remaining challenges for forest management 
3.5.1 Land-use planning and the division of power between central and district 
government 
As described in section 3.4, in the early period following reformasi, there was considerable 
confusion over the exact distribution of powers between the central Ministry and the 
lower levels of government, particularly the district-level government. That is, following 
the spirit of reformasi, district governments claimed authority to distribute some licenses. 
However this authority was quickly revoked by the central Ministry, which sought to 
retain the authority to manage the nation's legal forest estate. Since this early period, 
there have arguably been some improvements as different actors' powers, such as power 
to distribute licenses, have become clearer. That is, the Ministry retains control over 
awarding licenses for activities within the forest estate, but applications to the Ministry 
must have recommendations from the district and province where the proposed activity 
will occur. The district and provincial governments then have authority to award licenses 
for activities outside the forest estate, which includes areas that have been annexed from 
the forest estate. Despite this clearer division of authority in the distribution of licenses, 
the tensions have arguably shifted to conflicts over the zoning of land between forest and 
non-forest estate. That is, the remaining tensions between the Ministry and other levels of 
governance are now largely focused around the distribution of land between the forest 
estate and non-forest estate and consequently there is ongoing tension over what licenses 
are required by different activities in different areas. 
Firstly in relation to areas released from the forest estate, the formal process involves the 
application for a release permit {izin pelepasari kawasan hutan). This release permit is 
awarded by the Ministry, based on an evaluation of the area, and legally annexes land 
from the forest estate."" Any activity that involves clearing forestlands and replacing it 
with an alternative land-use must have this release permit from the Ministry, before any 
For forest areas to be annexed from the forest estate they must meet several criteria, including less than 
20mVha of commercial species with a DBH less than 30 cm. 
clearing can occur. On paper this process is clear; however, in practice there are significant 
challenges due in part to conflicting ideas about where the forest estate lies. The 
conflicting ideas are due in part to the fact that many areas in the legal forest estate (as 
specified in the TGHK) were not originally forestlands or have since been subject to 
clearing, meaning there is a disconnect between the legal zoning of forestlands and the 
actual forest cover. 
One case of this conflict between formal forestlands and actual land-use in Central 
Kalimantan is the case of the mega rice project. The mega rice project was a vision of the 
Suharto Government, which in 1996 sought to convert over 1 million ha of peat-land 
forest in Central Kalimantan to rice production. From 1997 the area was cleared of timber, 
canals were built, peat-lands were drained and some rice crops were planted. Far from 
becoming the food bowl of Indonesia, however, the mega-rice project failed to produce 
any rice and many areas of the former project were left unattended, were burnt in 
extensive wildfires or were converted to oil palm plantations (Galudra et al., 2010). In 
2006, a court decision revoked the original government decree, arguing that the 
procedures for releasing the forestlands had not been followed. That is, the area had not 
been formally annexed from the forest estate with a legal release permit (Galudra et al., 
2010). The lands of the mega-rice project were therefore reclaimed by the Ministry and 
any concession in the area became illegal. Since this court decision, there have been 
successive attempts by the provincial, district and central Ministry to resolve the disputes 
over the land-use plan and establish boundaries of the forest estate (Appendix 5), but 
many areas remain in dispute and tensions continue as different levels or departments of 
government adopt different land-use plans, which I discuss further in Chapters 5 and 7. 
3.5.2 Ongoing forest loss to oil palm concessions 
As second challenge for forest management has to do with managing the impacts of the 
expanding oil palm industry. Oil palm {Elaeis) was first introduced to Indonesia during the 
Dutch occupation, yet it has only been the last few decades that the industry has 
undergone rapid expansion (Casson, 2000). The easy availability of land and high 
international price for the oil palm products led Suharto, in 1996, to plan expanding the 
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area of land dedicated to oil palm to 5.5million ha by 2000 (Casson, 2000). Whilst shy of 
Suharto's vision, oil palm covers a total of 4.6 million ha in Indonesia (Shell et al., 2009). 
This represents an increase of over 2100% since the late 1980s. The popularity of oil palm 
comes from the fact that the oil produced by these palms is incredibly versatile and cheap 
to produce, vi/ith up to three to eight times the productive yield of other seed-based oil 
crops (Wahid et al., 2005). The oil is used domestically as well as being exported for food 
and non-food products (Wahid et al., 2005). When processed, palm oil can also be used as 
a bio-diesel, a fuel source which has a potentially better energy/pollutant ratio than other 
hydrocarbon-based fuel (Shell et al., 2009). 
The high value and extensive production of oil palm has contributed to the Indonesian 
economy. In 2007 alone, export revenues from oil palm in Indonesia were over US$12 000 
million (Shell et al., 2009). The oil palm industry also provides district-level economic 
benefits through land fees, royalties and employment (Rist et al., 2010). There are also 
opportunities for local communities to benefit from the expanding oil palm sectors, 
particularly in the operation of the Nucleus Estate and Shareholder (NES) system. In the 
NES system, farmers sign portions of their land to a company, often 10 ha. The company, 
which collects many individual farmers' areas, develops as a commercial plantation 
comprising the core commercial area {inti) and the outer area {plasma). The plasma area 
is, in turn, divided into smallholdings, often 2 ha, and returned to the farmer groups 
(Barlow et al., 2003; Rist et al., 2010). Even though this system does provide income and 
employment in areas where other sources of economic development may be limited, 
there have been many reported incidents of human rights abuses associated with the oil 
palm sector. These include poor employment conditions, intimidation and even violence 
towards local communities (Marti, 2008). There are also complications with the 
regulations regarding smallholders as the law, which allocates 20% of concessions to 
smallholder plantations, and whether this law requires the 20% to be inside or outside the 
HGU license area. There is also considerable inequality in the distribution of benefits 
between small-holders and the international corporate benefits. For example, the debt 
structure of the nucleus system can leave some small-holdings indebted to the 
establishing company for up to 14 years (Barlow et al., 2003). Yet despite these problems, 
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enthusiasm for developing oil palm plantations in Indonesia remains high and it has been 
reported that up to 20 million more ha of land has been reserved for oil palm 
development by local governments (cited from Rist et al., 2010). 
Although oil palm plantations do confer benefits to the Indonesian economy, poor 
governance has meant that many of the benefits of oil palm have come at the expense of 
rapid conversion of tropical forests (Wilcove and Koh, 2010). Based on analysis of FAO 
spatial data, Koh and Wilcove (2008) argue that between 1995 and 2005, 56% of the 
expansion of oil palm plantations in Indonesia was at the expense of forested lands. In 
many areas this conversion has occurred in ex HPH (Darussamin et al., 2003). The 
contribution of poor management of HPH concessions, particularly to forest degradation, 
has already been discussed. However, even degraded forests can maintain ecological 
function and, in time, recover. By clearing remaining forests and establishing oil palm 
plantations there have been added environmental impacts, including biodiversity loss, as 
few forest dwelling species can inhabit areas under oil palm (Wilcove and Koh, 2010), as 
well as other landscape problems including increased fire hazard and carbon emissions 
(Sheiletal., 2009). 
Importantly, poor governance and corruption in the management of the expanding oil 
palm industry is a key concern for the future management of Indonesia's forests. This is 
because plantations may only be established in the forest estate if it is zoned as 
conversion forests (HPK), meaning the area has been released from the forest estate. 
However, as with the HTI licenses, release permits from the Ministry give the plantation 
operator the right to cut and sell timber from within their plantation boundary. This has 
led to corruption in the placing of concessions in areas where there is considerable timber 
supply (Koh and Wilcove, 2008). It has also led to large areas being zoned to oil palm and 
cleared accordingly, with no plantations developed. For example, in West Kalimantan, 
only one million ha of land was planted with oil palm, despite 5.3 million ha of land being 
allocated under oil palm permits, suggesting that at the time, access to timber may still be 
a driving force behind deforestation and forest degradation (Casson et al., 2007 cited in 
Shell et al., 2009). There have been efforts to improve the management of the oil palm 
industry and minimise the impacts on the forests,"^ but it is clear that there are competing 
priorities over oil palm expansion and the ongoing management of forestlands. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a background to the Indonesian case and presented information 
that further justifies the selection of Indonesia as a case for this research. Specifically, I 
described the importance of Indonesia's forests and the long history of activities that have 
contributed to high rates of deforestation and forest degradation. Beginning with colonial 
occupation, 1 have described the evolution of forestry regulations, and highlighted some 
key governance challenges that remain. Two key arguments from this chapter that are 
most relevant to the future chapters are: firstly, the ongoing tensions between the central 
Ministry and the districts over authority to award licenses and determine land-uses and 
secondly, the challenges of corruption and illegal activities in the forest sector. These 
issues will be analysed in greater detail in Chapters 5 through 7. Before this analysis, 
however, the next chapter provides a similar background for the case of Papua New 
Guinea. 
NGOs, for example Sawit Watch, have been particularly vocal in their efforts to improve the management 
of the oil palm industry, including campaigns to encourage oil palm expansion on forestlands that had 
already been degraded. 
Chapter 4 
The Papua New Guinea Case 
4.1 Introduction 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) is well-l<nown for the high diversity of unique species in its 
forests, and for the diverse character of its people and systems of iandownership. PNG is 
also renow/ned for a long history of corruption and mismanagement of its forest 
resources. This chapter presents a background to the history of forest management and 
the current status of forests, and forest exploitation in PNG. Before going into more detail 
of the history of forest governance and corruption, I begin w/ith a brief introduction to the 
physical and cultural context of PNG. The second section describes the history of forest 
exploitation and describes the evolution of the legal framework relevant to forest 
management. This is followed by a more in-depth description of the current forestry Act, 
focusing on the system of licensing and the broader administrative structure. The final 
section highlights the key remaining challenges in managing forests in PNG, and the 
problems of Ministerial interference, bureaucratic capacity and the challenge of 
Iandownership. Whilst this background chapter attempts to cover a great deal of 
information, it is nonetheless selective—focusing only on a few key regulations and 
conditions in relation to forestry, deforestation and the broader context in PNG that are 
most relevant to understanding the following chapters. 
4.2 The physical environment 
4.2.1 Geography 
PNG is located on the eastern half of the Island of New Guinea (of which Indonesia Papua 
is the west). The 462 840 km^ of Papua New Guinean territory includes 85% on the 
mainland and the remaining 15% spread across over 600 islands. Of these 600-odd islands. 
New Britain, Bougainville, and New Ireland are the biggest. The geography of mainland 
PNG is dominated by the central cordillera which runs for over 2000 km from the northern 
corner of the Indonesian province of Papua down to the ocean in the southern tip of PNG. 
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Formed over millions of years of tectonic activity, the cordillera is a series of folding and 
rugged mountain terrain, w/hich pans out to the lowlands of Western Province and eastern 
coastal areas. 
4.2.2 People and landownership 
With over 826 known languages spread over a population of only 7.01 million people 
(World Bank, 2011), Papua New Guineans are recognised as one of the most diverse 
nations around the world. The majority (88%) of PNG people live in rural areas (World 
Bank, 2011), which because of the rugged terrain makes trade and development difficult. 
These rural villages and towns rely on (both subsistence and marketable) agriculture, 
some fishing and non-timber forest products for survival. Education, particularly in these 
rural areas, remains low, and child mortality rates remain high (UNICEF, 2003). The 
remaining 12% of Papua New Guineans live in several (fast-growing) urban centres, such 
as the capital Port Moresby, and Lae. These urban areas have better access to services and 
markets, but they do suffer from high rates of crime, violence and poverty (Guthrie et al., 
2005). 
Socially and administratively, the structure of PNG society varies greatly across the 
territory; however, in general Papua New Guineans retain a strong sense of connection 
with their land and the people from that area (commonly referred to as the wantok 
system).^® In much of the literature about natural resource management in PNG, people 
are referred to as landowners. Landownership in PNG, as in much of Melanesian culture, 
has particular social, historical and economic factors as land is fundamental to individual 
and group identity (for example see Filer, 1997; Sillitoe, 1999). To this end, customary land 
is well protected in legislation—It cannot be 'sold, leased, mortgaged or disposed of 
except in accordance with custom'." It is also to a certain extent protected in de facto 
"'Wantok is an incredibly complex phenomenon but generally it refers to strong kinship relationships. See de 
Renzio 2000 for some more description. 
" According to section 132 of the Land Act 1996, "Subject to Sections 10 [State acquisition] and 11 [lease 
leaseback], a customary landowner has no power to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of customary land or 
customary rights otherwise than to citizens in accordance with custom, and a contract or agreement made 
by him to do so is void.' 
systems. That is, whilst there has been a great deal of land (legally and illegally) taken 
from customary owners/^ the power of landowners remains dominant in PNG as 
customary landownership traditions, which for example define inheritance and the use 
rights of different resources, constitute some of the key governing rules In PNG's forests 
(Tararia and Ogle, 2010). The power of landowners and the challenge of resource 
exploitation in such a situation is evident in the many and costly disputes between the 
current liquid natural gas project and the many landowner groups affected (see Garrett, 
2011). 
4.2.3 Forest resources and the problem of deforestation 
PNG is a naturally resource-rich country, with resource rents from natural resources 
contributing 36.4% of the country's GDP between 2008 and 2012 (World Bank, 2011). This 
includes resources such as gold, coal, gas and oil. PNG's 28 million ha of forests (FAO, 
2011) are also a source of wealth. Unlike Indonesian teak, very few PNG species are 
known on international timber markets'" (PNG FA, 2007b), and the rugged terrain in many 
areas makes harvesting difficult (Filer, 1997). Despite this, from 1990-2006, the forest 
sector contributed on average 7% to PNG's GDP (ITS Global, 2006a). This is no doubt an 
important contribution from forest exploitation, but these figures nonetheless 
underestimate the important subsistence value of forest resources, as much of the 
population of PNG depends on local resources for their livelihoods. 
Data about the rate of deforestation and forest degradation in PNG is limited. One study 
suggests that since 1970 approximately 15% of primary forest has been cleared, with a 
further 8% degraded; a total of almost eight million ha (Shearman et al., 2008). The major 
causes of this deforestation and forest degradation, according to Shearman and 
colleagues, were logging (48.2% of net forest change) and subsistence agriculture (45.6%), 
For further discussion on the process of land grabbing and the political economy customary 
landownership see Filer and Nikhil (1998) and Filer (2011). 
Some of the main commercial tree species that are exported from PNG are; Homalium, Pometia, 
Calophyllum, Eucalyptus, Terminalia, Dillenia, Toono, Buchananio, Canarium, Anistoptera, Endospermum, 
Octomeles, Instia, Syzgium,, Celtis, Burckella ,Mastixiodendron, Dracontomelont, Canarium (PNG FA, 2007b). 
with lesser causes being fires (4.4%) plantations (1.2%) and mining (0.6%) (2008). 
However, these results have been criticised for overestimating the impact of swidden 
agriculture and underestimating the regenerative capacity of PNG forests (Filer et al., 
2009). 
The impact of deforestation and forest degradation in PNG has also not been well 
documented. The impact of deforestation and forest degradation on carbon emissions 
suggests that it has resulted in between 146 and 269 MtC02e being released in 2007 
alone.^° Forest loss has implications for biodiversity loss. For example, a study of 
deforestation on New Britain island estimates that the loss of 12% of the forest cover 
could threaten up to 28 endemic bird species (Buchanan et al., 2008). Finally, forest loss 
and degradation has potentially significant impacts on the livelihoods of many PNG 
people, both directly, due to the loss of access to hunting grounds, or the changing system 
of swidden agriculture. Indirectly, many of the (particularly commercial) activities that 
contribute to deforestation and forest degradation also have wider impacts, including 
causing river pollution (for logging examples see Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring, 2003, 2004b). These impacts are exacerbated by the fact that many of the 
promised development and infrastructure benefits associated with the timber (or mining) 
industry have often failed to materialise. A review of existing projects (in part 
commissioned by the World bank) found that in general the 'benefits to landowners from 
logging generally last less than five years, and are too small to result in any long term 
improvements in socio-economic welfare, especially given the paucity of public services to 
augment and multiply their impact' (Review Team, 2004). That is, despite millions of Kina 
paid to landowners (and millions more to the national and provincial governments), the 
general conditions for most PNG people remain dire, as the literacy and mortality rates 
provided earlier demonstrate. 
Filer and colleagues have heavily criticised this amount, because it is based on an overestimation of the 
rate of deforestation and a failure to account for reforestation or the actual practice of swidden agricultural 
system. 
4.3 The management of forest resources 
4.3.1 Colonial 
Although European explorers had travelled past PNG in the early 16th century and there 
were some brief experiments by Christian missionaries (Dorney, 2000, p. 26), it was not 
until the late 19th century that colonial occupation really began. The Dutch claimed the 
western half of the New Guinea mainland in 1848 (now the Indonesian province of 
Papua). The north-eastern corner of the mainland, along with several islands, was taken 
under the colonial administration of the German Empire in 1884, under the name of New 
Guinea.^' Three days after raising the German flag, the southern half of eastern New 
Guinea was claimed as British territory, Papua, and put under the administration of the 
Colony of Queensland (Dorney, 2000, p. 26). The colonial administration of Papua was 
transferred to the administration of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1909 and after 
WWII, under the guidance of the United Nations, the territories of Papua and New Guinea 
were united under the Australian colonial administration. Throughout this colonial period, 
these different powers developed several key regulations relevant to the evolution of 
forest policy and forest management. 
Firstly, whilst the Germans efforts to establish an agricultural centre were largely 
disappointing," they did develop several policies that became key forest legislation for 
many years. For example, the 1936-37 Forestry Ordinance, which lasted well into 
independence, was based on a German forestry ordinance and was adopted to cover all of 
PNG after WWII. This 1936-37 Ordinance was particularly important because it established 
the conditions by which the government could coordinate activities on land that was still 
held by landowners. That is, the ordinance established the conditions for the timber rights 
^'ihe German colonial operations viewed New Guinea as a possible German Java, in reference to the 
agricultural and timber booms of the Dutch colonial administration in Java described in the previous chapter, 
^^he high rate of mortality of both the administration and the worker (particularly from malaria) and the 
constant battles with local groups over land meant that most agriculture efforts were abandoned quickly 
(Ohff, 2008). 
76 
purchase (TRP). Under the process of the TRP," the government purchased the rights to 
harvest the timber products from landowners (rather than rights to the land), and then 
sold-on these harvest rights to a developer, in the form of permits and licenses (ODI, 2007, 
p. 7). Beyond the initial decision to lease their land under a TRP, the landowners had no 
control over subsequent decisions, such as which company would log in their area. 
Landowners were also denied many financial benefits, as systems of payments and debt 
by government left many landowner groups receiving very little for their timber (Barnett, 
1990a). 
In 1971, under Australian colonial control, the new Forestry (Private Dealings) Ordinance 
was introduced. The effect of the Private Dealings Ordinance was to shift much of the 
power of forestry operations away from the bureaucracy because it allowed landowners, 
organised into landowner companies, to negotiate directly with potential logging 
contractors. A successful negotiation led to the formation of Local Forest Area (LFA) 
agreements, which had to be approved by the Minister. Even though the Private Dealings 
Ordinance sought to more directly empower landowners, in practice they (or their 
representatives) often lacked the capacity to effectively negotiate these contracts. Many 
of the executives of these landowner companies were also engaged in collusive 
relationships with logging contractors, leading to the private capture of many of the 
profits that were meant to go toward landowner development projects (Forest Revenue 
Review Team, 2002; Review Team, 2004). The different types of corrupt activities that 
dominated that period of forestry in PNG are well-documented and continued into 
independence (Barnett, 1990a). 
4.3.2 Independence 
The transition to self-rule and eventual independence in PNG began in 1972, moving to be 
self-governing in 1973. When PNG became fully independent in 1975, significant 
governance challenges remained and the context of PNG independence was fraught with 
difficulties. This included 'weak administrative systems, foreign laws often at odds with 
®^/Vhich were officially laid out in the 1951 forest policy statement. 
customary laws and an elite PNG minority representing only 1 per cent of citizens' (Pitts, 
2001). These challenges have been played out in the struggles and problems of forest 
management since independence. 
Firstly, there were some attempts to create laws that better reflected and engaged with 
landowners. One mechanism to facilitate this was the creation of the Lands Group 
Incorporation Act (1974). This Act sought to legally recognise and engage customary 
groups by encouraging them to register as a formal group, called Incorporated Landowner 
Group (ILG). The ILGs are 'a registration of a group, rather than registering ownership over 
land, meaning that none of these measures interfere with the customary arrangement of 
temporary access rights to land resources for certain individuals' (ODI, 2007, p. 2). Under 
this Lands Group Incorporation Act, the members of the clan must submit an application 
to the Department of Lands and Physical Planning. The application should include a list of 
all members and a registration of assets of the group, such as a description of the land 
area. These applications are meant to be verified by government officials, for example, to 
ensure that the membership reflects the true and comprehensive list of landowners. Once 
this has been submitted, the application details are advertised in the national Gazette to 
allow for any concerns by others to be voiced. If no complaints are made, the group is 
formally registered. The registration was initially seen as a mechanism to promote 
community management of their resources, however it has become the key vehicle by 
which companies, such as logging companies (hereafter referred to as developers), gain 
consent from the landowners (Marru, 2002), ILGs are also often the main vehicle for the 
distribution of royalty payments from development activities. 
As well as the ILG, the other formal bodies that have come to be representatives and key 
actors in the process of resource exploitation are the so-called landowner companies. 
Under the Companies Act, these are standard commercial companies.^" Executives of 
landowner companies have also emerged as main actors, negotiating the conditions of 
logging contracts on behalf of the landowners, and also have major roles in managing the 
Landowner companies are required to have named shareholders and directors, to hold an annual general 
meeting, and to lodge annual company returns. 
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funds that are distributed to landowners through royalty payment systems. Their 
connection to actual landowners is often limited to including several ILGs as shareholders. 
The only assets that many landowner companies have are the customary lands to which 
they belong (Filer, 2011). 
Even though these efforts were designed to enable landowners (and the country) to 
benefit from the exploitation of resources, in practice there continued to be major 
challenges. One of the major challenges was a result of the abusive and negligent 
practices of landowner company executives. The executives—who were meant to 
represent landowners and manage the distribution of royalties—were often self-
appointed, with little experience of company management (Simpson, 1997). This meant 
that there were poorly designed contracts with logging companies, and royalties were 
often embezzled or misused. For example, in one case in West New Britain, the conditions 
of the agreements were that the landowner company, not the logging contractor, was 
responsible for meeting the forest management guidelines of the Department of Forests. 
Furthermore, widespread Ministerial interference occurred, with local and national 
politicians and Ministers promoting and failing to ensure there was due practice (Barnett, 
1990a). The consequence was that in several areas, such as New Britain, there was 
significant destruction of forest cover, with few benefits to the nation and the people. It 
was this widespread corruption and other abuses that eventually led to then Prime 
Minister Paisa Wingti, in 1987 to instigate a Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the 
Forest Industry, led by Judge Thomas Barnett. 
4.3.3 The Barnett inquiry 
The investigation by Judge Barnett took two years to complete and resulted in 20 
volumes, seven interim reports and one final report and has been a crucial document to 
the evolution of forest governance in PNG. Judge Barnett uncovered widespread 
corruption, fraud and the abuses of privilege by politicians, industry officials and to a 
lesser extent the forestry bureaucracy. He describes an industry riddled with corruption 
and abuse as 'the practice of Ministers and senior public servants of negligently, and 
sometimes deliberately, ignoring and contravening the laws of Papua New Guinea's 
Parliament and the policies of its government' (Barnett, 1990a, p. 18). 
There were several key findings of the report that are relevant to the evolution of forest 
policy in PNG, and more specifically to the analysis and findings of this thesis. First was the 
ubiquitous problem of Ministerial interference, conflicts of interest and corruption. This 
included payments by logging companies to provincial MPs (one member of the national 
parliament reportedly received overseas travel and payments of K30 000 from a foreign 
logging company) and landowner company executives to ensure that their company was 
selected for the logging contract (Barnett, 1990a). 
Secondly, Barnett's report documents the genuine failure of the PNG government and the 
landowners in logging areas to benefit financially from forestry operations. The losses to 
the government were particularly large due to the widespread practice of transfer 
pricing." Poor regulations—which set low minimum sales prices for their timber, enabling 
companies to undervalue their timber and reduce tax payments—in conjunction with 
corrupt and complicit officials who failed to enforce regulations, meant that many 
companies failed to pay sufficient taxes. One company, Santa Investments, admitted to 
transfer pricing: in one year alone, they transferred over K1.2 million offshore. Another 
company, Gaisho Co (PNG) Pty Ltd, was able to transfer over K6 million in 14 years of 
operation. The amount that was lost from all transfer pricing activities is incalculable, but 
substantial. 
For landowners, the conditions of many logging contracts—those between landowners, 
landowner companies and timber companies—highly favoured the interests of the timber 
companies. This was largely a consequence of the activities of local politicians who had 
claimed executive roles in the landowner companies, or of developing companies who 
provided lawyers for landowner companies. For example, the law/yer for the landowner 
company Mamirum Timbers Pty Ltd of New Ireland was also the law/yer for the logging 
^^ransfer pricing refers to practices whereby industry undervalues the selling price of the timber, which 
reduces tax payments to the PNG government. Timber is then on-sold at a much higher price in a foreign 
location. 
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company seeking to negotiate an LFA. The conditions of the contract, which the lawyer 
organised, deprived the landowners of over K120 000 in just three shipments (Barnett, 
1990a). In another case reported by Barnett, the contract of one logging agreement 
which required the New Ireland Otsuka Development Company to build extensive 
infrastructure (including a wharf, a town, and a furniture factory to name a few) was 
shown to be a sham, which the company had agreed to falsely. When pressured by the 
State to fulfil these infrastructure requirements, the company shut down and went into 
liquidation, leaving the landowners with no development. These are just a few of many 
cases reported throughout the various interim reports by Barnett. 
Thirdly, Barnett uncovered a widespread failure by the government to enforce regulations 
and punish violations. Not one of the companies investigated was considered to be in 
compliance with conditions established under their logging contracts. In some cases the 
non-compliance was associated with infrastructure demands as described above. 
However, non-compliance also involved activities in the forest such as high-grading (the 
selective harvest of the most valuable species), over-harvesting, harvesting in prohibited 
zones such as slopes or river banks, and many more (see Barnett, 1990b, p. 67). Whilst 
Barnett made no specific investigation into the environmental impacts of these practices, 
the reports nonetheless document the rapid destruction of forests across regions of PNG. 
4.4 Responding to Barnett and the Forestry Act 
Following the release of the Barnett Report and a change of government, PNG went 
through a period of reform in the forestry sector. The primary outcome of this was the 
new Forestry Act 1991, (gazetted in 1992; hereafter the Act). The Act was the first 
substantial change in forest policy since the forestry ordinance of 1936-37. It replaced 
Forestry (Private Dealings) Act 1971, the Forestry Act 1973, and the Forestry Industry 
Council Act of 1979. It was a very complex and highly politicised process, particularly 
because of the involvement of the World Bank, which I discuss in more detail shortly. 
4.4.1 The PNG FA and the administration 
The main structural contribution of the Act was to establish the Papua New Guinea Forest 
Authority (FA), which replaced the Department of Forestry. The national forest service 
(NFS) remained the administrative arm of the bureaucracy. Importantly, the Act also 
established the National Forest Board (hereafter the Board), consisting of six members 
representing industry, civil society and relevant government departments. The aim of 
introducing this board was to reduce the high prevalence of political interference, 
particularly from Ministers of Forestry. To this end, the Board has responsibility over most 
of the functions of the FA including licensing.^' In order to remain independent, the 
composition of the Board is legally defined. Many of the day-to-day functions of the FA 
are delegated by the Board to the managing director of the FA, whose appointment is also 
vetted by the Board." Whilst the operation of the Board has greatly reduced the 
opportunities for Ministerial interference, there have nonetheless been many attempts by 
Ministers to interfere with this operation of the Board and the managing director, and 
there have been allegations of corruption within the Board, which I discuss further in 
section 4.5.1. 
4.4.2 License types and procedures 
The Act also sought to improve the licensing procedures by abolishing the older TRP and 
LFA licenses in favour of new license types. The first, and major, license for the timber 
industry is the Forest Management Agreement (FMA). The FMA are large-scale logging 
licenses. Unlike in the Private dealings Act, the FMAs effectively reinstated the 
government's exclusive rights to enter into logging agreements. However, landowners 
^Vinal licenses must be signed off by the Minister, but only on the recommendation of the Board. 
" The selection of managing director has also been open to interference. In 2002, Minister Ogio sought to 
replace the managing director with David Nelson. The Board did not approve Nelson's appointment. This led 
to a standoff between the Minister and the Board. In response to this, the Board withdrew/ their delegation 
to the managing director and the FA essentially stopped functioning for several days (Industry 
representative. Meeting 2, 5 May 2011). 
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have increased ability to negotiate directly with prospective companies. There are 
currently 29 FMA in operation, covering 3.5 million ha (PNG FA, 2007a).®® 
The process for getting an FMA is complex and involves 34 steps, some of which were 
introduced to address the key problems of previous license types. Firstly, landowners 
(often registered into ILGs) have increased capacity for negotiating which company will log 
in their area and the logging conditions through the operation of the provincial forest 
management committee (PFMC). Beyond initial approval of an area for the FMA by the 
Board, project guidelines are developed at the PFMC, approved again by the Board, and 
advertised for tender. Prospective developers submit applications, several of which may 
be negotiated further by the PFMC. Once the full conditions of the operation are 
approved, and agreed to by the landowners, the PFMC provides a recommendation of 
which developer has been selected. The developer uses this recommendation in another 
application to the Board. If the Board approves, they provide another recommendation to 
the Minister, who signs the final FMA permit. This means that, unlike in the past where 
landowners were only involved in the process of leasing their land to government (under 
the TRP), according to the new Act there are more opportunities for landowners to 
engage in negotiating contracts. Furthermore, the system of multiple levels of 
government and the Board is meant to ensure that the applications are appropriately 
evaluated and confirmed by the independent Board. 
A second type of license is the Timber Authority (TA). In colonial times, the timber 
authority was a small-scale license which allowed, for example, missionaries to buy timber 
directly from locals. However, these have essentially become another timber permit, 
allowing commercial operations to buy up to 5000 mVyear directly from landowners. 
They are also meant to provide opportunities for local agriculture development. The TA, 
being a smaller area, does not require the formation of ILGs and given that the purpose of 
the TA is to clear forest for agriculture, there are also no provisions in the regulations for 
managing the timber supply. 
There have been no new FMA signed since 2007; however, there have been extensions to some FIVIAs. 
A final two license types, most directly related to forestry, are the Forest Clearance 
Authority (FCA) and the associated Special Agriculture Business License (SABL). An FCA can 
be awarded to companies or individuals to clear up to 500 ha of forested land at a time. 
The purpose of the FCA is to enable forest areas to be opened up to provide more land for 
population growth and agriculture expansion. Despite being a key part of the legislation 
for decades, recently the release of FCAs has come under intense pressure for their 
association with the release of SABL. Since 2007, over five million ha of land in PNG has 
been awarded to SABLs—mostly for oil palm. Of this, only six FCAs have been released; 
however, there has been considerable concern that logging companies are using SABL to 
get access to timber without having to go through the FMA process (Filer, 2011), a 
concern which has yet to be disproven. 
4.5 Remaining challenges and governance concerns 
Despite the reforms in the Act, there are nonetheless considerable challenges to the 
implementation of these regulations and the management of forests in PNG. Whilst there 
are many different challenges, I introduce only the three that are most relevant to 
understanding the problems of corruption and poor governance of forests. The first is the 
ongoing problem of Ministerial influence and interference with the management of forest 
resources, including the broader problem of corruption. The second is the issue of 
bureaucratic capacity, conflicts of interest and the monitoring of environmental 
standards. The final section is about the rights and responsibilities of communities, and 
the relationship between communities, companies, and government that has evolved in 
PNG. 
4.5.1 Ministerial influence and interference 
One of the central problems documented in the Barnett report were the problems 
associated with political interference. As I mentioned above, the 1991 Act was designed, 
in part, to reduce the risks of political interference particularly through the operation of 
the Board. The Minister is obliged to act on the recommendations of the Board. However, 
despite the prescriptions in the Act, there have been many attempts by consecutive 
Ministers to interfere with this regulation. In 1994, for example, as PNG began to suffer 
from an economic crisis, the government of the day sought to fast-track several logging 
projects as a means to generate fast w/ealth. To do so, an amendment w/as introduced to 
parliament that sought, in part, to alter the composition of the Board. However, the World 
Bank, which at the time was involved with PNG to assist in economic recovery, was 
determined the Minister would not be able to alter the composition and powers of the 
Board or the budget of the Forest Authority (Filer, 2004, p. 95). The stand-off between the 
government of PNG (which argued on grounds of national sovereignty) and the World 
Bank (which insisted on strict enforcement and compliance with the original Forest Act) 
lasted for a year,®' By the end of 1996, the government capitulated and reversed previous 
amendments restoring the independence of the Board (Filer et al., 2000). In another case, 
a Minister of Forestry tried to award licenses against the recommendation of the Board 
(Yadi, 2001); or sought to pressure the Board to approve a particular company. In 2001, 
then Minster of Forestry, Michael Ogio, wrote a letter to the Board reportedly saying 'I am 
now confirming my earlier directive to the National Forest Board dated 6th June, 2000 to 
officially endorse my decision and award the Josephstaal FMA to ASB Timbers at the 
coming Board meeting... Given the economic difficulties the government is experiencing 
and to attract more credible investors into the forestry sector, I direct that ASB Timbers is 
awarded the project and be invited for negotiations without further delay' (Yadi, April 11 
2001,). This was in breach of the responsibilities under the Act. What these examples 
demonstrate is that despite regulations there is ongoing pressure to alter the structure 
and function of the Board and the FA in order to suit political needs. 
4.5.2 Bureaucratic capacity and monitoring environmental standards 
A second main concern for PNG forestry management has been the problem of 
widespread non-compliance with the environmental standards of logging operations 
(Review Team, 2004). This is particularly non-compliance with the procedures stipulated in 
the logging code of conduct, which spells out the procedures for planning and conducting 
' During this time the World Bank refused to release the second half ($25 nnillion) of the ERP. 
logging activities, such as skid line placements, road construction, and harvesting 
technique, to name a few. All FMA areas are required to have NFS officers^" permanently 
on-site to report on compliance with this code. Beyond activities in the field, in 2001, 
third-party independent monitors Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS) were engaged to 
verify the legality of timber exports" from PNG. Whilst this has led to some improvement, 
particularly for the reputation of PNG timber, the operations of SGS are confined to the 
point of export. They are not able to inspect logging practices in the field, which is mainly 
the responsibility of the NFS officers assigned to each company. 
Despite the presence of NFS officers, there is considerable evidence that many companies 
are failing to meet the conditions of the logging code. In 2003 and 2004, there was an 
independent review of compliance of 17 logging companies with the code and other 
regulations (such as labour laws). The review team documented a variety of illegal 
activities—including failure to plan skid areas, lack of vine cutting, excessive damage to 
residual stand, topsoil bulldozed into watercourses, and debris not removed (Review 
Team, 2004). In many of the reports they detail that the illegal activity had not been 
sighted by the NFS officer, or that logging plans had been approved with obvious flaws. 
There are several reasons for this challenge. Firstly, the motivation for companies to 
operate illegally is reportedly not always for their own benefit. One logging company field 
managers reported that they cut trees inside the buffer zone at the 'request of the 
landowners themselves' who claimed that 'their villages were neglected by the 
Government so long, and that they are in dire need of money to uplift their standard of 
living' (Department of National Planning and Monitoring, 2004b). More generally, there is 
a widely documented problem of the quality of training and the interests of NFS officers. 
The remoteness of many FMA areas combined with the limited financial capacity of the FA 
means that many of these officers at logging sites rely heavily, if not entirely, on the 
support of the companies they are tasked with monitoring. This includes support for 
accommodation, food, healthcare and transport. This form of conflicts of interest is a well-
°°Depending on the size of the FMA, more than one officer may be based at the logging camp. 
The role of SGS is to independently verify that all timber exports have the appropriate permits. 
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documented problem in PNG and is thought to be one of the reasons for widespread 
failures to monitor logging operations, and is discussed further in subsequent chapters. 
4.5.3 Customary rights and development 
A final challenge that I discuss in this chapter is the continued efforts to recognise and 
engage landowners. As I described earlier, the process of registering ILGs and negotiating 
contracts through the PFM was designed to identify and engage landowners in the use 
and management of their resources. In practice there are many problems with registration 
of ILGs and the activities of LOC, particularly in rural areas. 
In terms of registering the ILGs, there is considerable evidence of ILGs being registered 
that have not developed proper membership lists, meaning the members of the ILG are 
not actually the full list of landowners in the area; or ILGs have failed to supply evidence of 
their actual land areas. The recent commission of inquiry into the SABL uncovered cases 
from all over PNG where landowners were disputing ILGs that had been registered over 
their areas (Col, 2011). Furthermore, most timber operations in PNG over the past decade 
have suffered from constant disputes between and amongst landowners and registered 
ILGs, suggesting that the initial process of registration has failed to successfully identify 
and integrate landowners (Review Team, 2004). Secondly, despite efforts to reduce the 
power of landowner company executives in the Act, the power of true landowners has 
frequently been captured by individuals or groups claiming to represent them and who 
then use this authority to gain private payments from developers. This has not only led to 
poor contractual conditions, such as those mentioned above, but to widespread 
corruption, embezzlement and mismanagement of royalties from timber operations. For 
example, in one case, landowners reported the inappropriate use of landowner company 
funds to pay for 70 landowners and company directors to travel overseas on a 'marketing' 
exercise (Department of National Planning and Monitoring, 2004a). In other cases, 
landowner executives have directed the spending of community royalties to companies 
that they manage privately, paying off local monitors to ignore such illegal activities 
(Department of National Planning and Monitoring, 2003). This means that millions of 
dollars of royalties are failing to reach the true landowners. What these challenges 
demonstrate is that whilst there has been an evolution of forest management in PNG, 
corruption, fraud, poor governance and environmental degradation have remained a 
dominant challenge to improving forest management. 
4.6 Conclusion 
As I described in the Introduction to this thesis, the selection of Indonesia and PNG was 
made on the basis of an inherent interest In the conditions of these two countries. In this 
chapter I have provided a more detailed description of PNG forest sectors in order to 
justify its selection as a case for my research. Specifically, I introduced the problem of 
corruption and poor governance of PNGs forests and the extent of the problems of 
deforestation and forest degradation—particularly for landowners. As a second 
motivation for this chapter, I also provide an introduction to the history of forest 
management, particularly focusing on the evolution of licenses and the challenges 
associated with the particular structure of landownership in PNG. This is by no means a 
comprehensive analysis of the Issues of landownership and its implications for forest 
management; rather, I sought to provide a background to PNG that will be necessary for 
understanding the subsequent chapters. The next chapter is the beginning of the results 
section of this thesis where I present the results and analysis of the grounded theory of 
forest governance. 
Chapter 5 
Negotiating laws and interests. A grounded theory of forest 
governance 
5.1 Introduction 
Governance of the world's forest resources has become a key policy and academic 
concern (Agrawal et a!., 2008; Contreras-Hermosilla, 2007; Kanowski et a!., 2011; 
Moellono et a!., 2009; SIkor and Stahl, 2011; Smith et a!., 2003a; World Bank, 2006b). 
Whilst there is ongoing debate over w/hat constitutes governance, there is some 
consensus that governance refers to the 'rules of collective decision-making in settings 
where there are a plurality of actors or organisations and where no formal control system 
can dictate the terms of the relationship between these actors and organizations' 
(Chhotray and Stoker, 2010, p. 3). Concern about the quality of governance of forests is 
driven primarily by the idea that many of the difficulties and problems of global forest 
management, and the associated high rates of deforestation and forest degradation, are 
caused by poor governance (Bottazzi and Dao, 2013; Umemiya et al., 2010; World Bank, 
2006b). There is some support for such claims (for example Bulte et al., 2007), but the 
results of these studies are complex and contested (Tacconi, 2011). This is because many 
factors—political, economic, and historical—have been shown to affect the governance 
process, and because the process of governing resources varies greatly in different 
contexts (for example McCarthy, 2004; Smith et al., 2006). The context-specific nature of 
governance means that in order to understand how it relates to deforestation and forest 
degradation, it is vital to understand the local processes of forest governance. Secondly, 
much of the forest governance research has targeted specific governance factors, such as 
illegal logging and decentralisation. There is less research understanding the holistic 
process of governance, and particularly the day-to-day process of governance in different 
areas. Understanding the more integrated process of governance is therefore important 
to understanding how poor governance may contribute to deforestation and forest 
degradation. 
In order to develop this localised and holistic description, this chapter presents a 
grounded theory of the process of forest governance. The next section provides a general 
background to the literature on governance. Rather than identifying theoretical concepts 
to be tested, the point of this review/ is to justify the research Interest In forest governance 
and to Identify ideas that are most relevant to the subsequent grounded theory (Glaser, 
1978). The second section presents the grounded theory of forest governance. The core 
process of governance that emerged from the data was a negotiation over if and how/ 
regulations are Implemented. I then outline the three key strategies that actors engage in 
to influence this process of negotiation over implementation. The final section returns to 
the literature, particularly the literatures of compliance and legitimacy theory, as a w/ay of 
theoretically analysing the results of the grounded theory. A brief discussion about the 
implications of the findings of this grounded theory for understanding what constitutes 
poor forest governance concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Background to forest governance 
With themes dating back to ancient Greece, governance is by no means a new concept 
(Court and Hayden, 2002). What is new, however, is the resurgence of the term, 
particularly in the last 20 years, to become one of the key concepts in the development 
literature and practice. One of the early focuses of the governance literature was part of 
an attempt to explain why countries' response to aid and resulting development differed 
(Leftwich, 1993; World Bank, 1989). That is, governance was seen to influence 
development, and good governance was a requirement for development. Indeed, the 
good governance agenda was used by international agencies, such as the World Bank, to 
place condltionality on aid for countries that were seen to have weak governance, or to 
select aid recipients based on perceived quality of governance (Leftwich, 1993). This 
agenda also allowed international agencies to engage with the political dimension of 
countries' development; indeed, the Integration of economic and political dimensions is 
one factor attributed to the attraction of the governance concept (Court and Hayden, 
2002; Santlso, 2001). 
This attention to the political dimensions reflects the fact that the early view of 
governance was very close to the term government, in that governance was defined as 
the things that governments do (Court and Hayden, 2002; Stoker, 1998). Whilst this was a 
common definition and is evident in some of the more recent literature (Smith et al., 
2006), the governance agenda has come to represent the activities of a broader range of 
actors. That is, the term governance has evolved to explicitly acknowledge the roles and 
relationships of multiple actors and to recognise that decision-making practices in a 
country (and consequently a country's response to aid) did not rely solely on the authority 
of state institutions (Stoker, 1998). This idea of fragmented authority between state and 
non-state actors, such as NGOs or transnational corporations (Paterson et al., 2003), has 
been a key component of the governance idea and, as I describe further shortly, has been 
a key reason why governance has become a dominant area of study for understanding 
forest use and change. 
The ideas of multiple actors and fragmented authority are key to the concept of 
governance, but there are nonetheless many definitions of governance. These definitions 
vary over whether governance refers to the rules, or how the rules are implemented; to 
daily human actions and intentions or the process of steering society towards a particular 
state (Court and Hayden, 2002). Many development agencies focus on the public 
administration aspects of governance." Daniel Kaufmann and colleagues, who initiated 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) program at the World Bank, define 
governance as 'the process and institutions through which decisions are made and 
authority in a country is exercised' (Kaufmann et al., 2012b). The authors go on to explain 
that this includes 'the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them' (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Whilst this definition has 
been criticised for failing to distinguish governance from the normal process of policy and 
" For example, the United Nations Development Program defines governance as 'the exercise of economic, 
political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels' (UNDP 1997, 2-3). 
administration (Court and Hayden, 2002), the World Bank's full definition does emphasise 
an important component of governance, focusing on the worl< of government and the 
institutions thought necessary to promote effective government. 
By comparison, the concept of governance that is more prevalent in the academic 
literature is based on a system that does not have a single state authority guiding 
decision-making. That is, as stated above, governance is commonly understood to be 
about 'the rules of collective decision-making in settings w/here there are a plurality of 
actors or organisations and w/here no formal control system can dictate the terms of the 
relationship betw/een these actors and organizations' (Chhotray and Stoker, 2010, p. 3). 
This definition includes many of the key features of governance from the academic 
literature, including fragmentation of authority betw/een different state and non-state 
actors (Krahmann, 2003b), and the recognition of the role of both formal and informal 
institutions (Gibson et al., 2000; Paavola, 2007). The latter definition is therefore taken as 
the base-definition in the grounded theory presented here, as it incorporates the key 
principles of governance evident in the literature, and also reflects key ideas of 
governance that emerged from the data collected for this research. 
Beyond identifying characteristics that define governance, such as fragmented authority, 
there has also been a considerable amount of research seeking to understand how to 
judge the quality of this process. One of the key conceptions of good governance comes 
from the World Bank's WGI program. Kauffman and colleagues identified six dimensions 
of governance—voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption— 
which they argue are the key features that determine the quality of governance 
(Kaufmann et al., 2012b). Based on a variety of data sources, they have sought to measure 
the quality of each of these dimensions within countries as a way to compare the quality 
of governance between countries and to track governance changes over time. The WGI 
have been prepared for 215 countries for the period 1996-2011 and, along with other 
indicators®' such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG),®" have been widely used 
by researchers to determine the impacts of different governance quality on a variety of 
development characteristics, such as growth and foreign direct investment (Morrissey and 
Udomkerdmongkol, 2012), and environmental pollution levels (Barrett et al., 2006; 
Dasgupta et al., 2006). The concern over the impacts of poor governance has also been 
extended to research on forest management (Andersson and Gibson, 2007; Blaser, 2010; 
Suite et al., 2007; Umemiya et al., 2010). That is, determining the quality of governance in 
different contexts has become a key element of research seeking to understand the 
impacts of poor governance on development, aid and forest management. 
As I stated in the introduction chapter, my interest in forest governance is due to the 
perceived impacts of poor governance on the rate of deforestation and forest 
degradation. That is, whilst there has been considerable amount of research seeking to 
understand the causes of deforestation, much of this has focused on discipline-specific 
factors, such as political science explanations of deforestation (Dauvergne, 1994), or on 
so-called proximate and underlying causes of deforestation (Geist and Lambin, 2002). The 
attraction of governance in forest cover change research is that it provides a more 
integrated, inter-disciplinary way to assess the causes of deforestation and forest 
degradation (Tacconi, 2011). This attraction has led to a considerable amount of research 
seeking to understand the relationship between the quality of governance and the 
amount of deforestation and forest degradation. Indeed several studies have provided 
evidence that poor governance, measured by WGI and other indices, is linked to higher 
amounts of deforestation and forest degradation (Barbier, 2004; Bottazzi and Dao, 2013; 
Bulte et al., 2007). These studies have identified different mechanisms by which 
" Many different organisations have developed their own quantitative governance indices. Some of these 
indices are based on specific agendas of the organisation, such as the indicators used by the NGO Freedom 
House. Others have been developed by business to measure efficiency for business operation, for example 
the iCRG (see below). Some also measure individual indicators, such as Transparency International's 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
" The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is compiled by private company The Political Risks Services 
(PRS) Group and comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic (PRS 
Group, 2013). 
governance may impact upon forests," and in doing so highlight some of the integrated, 
inter-disciplinary processes that drive deforestation and forest degradation in different 
countries. 
Whilst such studies have highlighted potential key mechanisms by which poor governance 
may contribute to deforestation and forest degradation, there are nonetheless two key 
problems with their findings and the particularly problems with the use of nationally 
aggregated perceptions indices of poor governance and corruption. The first main 
problem is that the definitional issues of governance mentioned above create challenges 
for efforts to identify and measure the quality of governance in different contexts. For 
example, the conception of governance of Kaufmann and colleagues, and their WGI in 
particular, have received criticism for their purported lack of internal consistency and 
construct validity. In a detailed analysis of the methodology used to create the WGI, 
Thomas (2010) argues that there is little theoretical evidence to support the claim that the 
six dimensions which underpin the WGI are an accurate reflection of the theoretical 
concept of governance. A second main problem is that measures of governance built on 
perceptions may be inaccurate, partly because the perceptions used to create these 
indices are not measuring the theoretical construct they purport to measure (Thomas, 
2010), and partly because perceptions data have been shown to have little resemblance 
to actual levels of governance factors (OIken, 2009). These factors challenge the validity of 
using quantitative measures to understand what governance is, and how governance 
processes may affect forests and draw attention to the need for more ground-up 
understanding of governance. 
Another criticism of perception indices like the WGI has come from the findings of the 
qualitative governance literature, which has demonstrated the context-specific nature of 
the features commonly used to measure the quality of governance. That is, qualitative 
research, often based on case studies, has identified many local factors that can affect 
governance processes. For example, research into the decentralisation of forest 
management has pointed to issues such as local social and financial capital (Larson, 2002), 
These studies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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public accountability and participation (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Xu and Ribot, 2004), 
political power interests (Ribot et al., 2006), historical patterns of power distribution and 
informal institutions (McCarthy, 2004), all of which can impact upon the outcome of 
decentralisation reforms (see Barr et al., 2006; Tacconi, 2007a). Studies on aspects of 
governance such as the rule of law (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2007; McCarthy, 2002b) and 
community-based forestry (Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Blaikie, 2006; Klooster, 1999; 
Nygren, 2005) have also identified how context-specific factors, such as historical land-
tenure arrangements, can affect these aspects of governance. The findings from these 
qualitative case studies therefore challenge the use of nationally aggregated perception 
indices, particularly when used in cross-country comparisons. These studies also support 
the claim in my research that understanding local governance processes Is vital to 
determine if and how poor governance may impact upon forests. 
These qualitative studies do complement the quantitative governance research described 
above, and provide insights into the complex, context-specific process of governance, but 
there are some gaps in this literature. Firstly, whilst the quantitative research noted above 
has treated governance as an integrated whole, the qualitative studies have typically 
focused on only one or two specific governance features (for example corruption and 
illegal logging Smith et al., 2003a). By focusing on isolated governance features, and how 
they operate in a specific context, these studies often fail to provide a more holistic 
description of the governance process. This is an important gap, because governance 
factors interact in complex and dynamic ways. In order to understand the governance 
process, it must come from this more complex manner. Secondly, the features studied are 
often derived from the broader literature on governance, many of which are treated as 
universal features of governance. By examining these features in specific contexts, 
qualitative research may have failed to identify locally specific governance characteristics 
and processes. That is, the top-down approach may miss local factors that are relevant to 
the process of governance. Finally, research that has adopted more inductive 
methodologies and sought to identify localised processes has often been conducted 
during periods of dramatic change (for example Skutsch and McCall, 2010b; Smith et al., 
2006). Although focusing on periods of change has been fruitful in identifying historical 
biases and suggesting future outcomes, there is also a need to understand governance 
processes in times of relative stability. This is not to say that all of the qualitative studies 
have these gaps; many studies have information that is relevant to filling these gaps. This 
review does highlight however, that there is a need for more specific ground-up study of 
what constitutes forest governance, particularly during periods of relative stability. 
Governance, and forest governance specifically, has been a major part of the development 
agenda and of forestry research for decades. Despite this body of literature, some clear 
gaps remain in our understanding of what forest governance is and how it may impact 
upon forests. Firstly, evident in the many definitions provided above, there is ongoing 
debate about what governance is, what the key features of governance process may be, 
and how they may interact. This is important because, as described in the qualitative case-
study literature above, the process of governance can be very context specific. Many of 
the factors generally associated with governance, such as participation and the rule of 
law, may or may not be important in a specific area, and are likely to interact with other 
governance factors in complex ways. In order to answer the research question of this 
thesis, there is therefore a need for research focused on conceptualising the processes of 
governance that actually happen in forested areas. The findings of the grounded theory 
presented below rely on the local case studies in order to develop an integrated and 
ground-up perspective of what governance is to those involved in governance, and how 
different actors in Central Kalimantan and PNG practice it. 
5.3 The grounded theory of forest governance 
The core process of governance that emerged from these data was the negotiation over if 
and how regulations would be implemented. That is, the content of regulations formed 
the base of different activities described by participants; negotiations and the decision-
making of governance were about if and how to deviate from the activities prescribed in 
different regulations. There are of course governance processes associated with forming 
policies and regulations; however, these were not investigated and developed as part of 
this grounded theory. Rather, I was interested in the process of governance as it happens, 
day-to-day 'in the field'. This focus on implementation was primarily driven by the fact 
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that neither country has had any major legal reforms or new regulations in the past 
decade.^® In order to understand what is happening in the forests, my focus was therefore 
on how the existing regulations are implemented. This meant that the interviewees were 
not policy-makers, but actors engaged in implementing regulations or actually doing 
activities (for example, industry development or conservation). Their responses were 
therefore describing the factors that influenced negotiations over if and how regulations 
would be applied. The components of this grounded theory therefore describe the key 
processes and strategies, prominent concerns and interests that influenced how 
respondents negotiated the implementation of regulations. 
Three conceptual categories emerged from the data collection and analysis: prioritising, 
legitimating activities, and controlling strategies; together, these categories incorporate 
the key processes involved in forest governance (Table 5.1). Within each of these 
categories, there are different factors and processes that affect how regulations are 
implemented. The detailed description of each of these categories, and some of the 
interaction between them, are developed in the next section. Whilst description of the 
categories treats them as discrete, in fact the three processes are interlinked, which 
means that some of the features described are common across the three categories. One 
particular feature that is evident across the three processes is the idea of a 'semblance of 
legality'. Even though a semblance of legality is not itself a strategy to influence the 
implementation of regulations, the idea of a semblance of legality emerged from the data 
as a key factor affecting the three categories. That is, a semblance of legality is 
conceptually different from the three categories, but it is still related to the process of 
governance, and it is described in detail at the end of the next section. 
® There have of course been amendments to regulations, some of which have been very recent. For 
example, new regulations introduced to manage programs to Reduce Deforestation and forest Degradation 
(REDD+). However, the descriptions by participants in this research are still focused predominantly on 
aspects of implementing current regulations and did not explain any major reform processes. 
Table 5.1. Key processes of forest governance. 
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5.3.1 Prioritising: Capacity and interests 
Prioritising, for this grounded theory, refers to the process that different actors engage in 
to decide which activity may be condoned at different times. The idea of prioritising 
emerged from the data as respondents described their multiple interests in how forests 
and forestlands were used. These different interests and roles identified by respondents 
included profits, rights, environmental protection and enforcing the law. Respondents 
identified how many of the interests associated with forest use were non-compatible and 
as such respondents engaged in a negotiation over which specific interests may be 
prioritised at different times. The process of prioritising is therefore about how different 
interests are selected and followed by actors. This is important for the governance process 
that emerged from this research, because the process of prioritising is about how 
decisions about the implementation of regulations are made. 
Of the many different interests that respondents discussed, a central interest revolved 
around issues of legality. The groups of actors, private sector, government and civil 
society/NGO, described different aspects of their interest in legality. For companies, for 
98 
example, the priority of legality was directed towards issues of compliance and the need 
to be legal. This need was driven by concern for legal punishment and for potential 
damage to a company's reputation from engaging in illegal activities. As a respondent 
from a company described, they refuse to pay bribes, and are called 'stingy' by local 
government officials, because 'they are a big company with a good reputation' and any 
allegation of impropriety would be bad for business (Multinational company 
representative. Meeting 51,14 July 2011). As another forest industry representative 
described, 'the way the world is going now, we need to be monitored and seen to be legal' 
(Meeting 2, 5 May 2011)."Government respondents on the other hand, described 
'following procedures', their own 'legal responsibilities' and/or 'ensuring compliance' of 
the private sector, as their main priorities associated with legality. However, there were 
variations within the responses by government respondents. This was particularly evident 
between the national and the district governments in Indonesia, where district 
governments were far more concerned with ensuring compliance of the private sector and 
dealing with the conflicting regulations. Whereas the national-level officials had a much 
broader interest with legality, in terms of 'following procedures', setting up institutions to 
'coordinate regulation' and 'building capacity' of district officials to enforce the laws. The 
respondents from civil society and from communities often described more complex 
interests with respect to legality. Partly, they expressed interests associated with 
monitoring activities of the other actors and a general desire for companies in their areas 
to 'follow the rules' (Meeting 62, 8 September 2011). However, legality was seen as less of 
a priority compared to issues of community rights, environmental protection, or 
infrastructure, such as roads or electricity, which I return to later. These interests show 
how there is a priority to complying with, or enforcing, regulations. It is, however, clear 
that the process of prioritising involves priorities for engaging in, or condoning, illegal 
activities. 
" The issue of being 'seen to be legal', as opposed to actually being legal, is something I return to later in the 
chapter because it is important to understanding the process of prioritisation. 
Respondents in both countries identified problems with the content of regulations as a 
factor driving the process of prioritisation. This is because, whilst there are incentives 
associated with being legal, there are often barriers to being legal, and incentives to being 
illegal. The barriers to being legal included the gaps in regulations that impacted upon the 
management of forests (Government representative. Meeting 37, 25 March 2011). Again, 
different actors had a different sense of the problems of the regulation, with national 
governments claiming that the regulations were 'too complex to be implemented' 
because of lack of local capacity. Alternatively, even though there are some benefits to 
complying with regulations, compliance may also be a barrier to achieving other interests. 
This perspective, that being legal was a barrier to achieving other priorities, was described 
by different respondents as a consequence of a variety of problems with the regulations. 
The problems identified by respondents included that regulations were overly complex 
and time-consuming, or that the regulations were 'not good' because having been made 
by those in the central government, they did not match local conditions (Government 
representative. Meeting 39,15 June 2011). The perceived problems with regulations, 
particularly the disparity between local interests and the regulations, are key to 
understanding how the process of prioritising can support illegal activities in each country. 
The specific problems with the regulations, and how this impacted the negotiation over 
the implementation of the regulations, differed between Indonesia and PNG. In Indonesia, 
a major problem with the regulations identified by respondents was the issue of land-use 
zoning. The fact that many areas that did not have forest cover, and that even areas that 
had already been developed as urban areas were still legally zoned as 'forest estate', were 
seen to create a barrier for development, as any proposed activity required costly licenses 
from the central Ministry of Forestry. Officials from district and provincial governments in 
Indonesia described this problem in relation to their need for development (roads, jobs 
and industry) and as they saw it, the power of the central government (particularly the 
Ministry of Forestry) to interfere with this development. In PNG, a main perceived 
problem with the regulation was the lack of (financial and technical) capacity of the 
government to implement those regulations. Respondents frequently explained that 
illegal activities were occurring because the government did not have the capacity to 
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conduct the surveys and provide legal documentation for the activity. Indeed, this has 
been a v\/ell-documented problem in PNG for decades (Department of National Planning 
and Monitoring, 2003). These different types of problems with the regulations, and 
different perception by different actors, impacted upon the process of prioritising and 
whether it resulted in legal or illegal activities. 
Whilst there were interests associated with complying with regulations, the problems with 
the regulations described above highlight the many different interests that may also be 
prioritised. One prominent interest that could also be prioritised was local development. 
For many of the respondents, development, particularly development for local 
communities, was described as a key priority and often justified illegal activities. In PNG, a 
forestry official explained that they were focused always on building the capacity of the 
landowners and giving them opportunities, which sometimes is difficult because it is so 
time-consuming to follow the legal process (Meeting 6,12 May 2011). In Indonesia, a 
similar sentiment was expressed when a district mining official described how they 
allowed illegal artisanal mining to continue in forested areas because the regulations (to 
get a local mining permit) were too costly and complex for communities and if they [the 
government] stopped illegal mining 'how about the community, what will they eat' 
(District government official. Meeting 42,16 June 2011). In practice, this priority took the 
form of government agents (or others) allowing and supporting activities that may 
contribute to development, but that were not necessarily legal. For example, government 
respondents and newspaper reports described many companies (mining and plantations) 
that were operating without full legal licenses (JakartaGlobe, 2011). Respondents 
described how complex and unnecessary regulations created a barrier to development 
and therefore did not need to be prioritised. 
This does not mean that the need for development was always the key priority, as the 
idea of a development imperative may also be a false justification. That is, the priority of 
the development imperative provided a socially acceptable, but false, justification for 
conducting or condoning illegal activities. In such instances, the real priorities are less 
socially acceptable, for example, to create opportunities for bribes. However, trying to 
understand when legitimate development needs and when other interests were affecting 
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prioritisation was impossible to determine from the data collected in my research, and in 
fact, any outcome may be a combination of both interests. This highlights the complexity 
in understanding which interests are being prioritised in different contexts, and how this 
may affect whether, and how, regulations are implemented. 
Beyond legal compliance and local development, other key interests which emerged from 
the data included environmental protection and engagement with local communities. In 
the case of environmental protection, this was often a key interest expressed by 
environmental NGOs who saw legal compliance as insufficient to serve their interests. For 
these actors, environmental protection was often associated with others' interests. For 
example, environmental protection was promoted as a means to secure long-term 
economic development, or increased engagement for local communities. For 
communities, a key interest was to do with engagement and development opportunities. 
Regardless of the legal process, there were strong interests expressed by communities to 
be consulted and engaged in decision-making about resource use in their area. This was 
often also tied to concerns about livelihoods and other development opportunities 
associated with resource use, particularly jobs (Meeting 33,18 March 2011). Importantly, 
many respondents from both these groups described situations where their interests 
conflicted. For example, respondents described cases where efforts by environmentalists 
to protect the environment resulted in trauma for communities, whose livelihoods were 
jeopardised by conservation practices (NGO representative. Meeting 32,18 March 2011; 
Community focus group. Meeting 33,18 March 2011). 
The activities of other actors such as NGOs or communities, who can also monitor and 
expose activities, can affect decisions by companies and government agents to either 
comply/enforce regulations, or to act illegally. The activities of NGOs and communities 
could result in higher priority given to legal compliance, or it could lead to increased 
support for illegal activities and a semblance of legality. Two key factors emerged from the 
data that determined whether the activities of NGOs and community resulted in a greater 
degree of compliance. The first are the interests of the NGOs and communities with 
respect to legality, secondly their capacity to influence the priorities of others. In the case 
of the former, whilst many NGOs purported to promote legal compliance, they also 
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promote activities beyond compliance, for example, encouraging companies to engage in 
community development programs beyond the level required by lavi/. On the other hand, 
companies have reported overharvesting w/ithin their concessions and harvesting timber 
in protected zones at the behest of communities vi/ho petition the company to harvest 
more timber so the community can get higher royalty payments (DPNM, 2004). In the case 
of the capacity of these actors to influence prioritisation of companies and governments, 
factors identified from the data include the reach of NGOs (particularly w/hether the NGOs 
are able to influence international markets), the support of NGOs for communities to 
voice their concerns, and the relationship between communities and government. NGOs 
that have the reach to affect international markets, and thereby reduce market access for 
illegal timber for example, can force companies to prioritise compliance in order to 
maintain market access. If communities have a good relationship with government agents, 
they can directly report to government if there are illegal activities (Government 
respondent. Meeting 55, 9 August 2011). This is not to say that such reporting can always 
be successful: many community respondents described how their efforts to report illegal 
activities were often ignored. This highlights how the process of prioritisation is a 
negotiation over the relative power of different actors and their interests. NGOs and 
communities can affect the process of prioritising, but often their monitoring and 
reporting of illegal activities is not sufficient to alter the priorities of more powerful actors. 
This shows that prioritisation involves a complex negotiation over the interests and the 
relative power of different actors that ultimately affects if and how regulations are 
enforced. 
It is important to note that respondents also described a partial enforcement of the 
regulations. Some illegal activities may be condoned by government agents in the short-
term, with the expectation that in the future the illegal activities would either be legalised, 
through a change in the regulations, or that the company involved would eventually 
comply with the existing regulations. A government representative with the environment 
department in Indonesia said that they did not enforce some of the environmental 
regulations for the new oil palm companies in their district because many of the oil palm 
companies were too busy setting up their commercial activities and would need more 
time to be able to comply with all the rules. The government agent explained that in three 
to five years time those oil palm companies would be in a position to comply with the 
environmental laws (Meeting 44, 27 June 2011). Another government official described 
how they were waiting to resolve issues with land-use plans before they would force 
companies to apply for further licenses from the central Ministry (Meeting 16, July 2012). 
Company respondents also identified this trade-off, saying that often they were complying 
with the regulations, but the bureaucratic process had not caught up. This meant that 
despite the company complying with the regulations, the government had not yet 
monitored the company's compliance (PNG Meeting 20,10 February 2012). This shows 
that whilst priorities may favour some illegal activities, it does not necessarily mean that in 
the long-term the regulations will not also be enforced. 
Finally, it is important to note that the factors affecting prioritisation could also be more 
passive. That is, government officials may not explicitly condone some illegal activities; 
rather, they might have little capacity or authority to enforce the regulations. For 
example, in PNG, regulations are frequently ignored because local officials have little 
capacity—particularly in relation to big companies. As one former forestry official 
explained, 'It is from the top, you cannot do much when you are down there. When you 
start making noise, they shift you out' (Meeting 12, 20 May 2011). This kind of pressure 
can also affect decision-making at the national level. A respondent from the PNG Forestry 
Authority (hereafter the PNG FA) explained that they frequently approved what they saw 
as inappropriate plans for the special agriculture and business leases (SABL) because the 
procedure for getting permits involved three other departments, and once those three 
had approved the proposals, there was little capacity for the PNG FA to question the 
validity of the proposal (Meeting 19,19 February 2012). No doubt this could also have 
been an excuse for their support of poor-quality projects; however, it does point to the 
fact that there are complex reasons, beyond specific priorities, that impact upon if and 
how regulations are enforced. 
This process of prioritising is therefore a negotiation process that includes the formal 
processes of the state and the informal interests. There are a variety of factors that 
influence priorities, some of which are developed further shortly. However, it is important 
to also note that this process of negotiation is ongoing, as interests, priorities, and 
capacities may change. This includes allowing business activities to continue despite them 
not fully complying with the regulations, for example operating without full licenses, on 
the expectation that the business will apply for licenses, or meet all legal requirements at 
a later date. 
5.3.2 Legitinnating activities 
Legitimating activities include different actions that are designed to build legitimacy for 
the actors' primary interests: logging, conservation and so on. Legitimacy is understood 
here to be about the perceived credibility of, and broad support for, an activity, and it is 
vital for understanding what activities are allowed to happen under different conditions. 
Two main aspects of legitimating activities emerged from the data. The first involves 
characteristics of the legitimating activities themselves—the types of legitimacy and 
actors' motivations. The second is about managing the expectations of different actors. 
The success of different legitimating activities can impact on what is allowed to happen in 
the forest; so legitimating activities are an integral part of resource governance. 
All respondents, but particularly those from companies and NGOs, described the 
importance of having good relationships with local communities and government, of 
engaging with these actors, and of sharing information, all of which demonstrate the 
importance of legitimacy. That is, these features are all part of building support for a 
particular idea or activity, such as the development of an oil palm plantation, and are 
components of the concept of legitimacy as it is used here. There are a variety of different 
activities which actors engage in to build legitimacy, including conducting community 
meetings, preparing and distributing informational material, providing infrastructure or 
organising other development programs, and supporting local community events, such as 
Ramadan celebrations in Indonesia. The activities generally take two forms. The first are 
information events, which are about providing or sharing specific information. For 
example, one mining company held regular meetings with communities in their area to 
share information about the company's blasting plans^® (Mining representative. IVIeeting 
35, 22 March 2011), This can be very important, as one of the main criticisms of 
companies and governments from communities is that they fail to provide enough 
information, w/hich leaves communities feeling marginalised (Community representative. 
Meeting 40,16 June 2011). The other types of activities are designed to build 
relationships, for example, through infrastructure projects or employment or livelihood 
programs. Legitimating activities were not directed at communities. Company 
respondents described the need to 'keep the politicians on-side' by providing them with 
services, or bribes (Mining representative. Meeting 35, 22 March 2011), highlighting the 
importance of maintaining good relationships with the other actors, particularly those 
who have control over your operations. 
Whilst many companies and NGOs engage in these types of activities, they were of course 
not always successful. Building relationships is difficult, and many of these legitimating 
activities did not always contribute to legitimacy. One challenge to building legitimacy, 
according to company respondents, was the lack of motivation of communities 
themselves. For example, one respondent explained that the community expected their 
company to build a village school, but the community were unwilling to work to maintain 
it so the project quickly deteriorated (Agriculture company representative. Meeting 58,11 
August 2011). More generally, the lack of education and capacity of communities was 
sometimes seen as a barrier to building this support. This highlights how complex a task 
building legitimacy can be, as wider governance factors can impact upon the success of 
these activities. Legitimating activities are nonetheless an important part of how actors 
seek to influence the negotiation over access to resources, and the distribution of benefits 
from resource extraction. 
In addition to the legitimacy that comes from activities such as community development 
programs, there is some legitimacy associated with legality. That is, legal activities have 
These were schedules of when the mine would be setting off minor explosives to get access to the 
minerals. In this mine, there were many communities living within the concession area, so the company 
organised regular meeting to share the mine's blasting plans for safety reasons. 
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some legitimacy due to the fact that they are supported by the state. This legitimacy was 
evident from the way respondents talked about the importance of compliance that I 
described earlier. For example in PNG, respondents from companies described the 
importance of going through the legal procedures to get licenses and to ensure that they 
are able to export and sell their products overseas. Even the appearance of legality can 
provide legitimacy to activities; a point considered in the section on a semblance of 
legality. Whether legality provides legitimacy (and from whose eyes) depends on a variety 
of factors. Factors such as perceived poor quality of regulations and widespread 
corruption, which meant that the public distrusted legal activities, decreased the 
legitimacy provided by legality. Whether the legal activity breached local norms is 
another factor. For example, in PNG, regardless of whether a company has a legal license, 
if landowners perceived their rights were not being respected, the company's activities 
did not have legitimacy. Indeed, there have been many cases where such conditions-
legal contract but operations which are seen to breach local norms— has led to 
landowners blockading or otherwise interfering with company operations. These 
conditions highlight how under different conditions legality may provide sufficient 
legitimacy for companies' operations, but in other conditions, wider legitimacy must also 
be gained. 
A key aspect of most legitimating activities was about balancing support for a program 
without raising expectations beyond those that could be achieved. That is, the ability to 
effectively manage expectations was vital to build support and ensure the long-term 
legitimacy of the project. A case of an NGO-run peat-land and orang-utan conservation 
project in Kalimantan, where expectations were not managed well, provides a good 
example of this. Respondents from the NGO explained how most of the staff were 
technical specialists and their inexperience in dealing with communities meant that they 
raised expectations too high. Being unable to meet those expectations, they had to cancel 
the project. The failure to manage expectations was particularly clear in the early stages of 
socialisation when the NGO staff explained the entire budget of the project, which was at 
the time several billion rupiah,®^ and explained that the project was in part funded by a 
multi-national oil and gas company. The failure to explain the situation led to high 
expectations that the money would just be handed out to the community, and that mining 
companies would be coming to develop the area (NGO representative. Meeting 8, 
November 2010). The NGO project collapsed but, even several years later, the 
communities in the area described the trauma associated with the activities of the NGO 
and the un-met expectations. Another conservation NGO that tried to establish a project 
in the area also had trouble building legitimacy because 'the community didn't want to 
believe anymore' (NGO representative. Meeting 32,18 March 2011). This demonstrates 
how the failure to manage expectations can affect the legitimacy of projects. 
Companies and government officials also described the need to manage (often reduce) 
expectations to maintain legitimacy. In Indonesia, company and government respondents 
described the need to try to limit the expectations of communities. One company involved 
in mining exploration in Indonesia explained that their early socialisation was limited to 
providing some information about the project and to identify traditional customary (adat) 
lands that could not be drilled. However they faced challenges meeting with communities 
who had high expectations that the company would provide a huge amount of local 
employment. The company representative explained that they had to be very careful and 
refused to commit to particular targets for local employment or infrastructure as a means 
to reduce expectations (Meeting 51,14 July, 2011). This was particularly the case in 
remote areas where there were few opportunities for development. One community in 
such a remote area was told by the government officials that 'if any investor wants to 
come here, just don't reject them' (Community representative. Meeting 11, 12 July 2011), 
which implicitly worked to limit the expectations of communities. Government officials 
involved in REDD+ socialisation in PNG also described how 'we have to tread carefully 
here in PNG because what we say to the landowners, we can't raise their expectations. So 
we in the Forest Authority have helped with the people for over 60 years, regarding the 
The average exchange rate in 2011 was lAUD = 8994 Indonesian rupiah (see http://aud.fx-
exchange.com/idr/exchange-rates-history.html). 
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timber operations. We are careful in what we say to the people, not to raise their 
expectations. Because then you have to deliver, and if you don't, they don't invite you 
anymore. So that is the way, and we have learnt from experience over the last 60 years' 
(Forestry officials. Meeting 6,12 May 2011). These examples show how companies and 
government sought to distribute information in a way that carefully managed 
expectations. Importantly, managing expectations was necessary because the activities of 
the company and government were held to account for meeting these expectations. High 
expectations that were not met, or could not be met, would result in a lack of legitimacy. 
Finally, whilst these strategies were described as important to build legitimacy for 
activities, it does not mean that legitimating activities were themselves legitimate. In both 
countries, building legitimacy sometimes involved activities such as bribery and fraud. In 
PNG, gaining landowners' support is key to the legitimacy of any development activity. 
Many reports and respondents described the sometimes-dubious activities by companies 
to gain this support, for example paying for travel to Port Moresby for village heads 
(Government respondent. Meeting 14, 25 May 2011). And these kinds of practices have 
been happening for decades. Advising a representative from the UN in the late 1990s, on 
the issue of gaining landowners' support, a forestry official described the conditions at the 
time '... the logging companies operate with pretty open rules. They provide money, 
booze, dancing girls to the landowner heads. So they just sign...' (Meeting 5, 9 May 2011). 
On the other side, community groups have been accused of abusing companies' 
legitimating activities. For example, companies have described how communities formed 
fictional land co-ops in an effort to attract funds from the company (Mining company 
representative. Meeting 35, 22 March, 2011). The variety of different strategies had 
different outcomes and different rates of success. However, it is dear that successful 
legitimating strategies were important determinants of how the negotiation process 
proceeded, and ultimately, how that impacted upon forests. 
5.3.3 Controlling strategies 
Controlling strategies refers to different activities that actors engaged in to control the 
process of negotiation. Legitimating activities are one aspect of this, in that by building 
legitimacy actors sought to control a greater share of decision-making. Other activities 
included are a broader set of activities that different respondents described. These 
controlling strategies include two processes. The first controlling strategy is managing 
information—collecting, manipulating and distributing it. The second is w/hat I refer to as 
positioning, which involves positioning allies into key decision-making roles. Controlling 
strategies are therefore not just about individual decisions regarding resource use, but can 
be part of a longer-term strategy to control the negotiation process. 
Managing the information 
The first controlling strategy that emerged from the data was the ways in which actors 
sought to manage information. Respondents described several dimensions of managing 
information and how this was used to manipulate and control the negotiation process. 
The different dimensions included the collection, the distribution and the manipulation of 
information. The strategies that actors engaged in to collect, manipulate and distribute 
information was a key part of the governance process, particularly in relation to 
legitimating activities and affecting how actors sought to influence others' priorities. For 
example, sharing information about the potential benefits of conservation programs was 
seen as important to change communities' priorities. The different activities of actors to 
collect, manipulate and distribute information can therefore have important implications 
for understanding what activities are allowed to happen in the forests. 
Whilst of course there were important strategies involved in collecting information, which 
I return to shortly, it was the failure to share information that was the most commonly 
reported strategy to control the process of negotiation. Government departments, and 
officials in both PNG and Indonesia, were renowned for holding on to important 
information. A respondent from a forestry-related NGO in Indonesia explained how they 
had made a request under freedom of information laws to the forestry department for 
the 2009 data on forest cover. They received the government's data through other 
channels two years before receiving a response from the Ministry—who explained that 
they were unable to share the data because it was still being compiled (Meeting 58, 28 
September 2011). The NGO respondent explained that this was because the government 
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did not want to share information that might be used to make the government look bad. 
This highlights how failing to distribute information can affect the negotiation process. For 
example, failing to distribute information about the location of different concessions can 
reduce the risks for companies who illegally operate outside their concession areas, and 
thereby encourage business to prioritise illegal activities. Another reason that government 
departments seek to hold on to information is because collecting information can be 
costly. For example, a respondent from the Forest Authority in PNG explained that they 
did not want to share some information with other government departments because it 
costs a lot to them to collect it, and it is not clear why other departments should benefit 
(Meeting 15, 25 May 2011). This shows that falling to distribute information is not always 
a strategy by government to control the negotiation process, but managing in format ion-
collecting and selectively distributing it—can be important strategies for some actors who 
seek to control the process of negotiation. 
Related to the issue of managing expectations is the manipulation of information to suit 
specific ends. That is, the process of managing expectations involved in a negotiation. But 
what is evident from the responses of different actors was the important way in which 
others sought to manipulate information to suit their own agenda. This was often an 
allegation by companies against the practices of NGOs. In one case an RSPO-certified oil 
palm company alleged that NGOs blackmailed them. They described how a local NGO 
took photos of a dead fish and threatened the company to publish the pictures unless the 
company paid the NGO a sum of money (Industry representative, 27 August, 2011). This 
was an extreme example; however, NGOs have often been criticised for their 
misrepresentation of information by pro-industry writers (Curtin, 2006; ITS Global, 2006b). 
As one industry representative explained, '1 could go out to any timber area tomorrow and 
find half a dozen upset land owners and take photos and stick them all over and say 'look 
at the exploited people'. But you don't see the photo of the other 5000 who want to kill 
these six because they are stopping the project' (Meeting 2, 3 May 2011). This 
demonstrates how different actors carefully collect and distribute information as a 
strategy to influence the negotiation over how activities in the forest proceed. 
I l l 
Positioning 
Positioning is aimed at influencing the negotiation involving if and how specific regulations 
are implemented. Positioning involved strategies such as building dependent relationships 
with those already in power—for example, funding election campaigns, or manipulating 
recruitment processes in the public service. Positioning between the elected official and 
the bureaucracy is particularly important. Respondents in both countries—from the 
government and the non-government sector—described the way in which elected officials 
sought to gain control over decision-making through the strategic employment of allies to 
decision-making roles. The practice of positioning is therefore a response to reforms that 
have sought to limit the discretion of elected officials. In Indonesia, NGOs and other 
researchers described how the heads of key departments often changed following 
elections of district heads. In one district, the heads of key departments were all family 
members of the head of the district. In PNG, there have also been efforts by elected 
officials, specifically Ministers, to position 'friends' as managing director (MD) of the 
Forest Authority. That is, the MD is elected through a process of short-listing and is 
appointed by the National Executive Committee, which means that the Minister of 
Forests, technically, should have reduced influence over the process.'" However, the 
Minister does have authority to determine the status of the MD, and some Ministers have 
used it to keep successive MDs as 'acting' MDs, as a means to keep some level of influence 
over the Forest Authority's activities (Private research institute. Meeting 5, 9 May 2011). I 
discuss these strategies in greater detail in the next chapter, as positioning often involves 
corrupt exchanges. It is important here, however, to understand how this impacts upon 
governance. Specifically, positioning is a strategy for those with little direct authority over 
decision-making to gain more control to influence the negotiation over if and how 
regulations are implemented. 
In one case in 2002, the Minister of Forests of the time illegally directly appointed a managing director of 
the then national forest service, which resulted in a stand-off between the Minister and the Board, who had 
appointed their own acting managing director. 
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5.3.4 Semblance of legality 
A semblance of legality, which here refers to the ability to cover illegal activities with the 
appearance of legality, is important for understanding when and how illegal activities can 
occur. It is therefore central to the process of governance described by respondents. The 
process for getting a semblance of legality interacts with the other processes described in 
this grounded theory. For example, being able to appear to be legal makes illegality less 
risky and can therefore influence priorities. A semblance of legality also provides a certain 
degree of legitimacy for illegal activities. Some of the systems that support this practice, 
such as use of fraudulent documents, are developed further in the next chapter. However, 
there are two aspects to this idea of a semblance of legality that are relevant here. Firstly, 
identifying what this concept means and how it was evident in the data. Secondly, a 
description of the activities involved and how they influence the process of forest 
governance. 
There were many different types of illegal activities that actors sought to cover with a 
semblance of legality, and often the particular type of cover was dependent on the type of 
illegal activities. Firstly, many companies were operating with some license, enough to be 
mostly legal, whilst ignoring other regulations. In Indonesia this was easier due to the 
ambiguity over the land-use plan (see Chapter 3). Other illegal activities such as harvesting 
beyond the concession area could be covered through timber laundering. In the past, 
timber laundering was common in Indonesia and involved illegally harvested timber being 
effectively legalised by being transported and marketed as timber from a legal concession 
(Chapter 3). A similar, and contemporary, version of timber laundering was a practice of 
plantation companies in Indonesia that cleared and planted areas in excess of their legal 
concession. The harvests from these illegal areas were legalised through the main 
concession area. Respondents from government and NGOs in Indonesia described this as 
'usual practice' with companies clearing 'often up to 2000 ha' beyond their concessions 
(NGO. IVIeeting 24, 29 November 2011). This shows that the type of illegal activity, and the 
type of cover required is dependent on the nature of the industry itself, the content of 
regulations and the activities of those monitoring. 
One of the key elements of a semblance of legality is the use of fraudulent paperwork. The 
different types of illegal activities described above, to varying degrees, relied on the 
creation and use of fraudulent paperw/ork, such as fraudulent licenses or fraudulent 
monitoring reports. There are many examples of illegal activities being covered by 
fraudulent paperw/ork. For example, in PNG, published reports and respondents in my 
research have described how monitors in the field approved timber that had been 
harvested in breach of the code of conduct (Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring, 2004b); licenses had been awarded for areas that illegally overlapped with 
other land-titles (Industry representative. PNG Meeting 2, 3 May 2011); and licenses had 
been awarded in Port Moresby offices despite failing to incorporate the interests of 
landowners (Meeting 12, 20 May 2011). Another widespread and recent case of this is 
evident from the allegations over the Special Agriculture and Business Leases (SABLs). One 
forestry official explained that even though the intended purpose of SABL was to cover 
agricultural projects, applications for these licenses mirrored applications for timber-
harvesting licenses, rather than a real agricultural project which would require specific 
road systems and planning for mills (Forestry officials. PNG Meeting 19, 8 February, 2012). 
This, he argued, supported the claim that the SABL were being awarded to cover illegal 
timber operations. In Indonesia also, licenses were illegally awarded based on fraudulent 
documents. Respondents from one NGO in Indonesia showed evidence of companies 
being awarded licenses based on environmental impact assessments (EIA) that had been 
copied from other projects (NGO representative. Meeting 2, 4 Sept 2011). These examples 
are just some of the many variations of fraudulent documents that exist in Indonesia and 
PNG and point to how ubiquitous this practice of a semblance of legality is. 
There are many reasons why this practice of a semblance of legality is so prevalent. Some 
of these have already been identified in this grounded theory, such as poor regulations. 
However, concern about poor regulations interacts with concern over risks—such as legal 
sanction—from being illegal. That is, a company may seek a semblance of legality to 
protect itself from costs associated with legal punishment^^ or damage to its reputation. 
As I described above, being legal (or the appearance of it) was a clear priority for many 
actors. Company and government respondents discussed the importance of being legal 
and the negative Impacts from allegations of illegality. For companies trading 
internationally, allegations that companies are operating illegally can affect international 
market access." In PNG the lack of monitoring by government officials was a key concern 
for the industry, 'because the way the world has gone, you have got to be independently 
certified and compliant and all the rest of it' (Industry representative. Meeting 2, 3 May 
2011). Being able to cover illegal activities with a semblance of legality therefore protects 
companies from potential loss of reputation, loss of market access and legal punishment. 
The practice of covering illegal activities with legal paperwork is equally important to 
protect the reputations of the relevant government agents. This can include both 
individual and organisational reputations. That is, government agents also risk their 
reputations for condoning some illegal activities. Promoting a semblance of legality 
reduces their risks of exposure. This highlights the importance of understanding the 
priorities of government agents to understand if and how different regulations are 
implemented. In addition, this shows that semblance of legality benefits the two key 
actors, which in part explains the prevalence of this practice and the importance of 
understanding this process to predict the outcomes from the governance process. 
A semblance of legality is not always necessary or sufficient. In some contexts, a 
semblance of legality may not be necessary because illegal activities are not being 
monitored. Alternatively, a semblance of legality may be insufficient because actors, other 
than those involved in the semblance of legality, are monitoring activities and reporting 
actual compliance. For example, NGOs' campaigns that monitor on-the-ground activities 
of companies reduce those companies' ability to cover any breaches with fraudulent 
" This depends on factors such as the fraudulent docunnents being exposed by government agents other 
than those who provided the fraudulent documents, and the willingness and capacity for those government 
agents to prosecute such crimes. 
" For example, Greenpeace's campaign against Indonesian oil palm company Sinar Mas, which led to 
Nestles cancelling their contract with Sinar Mas (Tabacek, 2010). 
paperwork. The presence of external monitors seems particularly important to preventing 
a semblance of legality. This highlights the importance of the interaction of governance 
factors in order to understand and predict what the outcomes (such as illegal or legal 
activities) may be. 
The three key processes described above, being prioritising, legitimating activities and 
controlling strategies, and the issue of semblance of legality, all interact to determine if 
and how regulations are implemented. How different actors seek to engage in each of the 
three processes and the different factors that affect their interests therefore constitutes 
forest governance that ultimately affects how forest resources are used (Chapter 7). 
Furthermore, the specific interaction of these factors is greatly influenced by the local 
conditions, particularly the match between local conditions and the regulations. 
Therefore, this grounded theory finds that the specific combination of these three 
processes determines if and how different regulations are enforced in different contexts. 
5.4 Discussion 
In this section I analyse the results of my grounded theory in order to better relate this 
grounded theory to the broader literature. To do so, I focus on three streams of literature 
that are most relevant to understanding the findings from this grounded theory: i) 
compliance theory, ii) legitimacy theory, and iii) theories about information and 
accountability. The implications of this grounded theory for current understanding about 
poor governance in the forests will be addressed at the end of the section. 
There has been a substantial amount of research into questions about how and when 
companies may comply with regulations in general (Amariei, 2005; Blaser, 2010; 
Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002; Etienne, 2011; Cunningham et al., 2005; Peterson and Diss-
Torrance, 2012; Ramcilovic-Suominen and Hansen, 2012), and environmental regulations 
specifically (Burby and Paterson, 1993; Decker and Pope, 2005; Cunningham et al., 2005). 
This body of literature can be divided into two broad groups. The first comes from the 
perspective of neo-classical economics, and the second focuses on the social dimension of 
compliance. 
The neo-classical perspective predicts that companies will comply with regulations when 
the benefit of non-compliance is outweighed by the risk of being caught and the relative 
severity of the punishment (Becker, 1968). According to this perspective, compliance is 
strengthened by frequent monitoring and a sufficient deterrent or punishment for any 
breaches, ideas which are widespread in writings about illegal logging (Jachmann, 2008; 
Kaimowitz, 2003; Richards et al., 2003; World Bank, 2006a). The prevalence of this 
rational-choice perspective is still evident in some of the discussions about the 
implementation of REDD+ programs, where calls to strengthen law enforcement and 
increase monitoring are common (Goncalves et al., 2012; Luttrell et al., 2011). 
Even though there is wide support for the neo-classical explanation of compliance, the 
logic behind it has nonetheless been challenged by the fact that many studies have 
demonstrated levels of compliance in excess of that predicted by the level of monitoring 
or enforcement. Harrington (1988) was one of the earlier researchers attempting to 
explain this puzzle. Harrington modelled compliance in a game where enforcement was 
targeted towards groups of firms seen as 'non-cooperative' at the beginning of the game, 
and less enforcement was directed to firms seen as 'cooperative'. The results showed that 
firms have an interest to exceed compliance in the early stages in order to be placed in the 
'cooperative' group, thereby avoiding future enforcement activities (Harrington, 1988). 
Further research has identified other factors such as compliance behaviour of other 
companies (Decker and Pope, 2005), or the characteristics of the firm itself, such as size 
(Gray and Shadbegian, 2005). The diversity of factors identified in the literature show that 
understanding formal enforcement practices is insufficient to be able to predict when and 
how companies may comply with regulations. 
The second body of research into compliance focused on the social dimension of business 
and government activity. Different factors, such as corporate governance systems, for 
example leadership systems, and social norms have been identified as key determinants 
of compliance (or non-compliance) (for example Cunningham et al., 2005; May, 2005; 
Ramcilovic-Suominen and Hansen, 2012). For example. May (2005) examined the relative 
significance of fear, associated with being found to violate regulatory requirements, and a 
sense of civic duty to comply across three areas: i) farmers in Denmark complying with 
agro-environmental regulations, ii) residential contractors in Washington complying with 
building-code provisions, and iii) marine facilities in Washington and California complying 
with water pollution regulations. This detailed investigation found that whilst regulatory 
inspections did affect compliance levels, other factors included how different actors 
framed the regulatory system, the different societal norms," and the perceived 
consistency of law enforcement against competitor companies (May, 2005). The diverse 
body of research on compliance has identified many different dimensions of why 
companies may (or may not) comply with regulations, such as whether other companies 
were complying and the level of punishment for non-compliance, with similarities and 
implications for understanding the results of the grounded theory of forest governance. 
The process of prioritisation in the grounded theory of forest governance demonstrated 
how features of compliance literature operate in the complex context of forest 
governance in Indonesia and PNG. For example, the fact that compliance (or at least the 
appearance of compliance) was seen as vital to protect companies from future 
prosecution supports the rational-choice explanation's view of the compliance literature. 
In practice, as demonstrated by my findings, this rational decision-making is dynamic, as 
companies could change their practices dependent on the changing risks of being caught 
and punished. For example, being legal was seen as more of a priority when companies' 
activities were being monitored by government officials or NGOs, or when particular 
illegal practices were exposed and politically condemned. There are also aspects of this 
grounded theory that provide support for the social dimensions of compliance. In both 
countries these norms tended to support non-compliance. This was evident in the social 
narratives about the poor quality of regulations and the expectation that enforcement 
would not be strict. It was expected and accepted that there was a process of negotiation 
over whether and how regulations would be implemented. The grounded theory 
therefore demonstrates how the social norms and rational-choice considerations can 
In at least one of these cases, the authors argue that extensive participation of different actors in forming 
the regulations contributed to norms of compliance and a stronger sense of civic duty. 
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interact to affect the compliance decisions of companies in the forests of Indonesia and 
PNG. 
As well as demonstrating how some of these features of compliance operate in the forest 
sector of Indonesia and PNG, the results of my research also draws attention to the gaps 
in the literature on compliance. This is a consequence of the fact that research on 
compliance has typically drawn on data from developed countries. These are places where 
the regulations are relatively clear and the legitimacy of the government is more or less 
stable: the United States, Canada and Denmark for example (see Harrington, 1988; May, 
2005; Potoski and Prakash, 2004). There has been less (quantitative) examination of 
compliance in developing countries (some exceptions include Hansen, 2011; Hauck, 2008). 
This is a problematic gap for understanding the results of my research because, by basing 
studies in developed countries, there has been less consideration of the effect of the 
perceived poor quality of regulations on compliance. My research, however, has shown 
that the quality of regulations can be critical to the issue of compliance in different 
contexts. The research from developing countries that is available has demonstrated how 
social norms can support non-compliance, and that the perceived quality of regulations 
can be important (Hansen, 2011; Hauck, 2008; Smith et al., 2006). For example, in a study 
of non-compliance with new forestry regulation in Peru, Smith and colleagues (2006) 
argued that decades of non-compliance with the previous regulation had contributed to a 
norm of non-compliance, and that this norm was not affected by introducing new 
regulations. The authors also describe other factors that supported the norm of non-
compliance, including a history of corruption and the perception that the government was 
anti-timber industry. Their research highlights the potential importance of long-term 
perceptions regarding the quality and legitimacy of regulations, as this long-term quality 
will have effects on norms associated with compliance, an argument that can also be 
made from the findings of the present research. That is, it is clear that historical 
conditions, such as changes to the land-use plan, can have long-term implications for 
levels and norms of compliance. 
Another area where the findings from this grounded theory provide additional 
considerations for the compliance literature relates to the role of government agents in 
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either enforcing regulations or condoning illegal activities. In this grounded theory, one of 
the key determinants of compliance are the different priorities of government agents and 
how/ they affect decisions about if and how/ to enforce regulations. The compliance 
literature does identify the fact that monitoring may be strategic from government 
agents. For example, some studies have assumed that government agents target 
monitoring activities towards firms that, in the past, have not complied w/ith regulations 
(Harrington, 1988). The w/ide literature on illegal logging has also identified how/ illegal 
activities are often condoned, supported or even promoted by government agents 
(Casson and Obidzinski, 2007; Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002; Richards et al., 2003; Smith et 
al., 2003a; Tacconi, 2007c). Despite the acknow/ledgement that government agents may 
be selective about whether and how they enforce regulations, with implications for 
understanding compliance by companies, the motivations of government have been 
relatively under-studied in the compliance literature. 
Firstly, my research has identified different priorities of government agents tasked with 
enforcing regulations and how these may affect their decisions to enforce regulations or 
condone illegal activities. For example, one priority was promoting investment. Decisions 
about whether to enforce regulations were, in part, dependent on the content of those 
regulations and whether they were seen to help or hinder government agents' ability to 
promote investment. Other considerations included the potential effects of the decision 
on the reputation of government officials and agencies, and how the decision to enforce 
regulations might affect the opportunities for corrupt payments. It is clear from these 
priorities that there are many factors that affect whether and how government agents 
may choose to enforce regulations or condone illegal activities. Ultimately, compliance 
will be dependent on the negotiation of priorities between companies and government 
agents. The results from this grounded theory then complement compliance theory by 
identifying the complex motivations of government agents that affect if and how they 
choose to enforce regulations. 
Secondly, despite there being widespread concern with the issue of rule of law and 
government effectiveness in governance research (Kaufmann et al., 2012b; Nanda, 2006; 
World Bank, 2006a), there have been few attempts to incorporate compliance theory 
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within the governance literature. In the governance literature focused on illegal forest 
activities, there remains a strong focus on the rational-choice dimension of compliance. 
This is evident in the common call to strengthen law/ enforcement and monitoring as a 
means to reduce illegal forest activities (for example Friesen, 2003; World Bank, 2006b). 
Some exceptions include the corporate governance literature, w/here the quality of 
corporate governance is reflected in the level of compliance (Crittenden and Crittenden, 
2012). Notwithstanding these exceptions, the focus on rational-choice explanations 
remains prevalent. This is despite the fact that the broader compliance literature 
demonstrates complex motivations for why companies (or individuals) may comply with 
regulations. And these explanations provided insight into why illegal activities occur 
beyond explanations that rely solely on rational-choice models. In addition, my research 
highlights the complex motivations of government agents tasked with enforcing 
regulations, and how these motivations are affected by the broader governance context. 
Further attention to the integration of compliance theory and prioritisation processes into 
governance research in different contexts seems to be important for future governance 
research. 
Legitimacy 
The second aspect of this grounded theory is the issue of legitimacy and legitimating 
strategies. Legitimacy formed a central concept in this grounded theory as many 
respondents described different activities, such as socialisation and the payment of bribes, 
which worked to build legitimacy for their interests. Often these legitimating activities 
were directed at those who had some form of authority over the activities. This included 
formal authority and informal authority. For example, companies worked to build 
legitimacy with government agents who had the formal authority to shut down business 
operations. They also work to build legitimacy with actors who had informal authority, 
such as landowners in PNG.^" Legitimacy was also an important concept in understanding 
" There is formal authority of landowners, but I refer here to the informal authorities that exist in addition 
to the formal, legal authority of landowners. For example, the informal authority that emerges when 
landowner groups are in dispute. 
the process of semblance of legality. These points highlight some of the dimensions of 
legitimacy that were identified in my research. 
The concept of legitimacy itself emerged from political scientists, including Weber, who, 
as early as the 1920s, described legitimacy as the citizens' acceptance of the use of power 
(from Hacek et al., 2013). Legitimacy was seen as one dimension of compliance and was 
therefore focused on activities of the state (Bernstein, 2005). The normative dimension of 
legitimacy was concerned not only with the capacity to enforce laws, but also the right to 
do so. In relation to governance, with the associated fragmentation of authority, the 
concept of legitimacy has taken on a broader meaning to include the legitimacy of actors 
beyond the state. For example, research has focused on legitimacy in global 
environmental governance (Bernstein, 2005), and legitimacy of the non-state actors and 
non-government institutions such as industry-led roundtables (Cashore, 2002; Hafner, 
1998). Applying the legitimacy concept to these non-state actors is seen as a form of 
power (Bernstein, 2005), and this power has important implications for understanding 
how governance occurs. Indeed, much of the literature on good governance, such as that 
from the World Bank, focuses on issues such as voice and accountability as vital to build 
legitimacy for different activities (Biermann and Gupta, 2011; Kaufmann et al., 2009). 
Beyond understanding the role of legitimacy, research has identified many different types 
of legitimacy. One of the most common distinctions involves three different types of 
legitimacy, being pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Pragmatic 
legitimacy refers to legitimacy derived from self-interest. Moral legitimacy is guided by 
value decisions about 'the right thing to do'. Cognitive legitimacy is achieved when there is 
a cognitive evaluation that something is understandable, or to do something otherwise is 
unthinkable (Cashore, 2002). Different types of legitimacy have also been categorised by 
whether legitimacy is served by the process or outcome. That is, legitimacy refers to the 
procedural characteristics of a rule-setting process—often associated with participation. 
Output legitimacy refers to the acceptance of rules because of their (perceived) ability to 
solve problems (from Costas-Perez et al., 2012). This is not the same as actually solving 
the problems; rather it is aligned to cognitive legitimacy, in that output legitimacy refers 
to the acceptance of rules because they are understandable solutions. Whilst these 
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categories offer important ways to understand the different types of legitimacy, they 
provide little information about what types of legitimacy may be relevant to forest 
governance in different contexts. 
That is. Even though there has been a lot of research into legitimacy, and it has been 
shown to be important in governing resources (for example Biermann and Gupta, 2011; 
Mascarenhas and Scarce, 2004), there has been less research into how different actors 
may seek to gain legitimacy and what this means for forest governance. An exception is 
Schouten and Glasbergen's study of the roundtable on sustainable palm oil (RSPO) (2011). 
Schouten and Glasbergen analysed how the RSPO sought to build legal, moral and 
consent/acceptance legitimacy, finding that factors such as participatory processes, 
negotiation of key principles, and the involvement of diverse actors all contributed to the 
emergence of some legitimacy. Importantly, they described how the RSPO sought to build 
moral justification: 'there was a need to create basic understanding and common belief 
related to what they are trying to govern' (Schouten and Glasbergen, 2011, p. 1892). 
Some of the different types of legitimacy were evident in the strategies adopted by 
companies and other actors identified in my research. For example, the efforts by 
companies to engage with local communities were a strategy to build input legitimacy. 
Beyond these strategies, what is clear from this grounded theory is the importance of 
balancing legality and a semblance of legality to building and maintaining legitimacy. 
One of the main sources of legitimacy identified in this research is the legitimacy of the 
state. There are two components to this. Firstly this has to do with the legitimacy of the 
state itself, which I return to later in this section. Secondly and relatedly, is the role of the 
state in legitimising activities by deeming them legal. That is, 'it is the state that defines 
what is legal and illegal and invests that distinction with legitimacy' (Aspinall and van 
Klinken, 2011a:2). The legitimacy associated with legality is evident in many studies on 
forest governance which focus on the importance of rule of law (Contreras-Hermosilla, 
2007; World Bank, 2006b). 
The legitimacy of legal activities is also evident in the fact that allegations of illegality are a 
key tool used by NGOs to challenge the legitimacy of companies and governments (for 
example EIA and CIP, 2005; EIA/Telapak, 2012; Raitzer, 2010; Urrunaga et al., 2012). The 
issue of semblance of legality, which emerged from this data, has implications for 
understanding the relationship between legality and legitimacy in the process of 
governance. Specifically, it suggests that while there is legitimacy associated with being 
legal, in the context of corruption and perceived poor quality regulations, the need to be 
legal is less important, but the need to appear to be legal remains. These findings then 
demonstrate how legitimacy and legality work in practice and particularly how the state 
also works to invest illegal activities with legitimacy. 
That is, the relationship between legitimacy and legality can be extended to consider how 
illegal activities may have legitimacy and so be prioritised. In the research for this thesis, 
the concept of development was given particular legitimacy, and activities that purported 
to provide development were often prioritised. Legality was sometimes seen as an 
unnecessary barrier to investment and development, which justified some illegal 
activities. This is not unique to my research: development is an obvious priority in much of 
the research on governance and is often used as an explanation for illegal activities. For 
example, in discussing the (often) illegal permits awarded by district heads following the 
fall of Suharto and the decentralisation of government in Indonesia, McCarthy (2006) 
described how district heads gained significant legitimacy from their ability to attract and 
encourage investment. The findings presented in this chapter then help to demonstrate 
how legitimacy is built and some potential interactions between legitimacy and 
compliance theories—particularly how legitimacy strategies can support and justify 
patterns of non-compliance or non-enforcement. 
This is not to say that in all cases illegal activities were considered legitimate by different 
actors, as there are other potential explanations for why respondents provided the 
answers they did. For example, many answers provided during interviews may have been 
attempts by respondents to provide socially acceptable answers, which has been a 
concern identified in other research on compliance (for example May, 2005). Responses 
about the legitimacy of illegal activities could be understood as an attempt to provide a 
social justification for decisions to condone illegal activities when in fact the decisions 
were made for private reasons. Other responses reflected a type of social narrative used 
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to explain and justify why they did what they did. For example, a common narrative 
associated with controlling strategies was the lack of capacity or education of 
communities as an explanation or excuse for failing to appropriately consult with 
communities. These factors influence the analysis of respondents' answers and draw 
attention to the complex and multifaceted nature of issues to do with legitimacy, 
compliance and power in managing natural resources. 
5.5.1 Controlling strategies and accountability 
The controlling strategies identified in this grounded theory are the final area to be 
analysed before turning to the question of poor governance. In the literature, the issue of 
control is also tied to systems of accountability. That is, control over resources is 
determined by who makes decisions, and whom they are accountable to. Accountability is 
a key concern in the governance literature, and accountability reforms—for example, 
through decentralisation, which has been promoted globally to improve governance 
(Coleman and Fleischman, 2012; Ribot et al., 2006). One key aspect of much of the 
literature on accountability is the importance of clear distribution of information or 
transparency, which is widely seen as a key component of accountability (Blaikie, 2006; 
Lockwood et al., 2010), The results of this grounded theory also support the argument 
about the importance of information and transparency in holding others to account for 
their actions. But one of the key findings of this research highlights the importance of 
managing information to develop or restrain the expectations of others. The ability to 
collect and distribute information in a way that minimises expectations of others was a 
key strategy to gain control over resources and to influence the process of prioritisation. 
This is important for accountability, because these expectations also become benchmarks 
by which the success and legitimacy of activities may be measured. That is, actors are also 
held to account by whether their actions meet the expectations of others. Understanding 
how actors seek to develop expectations in others, and how these expectations are used 
to hold activities to account, is important for understanding the relationship between 
informal accountability and the process of forest governance. 
The findings of the grounded theory and the analysis presented here also point to a 
broader debate in the literature on governance. As I identified in the introduction to this 
chapter, one of the contentious aspects in definitions of governance is the relative 
influence of the government. At one end of the continuum, the World Bank's conception 
of governance has government as the central actor. This perspective is also evident in 
some of the academic literature, v»/here governance is defined as the w/ay in which 
government exercises its functions (for example Smith et al., 2006, p. 467). On the other 
hand, governance is also understood to be the combination of structures and processes 
that are involved in the coordination of interdependent needs and interests in the 
absence of a unifying political authority (Krahmann, 2003a, p. 11). Indeed, a lot of the 
focus of governance research has been on the role of w/ider actors and non-government 
organisations, such as markets as key governance processes affecting resource use (for 
example Brannstrom et al., 2012; Cashore, 2002). These conflicting ideas, about what 
governance is, highlight a complex role for government in governance. 
The evidence from this theory supports aspects of both perspectives regarding the role of 
government in governance, and points to a multifaceted relationship between the state 
more broadly and governance. Firstly, the fact that regulations and the need for legality, 
or a semblance of legality, are core to the way in which governance happens supports the 
idea of the government as central to the process of governance. Secondly, the legitimacy 
and authority of the state is, in part, a result of the governance process. Even parts of the 
governance process that may be seen as poor governance, such as the semblance of 
legality, can work to support the authority of the state by protecting the reputation of 
government officials and the state more broadly. A semblance of legality can of course 
also damage the reputation and legitimacy of the state, highlighting the complex impacts 
of the governance process and state authority. Thirdly, the fact that legality is often 
insufficient to legitimise activities, and indeed that the regulations are not strictly 
enforced and their implementation is negotiated, reflects the notion of fragmented 
authority and negotiated interests. These features are central to the more academic 
conception of governance where there is less of a central focus on the activity of 
government. These apparently competing ideas—government as central or peripheral to 
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governance—suggests the need for a more nuanced understanding of the role of 
government in governance. 
5.5.2 Poor governance 
These findings have implications for our understanding of poor governance of forests. 
Conceptions of poor governance often focus on the presence or absence of specific 
governance features. For example, according to the Worldw/ide Governance Indicators, 
the presence of illegal activities, which demonstrates a lack of rule of law, is indicative of 
poor governance. Indeed, the definition of poor governance often used by the World Bank 
lists the absence of features of good governance, such as the lack of transparency, the lack 
of accountability and the lack of rule of law (World Bank, 2009; WRI, n.d.). And no doubt 
there are many negative impacts from the absence of these features, evident in the huge 
body of literature addressing issues such as illegal logging (Smith et a!., 2003a; Tacconi, 
2007b), and accountability and participation (Xu and Ribot, 2004). Despite this body of 
research however, the focus on the presence or absences of specific outcomes fails to 
address the broader question of what constitutes poor governance as a whole. 
Whilst this thesis does not attempt to answer such question, the results do challenge 
some common features of poor governance, particularly rule of law. The findings of this 
thesis also challenge the focus on specific outcomes as indicators of poor governance. This 
is because the core character of the governance process that emerged from the data is 
the negotiation over if and how regulations are implemented. This means that, for 
example, the occurrence of illegal activities does not necessarily reflect poor governance. 
It may be the result of legitimate negotiation and participation of diverse actors 
responding to local needs and poor regulations. Instead, the results suggest that poor 
governance is best measured by qualities of the process of negotiation, rather than any 
particular outcome. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the results and analysis of the grounded theory of forest 
governance. The core activity of governance that emerged from the data was a 
negotiation over if and how regulations were implemented under different conditions. 
The three processes that emerged to influence this negotiation involved prioritising, 
legitimating activities, and strategies of control. These processes were then analysed 
drawing on the literatures of governance, compliance theory, and legitimacy theory. One 
key finding from this analysis is the identification of the importance of different incentives 
for government agents to enforce laws, and how this affected overall compliance. This 
idea of government agents negotiating and selectively enforcing laws has, so far, not been 
well-developed in the broader compliance literature. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
literature that identifies particular outcomes (such as illegality) as a feature of poor 
governance, the results of this grounded theory focus instead on the process of 
negotiation itself to assess the quality of governance. That is, poor governance refers to 
particular qualities of the process of prioritising, legitimating, and controlling resources, 
rather than any specific outcomes (for example, the occurrence of illegal activities). The 
topic of poor governance and its impact on forests will be discussed further in Chapters 7 
and 8, when I address the overall research question of this thesis, which relates to the 
impacts of poor governance. The next chapter presents the results of the grounded theory 
of corruption, needed to inform the analysis of those impacts. 
Chapter 6 
Regulatory quality, mutual dependency and political 
interference: A grounded theory of forestry corruption 
6.1 Introduction 
Corruption has been a well-documented feature of the forest sector of many countries 
(Global Witness, 2007; Richards et al., 2003; Urrunaga et al., 2012), including Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) and Indonesia (CELCoR and ACF, 2006; Dauvergne, 1994; Laurance et al., 
2011; Smith et al., 2003a). Corruption—commonly defined as 'the misuse of entrusted 
power for private gain' (Pope, 1996, p. 16)—Is widely reported to be contributing to 
deforestation and forest degradation (Bulte et al., 2007; Dauvergne, 1994; World Bank, 
2006a; WRI, 2003), and over the past several years there has been a growing concern 
about the Implications of corruption for efforts aimed at reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) (Tacconi et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2011). 
Forestry-related corruption research has focused mostly on: i) how corruption facilitates 
illegal logging (Callister, 1999; Contreras-Hermosilla, 2001); 11) the impacts of corruption 
on land use change (Bulte et al., 2007; Koyuncu and Yilmaz., 2008); and ill) how corruption 
affects the broader political-economy of resource use (Bulte and Damania, 2008; Burgess 
et al., 2012; McCarthy, 2006; Ross, 2001). However, there has been less focus on how the 
actors themselves understand and engage in corruption (an exception includes Ufere et 
al., 2012) and how this relates to the broader forest governance process. It is important to 
address this gap with a more detailed investigation Into local-level processes of corruption 
because understanding how corruption happens, according to those who engage in it. Is 
necessary to understand the complex, context-specific nature of corruption In the forest 
sector. Ultimately, better understanding of how and why corruption occurs in the forests 
is necessary to understand if and how corruption may be contributing to deforestation, 
and what to do to reduce corruption. This chapter therefore presents the results of the 
grounded theory of corruption in the forests of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
The next section provides a bacl<ground to the literature on corruption. In keeping with 
the principles of grounded theory, the background presented is not intended to be a 
complete literature review; rather, the focus is on identifying some of the key aspects of 
the research and thinking about corruption that are most relevant to the subsequent 
grounded theory. The second section presents the results of the grounded theory of forest 
corruption. The key process that emerged from the grounded theory of forest governance 
(Chapter 5) was the negotiation over if and how regulations are implemented. The 
grounded theory on forest corruption is then focused on how different types of corruption 
are involved in this negotiation over if and how regulations are implemented. Three 
processes emerged from the data. The first two are specifically about corruption, 
identifying the role of corruption in negotiating the implementation of regulations, and in 
building the relationships and systems associated with mutual dependency. The third 
involves activities associated with positioning and political interference. What is evident 
from these processes is that to understand corruption, it is important to consider not only 
the specific corrupt exchanges, but the broader systems that support and protect those 
exchanges. The fourth aspect of this grounded theory is referred to here as the 
'associates' of corruption. These are activities that can be associated with, or confused for, 
corruption and include conflicts of interest and negligence. These activities highlight the 
difficulty of isolating corrupt exchanges from a variety of other problems associated with 
forest governance. The final section presents the analysis of the results of this grounded 
theory, focusing on issues of legality, state-society relationships and legitimacy. 
6.2 Background 
With some of the earliest references to corruption dating back to the 4th century B.C. 
(Bardhan, 1997), corruption has obviously been part of human relations and all types of 
governance systems for many centuries (Campos and Pradhan, 2007). Despite this history, 
up until the later part of the century corruption was under-represented in political-
economy research. This situation has changed in the past several decades, as evidenced 
by the growing body of literature from multiple disciplines investigating the nature, causes 
and consequences of corruption (Tanzi, 1998). Despite this growing body of research, 
there is still considerable debate over the definition of corruption, and the causes and 
consequences of different corrupt exchanges. 
One of the most common definitions of corruption is that developed by Transparency 
International (Tl)," in w/hich corruption is 'the misuse of entrusted power for private gain' 
(Pope, 1996, p. 16), with the wording 'entrusted power' having replaced 'public office' to 
acknowledge the role of private contracting in the provision of public services (Pope, 
1996). Despite the recognition of the role of the private sector in the provision of services, 
as private sector CEOs also have entrusted power, corruption is still most commonly 
understood to involve public officials. That is, many definitions go on to explain that 
corruption is 'behaviour on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or 
civil servants, in which they improperly and unlaw/fully enrich themselves, or those close 
to them, by the misuse of the power entrusted to them' (Pope, 2000, p. 2). These 
definitions of corruption are the most common, but there are obvious challenges to this 
sort of definition. Firstly, this definition relies heavily on a distinction between public and 
private interests, which may not be appropriate in all countries (Andvig et al., 2000; 
Warren, 2004). That is, different cultures may have different definitions of public and 
private interests, and what constitutes an abuse of such powers (Larmour, 2008).'® As 
such the definition does not accurately cover different countries' experiences with 
corruption. Secondly, these types of definitions place corruption as primarily an act of one 
individual, when in practice (as will be evident below) corruption requires an exchange of 
some sort. Otherwise, corruption cannot be distinguished from other crimes such as 
embezzlement and fraud. 
Beyond these definitions, much of the literature on corruption has sought to develop and 
understand different types of corruption, such as petty and grand corruption, state-
capture and bureaucratic, political and administrative, collusive and non-collusive (Clarke, 
2011; Hellman et al., 2003; Pope, 1996; Ross, 2001; Smith et al., 2003a; Sundstrbm, 2012). 
"Transparency International is a leading international anti-corruption non-government organization. 
" There have been criticisms of this culturally relativistic perspective of corruption (Pope, 2000), there are 
nonetheless debates about how culture may affect perspectives of »/hat constitutes corruption (Larmour, 
2008). 
These different categories of corruption draw on characteristics of the corrupt exchange, 
such as the actors, contexts and motivation of corrupt exchanges. For example, collusive 
corruption refers to corruption where both parties in the exchange benefit, and non-
collusive refers to situations where one party compels the other to pay a bribe, often for 
something that they are legally entitled to. However, whilst different categories are 
prevalent in the literature, and highlight many complexities of the phenomenon of 
corruption, there is often ambiguity in how they are applied. This is particularly a problem 
because these categories are used without specific explanation, leading to considerable 
confusion and overlaps between such categories. For example, to some, grand corruption 
only refers to large payments to higher political figures (Tanzi, 1998); to others, it can also 
include high-level bureaucratic officials (Callister, 1999)—in which case grand corruption is 
similar to bureaucratic corruption. To others, grand is the same as state-capture, meaning 
it refers to corruption that intends to influence the content of regulations (Hellman et al., 
2003). Whilst no doubt, corruption is a very complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon, 
and as such no single definition will be universally applicable (Larmour, 2007). However, 
these overly-simple definitions that are so common in the literature are in many ways 
misleading. A result of this is that discussions about corruption—particularly in the 
development literature—are confined to bribery or treated in passing as an activity which 
'often facilitates illegal logging' (WRI, 2003), rather than as the complex phenomenon that 
it actually is. 
Despite the definitional challenges, research and concern about the perceived problems 
of corruption has been growing. In the past, corruption was largely treated as an 
individual 'bad apple'" problem; however, over the last few decades the international 
profile of corruption has become far more prominent, including as an academic concern 
(Tanzi, 1998). Part of this growing prominence was the work of several economists, 
particularly Rose-Ackerman (1987) and Robert Klitgaard (1988), during the 1980s. They 
" 'Bad apple' definitions of corruption treat it as the result of the particular psychologies of the people 
involved. 'Bad apple' explanations of corruption remain common in response to corruption scandals, as this 
conception provides clear, albeit simplistic, solutions to the occurrence of corruption (Darley, 2005). 
were among the first to apply rational-choice theory to corruption. In this approach, 
corruption is seen as an individual calculation to maximise utility. This literature also 
involved the acknowledgment that broader systems create the interests associated with 
corrupt activities, rather than just seeing corruption as the criminal behaviour of some 
'bad apples'. Rose-Ackerman's (1987) seminal paper focused on the costs and benefits to 
different (government) agents, of bribing and being bribed, under different models of 
competition. She found that increased competition reduces the opportunities for 
corruption. In a similar fashion, Klitgaard's (1988) 'corruption equation' describes the 
broader systems which affect corrupt interests. Specifically, he argues that the risk of 
corruption is positively related to the level of monopoly control and the level of discretion 
in decision-making, and inversely related to the level of accountability. 
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability (Klitgaard, 1988, p. 78). 
Whilst the rational-choice view of corruption has been influential, there are nonetheless 
problems with this perspective. Part of this is criticism comes from the fact that actual 
experiences of corruption do not match the predictions inherent in the rational-choice 
perspective. For example, Klitgaard's and Rose-Ackerman's perspective advocates the 
need for markets, that provide choice of suppliers, as a means to reduce corruption 
(Larmour, 2007). Indeed there are ongoing calls to privatise activities as a means to reduce 
corruption. In practice, however, efforts to privatise industries have also been susceptible 
to corrupt activities (Hellman et al., 2003). A second criticism is that that this conception 
fails to accommodate the more complex social, historical and political dimensions that 
create and support different types of corruption. 
This second criticism is supported by a large body of research that has focused on the 
complex social and institutional dimensions of corruption. This, primarily qualitative 
research, points to the complex social processes, relationships and norms associated with 
corruption in different contexts. For example, in their research on local-level tree trade in 
India, Corbridge and Kumar (2002) described the complex bureaucracy and the social 
relations between state officials and communities which affects the cost and type of 
corruption involved. Indeed, the social dimension of corruption was also supported by an 
analysis focusing on the institutionalised nature of corruption in natural resource 
management (Robbins, 2000). McCarthy's work (on the political ecology of agrarian 
reform in Indonesia) also documented how historical, political and economic biases 
affected corrupt networks following decentralisation (McCarthy, 2000b, 2006). In 
Cameroon, the complex interplay between political interests, regulatory changes and 
livelihood opportunities has also been shown to impact upon the type and nature of 
corruption, specifically driving shifts towards the informal taxation of timber logged by 
small-scale operators (Cerutti et al., 2013). This body of research has therefore pointed to 
the complex economic, social and institutional norms that can affect whether corrupt 
exchanges occur, and the type of corrupt exchanges. Furthermore, in describing this more 
complex context-dependent perspective of corruption, these authors challenge the simple 
idea of corruption that are evident in the more rational-choice perspectives. 
Relatedly, there has also been a stream of literature focused more specifically on issues of 
patronage and rent-seeking, both of which have been documented in the literature on 
corruption and natural resources (Kolstad and Spreide, 2009). Patronage, which refers to 
the use of state rents to secure political power, has been shown to be incredibly prevalent 
in many contexts (McCarthy, 2002a, 2006; Ross, 2001), and is thought to be a core type of 
corruption that occurs in the forest sector (Kolstad and S0reide, 2009; Kolstad and Wiig, 
2009). The focus on patronage in forest-related research therefore highlights the issue of 
political power and how corrupt exchanges may be used to attain it. Rent-seeking, which 
refers to the socially costly pursuit of rents, is another activity which can involve 
corruption. That is, there are rent-seeking activities that do not involve corrupt exchanges, 
such as political lobbying. However, corruption can also be used as a rent-seeking 
strategy; indeed, the role of corruption in rent-seeking has been a common theme of 
much corruption research (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Krueger, 1974; Lambsdorff, 2002). 
Furthermore, given the negative economic impacts of rent-seeking, the focus on corrupt 
rent-seeking and natural resources has led to concerns that corruption may be an 
explanation for why the presence of natural resources may negatively affect a country's 
economic development (Kolstad and S0reide, 2009; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009): a paradox 
referred to as the resource curse (Sachs and Warner, 2001). I return to discuss the 
resource curse and the broader impacts of corruption further in the next chapter. 
However, the final part of the literature on corruption that I introduce here is a recent 
study on the experiences of corruption by entrepreneurs. Much of the literature described 
above has focused on drivers of corruption, such as rent-seeking, or the broader 
institutions that support and demand corrupt exchanges. However, much of the literature 
has failed to investigate the experience of corruption from the point of view of those 
actually engaged in it. An exception to this is a recent study of corruption in Nigeria, which 
sought to understand how entrepreneurs experience corruption (Ufere et a!., 2012). Ufere 
and colleagues argued that rather than being victims of greedy government officials, 
entrepreneurs were engaged in many activities, which created a demand for corruption. 
Specifically, they identified two main strategies that entrepreneurs use corruption for: the 
first being budget capture, the second consent. These different motivations for corruption 
involve different types of corruption, with the first involving kick-forwards and long-term 
strategies to build relationships with key government officials in order to secure 
government contracts, while the second involves simple incentivising payments in order to 
gain access to government services, such as permits. Their findings highlight the diverse 
strategies and motivations that are involved in corruption and they describe how 
corruption is 'governed by an intriguing and well-embedded set of social norms, rules, 
routines, and power relations' (Ufere et al., 2012, p. 2440). However, their focus solely on 
the entrepreneurs may miss some of the important aspects of how government agents 
respond to the strategies of entrepreneurs, and how government agents may also create 
demand for corruption. Their paper therefore highlights the need for further research into 
how multiple actors, such as government, business and civil society, engage in and 
experience corruption in different contexts. 
Together the diverse body of literature on corruption, including the rational-choice, the 
cultural, the sociological and the institutional perspectives, highlights how multi-faceted 
the phenomenon of corruption is. Even though this body of literature has identified many 
complexities associated with corruption, there are nonetheless gaps. In particular, there 
has been less research from the perspective of those engaged in corruption, an important 
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gap given the interesting findings of Ufere and colleagues in Nigeria (2012). And whilst the 
findings of Ufere and colleagues identify aspects of how specific actors experience 
corruption, by focusing only on the activities of entrepreneurs and their strategic use of 
corruption, their research may miss the important interaction between the activities and 
experiences of entrepreneurs, and the activities and experiences of other relevant actors, 
such as government. Furthermore, the existing research demonstrates how context-
specific factors—including the formal institutions of the state, the availability of rents, and 
the historical or cultural practices—affect the type of corruption that can occur. 
Therefore, the literature on corruption highlights the need to understand the context-
specific process of corruption in order to better determine how corruption may affect 
resource use, and further justifies the use of grounded theory methodology for my 
research. 
The next section presents the results of the grounded theory of corruption. This grounded 
theory is based on fieldworl< conducted in Central Kalimantan in Indonesia and PNG, 
between November 2010 and March 2012. Overall, 82 people were interviewed, several 
of whom were interviewed multiple times. Secondary data including government and 
media reports were also analysed. As discussed in Chapter 2, conducting a grounded 
theory on the sensitive topic of corruption posed specific methodological challenges, 
particularly in relation to the availability of information and the analysis process. The 
consequence of these challenges is that although many people were interviewed for this 
research, much of the data for this theory is based on several key informants—an 
approach which has been adopted in other ethnographic and sensitive research (Houston 
andSudman, 1975). 
The process of data collection and analysis for this grounded theory was done in 
connection with the collection and analyses of data for the grounded theory on forest 
governance presented in the previous chapter. The grounded theory presented below 
therefore draws on the findings of the grounded theory of forest governance. Overall, the 
process of open coding identified six concepts, which explained the nature and process of 
corruption that the respondents described. Through the use of the constant comparison 
method and theoretical sampling (Chapter 2), these original six concepts were reduced to 
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the three core elements that are presented below. Following the grounded theory. 
Section 6.4 presents an analysis of the findings of the grounded theory on corruption, 
focusing on issues of compliance and legitimacy. 
6.3 Theory 
This grounded theory is closely related to the previous grounded theory on forest 
governance, because the key process of negotiating if and how regulations are 
implemented remains the same. Therefore, a key theme throughout this grounded theory 
of corruption is how corrupt exchanges, or corrupt interests, may affect the negotiation 
over the implementation of regulations. Specifically, a core feature of this theory is the 
inter-linkages between corrupt exchanges and the regulations. Again, my focus is not 
about the creation of regulations, but rather on the corruption that occurs in the field. 
Furthermore, whilst there is no doubt a considerable amount of corruption involving 
actors such as civil society, the focus of this theory Is on the higher-order, commercial-
scale corruption, particularly that taking place between government agents and 
companies. The focus in this grounded theory is therefore on the actual practice of 
corrupt exchanges and the broader systems and relationships that are built to support or 
demand that corruption. 
There are three core elements of this theory. The first element is about the different types 
of corruption and how they relate to perceived problems with the regulations. This is 
particularly the focus of companies, for whom corruption was a means to secure other 
interests, such as preferential treatment or to bypass costly regulations. The second 
element has to do with the motivations of government agents themselves, and how they 
use the authority of the state and the threat of enforcement of regulations as a tool to 
meet other ends. Together, these two elements build towards understanding the system 
of mutual dependency, which defines the relationships behind corrupt exchanges. The 
final element of this theory has less to do with specific corrupt exchanges, but it is key to 
understanding how corruption occurs. It is about the process of positioning, whereby 
government agents seek to position themselves to create opportunities for future 
exchanges. The final part of this theory points in a different direction, describing specific 
relationships and exchanges that were often described as linl<ed to corruption, but are 
nonetheless distinct from specific corrupt exchanges. 
6.3.1 Regulatory problems and corruption 
Companies 
One of the key elements of this grounded theory is the relationship between corruption 
and the content of regulations. On the one hand, corruption can affect the perceived 
quality of regulations, as regulations are seen to be protecting the interests of the corrupt, 
rather than protecting the interests of all citizens. Corruption was also commonly 
described as a response to problems with the regulations. As described in the previous 
chapter, there were many of those perceived problems, including a mismatch between 
the content or demands of regulation and the other interests associated with government 
or business activities, ambiguity in the regulations and overly complex regulations. 
Corruption was routinely described in relation to these problems. That is, a key 
characteristic that was used to distinguish different types of corruption was the regulatory 
problem which corruption dealt with. Put another way, corruption was often described as 
a tool to deal with problems with the regulations, and different respondents described 
different types of corruption that were used to deal with different regulatory problems. 
One of the most common examples of this was in relation to the problem of overly 
complex and time-consuming regulations and 'speed money' corruption. Respondents 
from companies in particular described using speed money, which is a payment aimed at 
speeding up the bureaucratic process. Speed money could be paid to both politicians and 
bureaucrats and could involve small or large sums. One company representative in 
Indonesia described how individual payments to government officials may be as small as 
Rp 50,000 (about US$5), often referred to by the euphemism cigarette money. At this 
lower order, these payments also worked to build relationships, and in one case where a 
company paid such cigarette money to police monitoring the traffic of timber down a 
river, they explained that it was to show appreciation, because the police must wait 
around all day (Industry representative. Meeting 36, 24 March 2011). Payments made to 
higher officials, such as heads of departments, were more costly, as anything 'less than 
several million rupiah would be useless' (Agriculture company representative. Meeting 56, 
August, 2011). The aggregate cost of getting paperwork through complex bureaucracies 
meant that many companies who were dealing with the bureaucracy in Jakarta described 
hiring agents to pay these bribes on their behalf. They hired these agents in part because, 
as one respondent described, the cost of these payments was too large for them to hide in 
their company records. If the company hires agents, these payments can be covered as 
consultancy fees, which provides a legitimate cover for such corrupt payments. Then the 
agent uses their networks and distributes the necessary bribes throughout the 
bureaucracy in order to help facilitate the paying companies' interests (Industry 
representative. Meeting 35, 22 March 2011). And in Indonesia particularly, these kinds of 
speed money were ubiquitous; as one company respondent described, these payments 
are made 'at every desk of every office' (Industry representative. Meeting 57,11 August 
11). 
Importantly, these corrupt exchanges also drew on personal networks and influence. 
These were particularly important for actors who were less likely, or able, to pay bribes. 
As a representative from an international organisation explained, getting an 
environmental impact assessment (AMDAL) completed could take from one to three years 
depending on how much one were willing to pay, but they would aim to get through, 
obviously without paying, by using their contacts and highlighting to officials that this 
project was about rehabilitation and reforestation (Meeting 16,12 November 2010). This 
idea of using relationships to get things done quickly is a more common strategy in PNG. 
Respondents from PNG described how it was far less common to make direct payments to 
bureaucrats. Rather, the strategy seems to be to get relevant politicians on-side, 
sometimes drawing on familial or ethnic relationships (wantok) (for example see Dorney, 
2000), and then those Ministers would use their influence to affect the bureaucratic 
process. Indeed, many bureaucrats described how Ministers call and make demands of 
the relevant department heads or the PNG Forest Authority (Government representative. 
Meeting 19,18 February 2012). 
Importantly, whilst many respondents described making such payments and seeking to 
influence the bureaucratic process, this was most often described as speed money, and 
claimed to be a necessary response to complex and time-consuming regulations. 
Respondents, particularly from companies, stressed that these envelopes (a common 
Indonesian euphemism for payments to government officials) did not affect the company 
behaviour, as they 'still needed full compliance' (Industry representative. Meeting 35, 22 
March 2011). That is, these payments facilitated speed, or preferential treatment in 
processing applications. They also include queue-jumping payments, which were paid in 
response to situations where there was a backlog of applications, and insufficient staffing. 
For example, when a 2006 court decision reversed the decision to re-zone forest area in 
the ex-mega rice project area (Chapter 3), companies operating in the area without 
permission from the Ministry of Forestry (hereafter the Ministry), particularly oil-palm 
companies, became illegally operating in the forest zone. These companies all had to 
apply to the Ministry for a permit'® that would release the area from the forest estate, so 
that they could operate legally. A representative from one such company explained that 
the reason they had so much trouble getting permission from the Ministry was that 'there 
are insufficient staff to actually go out and conduct the appropriate surveys and they 
[government officials] are all confused' (Industry representative. Meeting 57, 11 August 
2011). Speed money therefore allows a company's application to be processed ahead of 
other companies who do not pay, or who do not pay as much. The analogy used by one 
respondent was of a toll way. You either sit in traffic or pay to use the expressway. Either 
way the destination—meaning the legal certificate—is the same (Meeting 35, 22 March 
2011). However, in situations where there were other problems with the regulations, such 
as ambiguous regulations or government capacity, corruption did not take the form of 
speed money. 
In PNG for example, there were many payments between companies and bureaucrats that 
were not speed money, but rather these were payments between companies and 
™ Specifically, companies required the area that they were occupying to be formally released from the forest 
estate, which came in the form of a permit [petepasan kawasan hutan) from the IVIinistry of Forestry. 
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government officers that resembled legitimate fees. Government, company and NGO 
respondents all acknow/ledge the practice of companies (mining, logging and other) 
providing the funds (or in-kind payments) in order to get government officials to carry out 
their jobs. For example, companies may pay government officials, or provide in-kind 
support such as transport, to enable the official to conduct the surveys that are part of the 
process of getting a logging concession. These types of payments were made in response 
to complex regulations and the lack of government capacity to implement those 
regulations. In some cases, such payments may not constitute corruption, which I discuss 
in further detail in section 6.3.4. However, these payments can involve corruption, when 
for example government officials demand such payments when they already have the 
funds to conduct the legal surveys. Indeed, respondents from NGOs and other groups 
argue that such payments constitute corrupt transactions, because the companies are 
paying to get a semblance of legality, or paying to get paperwork which they are not 
entitled to. This suggests that whether or not such payments constitute corruption 
depends on a variety of factors, such as whether the payments affect how the 
government officials do their job and whether such payments are demanded in excess of 
the actual costs of operation. 
This leads to another type of corruption described by respondents, specifically where 
payments (or in-kind exchanges) are made to bypass an existing regulation, rather than to 
speed-up or facilitate the bureaucratic process. These types of corrupt payments were 
made to bypass regulations that were seen as impossible to comply with or that 
generated high compliance costs. In both cases, such payments are made to secure the 
sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit, support of government officials for activities that are 
illegal. That is, these types of corruption involved payments to ignore illegal activities, and 
payments to get a semblance of legality. Payments are made to hide illegal activities with 
the appearance of legality, often in the form of fraudulent documents. These fraudulent 
documents include, for example, payments to obtain monitoring reports that do not 
disclose breaches, or transport permits that falsely identify illegally harvested timber as 
being timber from a legal concession. Many reports, articles and respondents from both 
countries have documented cases where, because of corrupt payments, government 
officials have failed to report on illegal practices of logging companies (Casson and 
Obidzinski, 2007; Department of National Planning and Monitoring, 2004b; ICW, 2009a; 
Review Team, 2004). Corrupt payments were also blamed for many logging proposals 
being approved despite clear flaws. As one industry representative described, proposals 
for licenses to develop agriculture in forest areas were approved, despite the applicant 
companies having little experience or financial capacity, because those companies had 
paid government officials, for example with 'study trips to Hong Kong or Rio or wherever' 
(Meeting 2, 3 May 2011). These instances highlight how corrupt payments can be used by 
companies firstly to bypass the legal processes that, for example, assess applications for 
logging licenses and secondly, to gain a semblance of legality. Corruption involved in 
either of these activities is therefore responding to regulations that have a high cost 
(relative to the cost of corrupt payments) of compliance. 
In other cases, it may be that payments were made because it was basically impossible to 
comply with regulations. That is, because regulations are ambiguous, it is impossible to 
operate fully legally, so companies have to pay to continue operating despite failing to 
fully comply with the regulations. For example in Indonesia, conflicting and changing land-
use plans means that companies may be illegally operating in the forest estate according 
to one map, but not according to others. Such companies routinely have to pay to secure 
ongoing support from different government agents, who threaten closure for non-
compliance. Indeed one district-level elected official in Indonesia explained that there 
were times when he felt sorry for companies that did not have the full permissions to 
operate plantations, because 'they become like ATMs'^® for the government officials 
(Meeting 42,16 June 2011). Different types of corrupt exchanges are therefore used as a 
means to an end, either to get preferential treatment or to bypass regulations. 
Government agents 
The perspective of corruption as a tool differed between companies and government 
agents. That is, corrupt payments were a tool to influence the negotiation over the 
Automatic teller machines (ATIVI). They are equivalent to instant cash machines. 
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implementation of regulations by companies specifically to speed-up the process, to get 
preferential treatment and to bypass regulations. However, for government agents, 
accepting and demanding corrupt payments from companies was a means to achieve 
other interests, such as private payments or recruitment costs. That is, the authority to 
enforce laws (or condone non-compliance) was the key power that government officials 
could use to demand such payments. However, for government officials, the reason for 
accepting such payments was not about influencing the process of negotiation over if and 
how regulations were implemented. 
The motivation for government officials to engage in corruption was described, by 
industry and NGO respondents and the media, in relation to systems of recruitment in the 
public service in Indonesia (for example Krisna et al., August 29, 2013). To be recruited to 
the public service, and later to be promoted, (prospective) officials need to bribe key 
public servants. This system was widely discussed in Indonesia—although few government 
participants openly acknowledged it. However, those who did pointed to a complex 
system of merit and debt. As one government schoolteacher explained, recruitment was 
based on several factors, including university transcripts, experience, and the amount of 
money that the candidate would provide (Meeting 64, May 2011). These payments are 
made at the point of recruitment as either up-front payments, or agreements are reached 
about payment plans. This system operates throughout the bureaucratic hierarchy, as 
those hiring new employees must also make payments to their bosses. Officials from 
forestry did not admit to this system openly, but representatives from NGOs and other 
departments, including agriculture and mining, supported this description, as do reports 
from the literature (Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006). This implies that we can expect this 
system to also apply to the forestry, and other related departments, such as environment 
or planning departments. 
As government officials must recover initial expenses, or continue to make payments to 
secure future promotions, it creates an interest to accept or demand payments. This 
created different incentives, as government officials sought to position themselves in jobs 
where there was a higher opportunity to extract payments—historically these were 
referred to as wet departments^°—and higher payments were needed in order to be 
employed in these positions. This meant that government agents were largely dependent 
on being able to extract extra payments from companies (or others) that they came into 
contact with, in order to distribute these payments to those higher up in the bureaucracy. 
As with public servants, elected officials were also dependent on being able to extract 
payments from companies in order to secure their position. That is, rather than using 
corruption as a tool to bypass regulations, for elected officials, corrupt transactions were a 
means to secure political power. In a similar way to public servants who relied on corrupt 
payments to secure their employment, elected officials relied on payments from 
companies to secure their election. Elected officials at all levels of government, being 
district, provincial and national, have been reported to be dependent on payments from 
companies to support their electoral campaigns. The dependency of elected officials on 
campaign contributions from companies has been particularly important since the 
implementation of decentralisation in 1998. This is because decentralisation led to a 
dramatic rise in the number of elections and an increase in the expenses associated with 
running a competitive election campaign. Political parties could no longer provide 
sufficient funds to prospective candidates. Furthermore, candidates have been reported in 
the literature and media as spending billions of rupiah to win district elections (Mietzner, 
2011; Tempo.co, 13 March, 2012). Prospective candidates must then find their own 
sources of finance in order to run successful campaigns. 
Respondents and evidence in media reports (for example Maryono, Tuesday, 17 April 
2012), described two processes that led to this dependency. The first involved prospective 
candidates directly approaching companies for funding. Respondents from one company 
explained how, even two years before the district election, prospective candidates had 
approached the company seeking support for their campaign; this was described as 
Whilst many officials acl<nowledge this term, it was not frequently used and it seemed to refer more to 
the conditions prior to decentralisation in Indonesia. However, it was clear from discussions with public 
servants, other researchers and NGOs that the positions are preferable in certain departments and with 
bosses that are best able to attract conservation funding or attract the investment of companies. 
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standard practice. They described how initially a company would support any true 
candidate, then as it becomes clear who the most likely real contenders are, the 
companies direct their support towards those candidates (Meeting 35, 22 March 2011). 
Another industry representative explained that it was important not to be too selective 
and to keep all potential candidates on-side, and was shocked at reports that one 
company had actually put advertisements for one particular candidate in their plantation. 
Such preferential treatment for one candidate was described as a very risky strategy for 
the company (Company representative. Meeting 61, August 2011). These payments are 
mostly used to directly fund aspects of the election campaign, such as buying election 
material—hats, clothing or banners. The second approach (reported on Java Island), was 
that candidates would go into debt, for example by mortgaging their houses, to fund their 
campaigns (Maryono, Tuesday, 17 April 2012). Those who are elected recover such costs 
during their term in office. In areas with significant natural resources, the costs of election 
campaigns were recovered through corrupt payments associated with licensing and other 
government functions that needed elected officials' approval. For example, one 
respondent noted that mining exploration licenses in one district cost around Rp 1 billion 
(about US$ 90 000) in bribes for every 5000 ha (Industry representative. Meeting 60, 
November 2011). 
6.3.2 Mutual dependency 
Mutual dependency refers to the relationship between government officials and 
companies that are built around corrupt exchanges. This relationship exists because 
government officials need the payments to secure elections, or positions within the 
bureaucracy. Companies need to be able to pay in order to be able to continue their 
business activities, and this is particularly the case for companies that, as one company 
representative described, are 'naughty' but brave, who pay to continue operating 
(Meeting 41,16 June 2011). In this way, these different actors are mutually dependent on 
the others engaging in corruption in order to secure their interests. However, the 
relationship of mutual dependency can go beyond regulations or illegal activities, as 
payments may not be tied to any specific illegal activity. 
That is, whilst corrupt payments may be tied to specific patterns of implementation of the 
regulations, companies also described how corrupt payments served to keep the elected 
official on-side and to ensure that there was a 'good relationship' between the 
government and company. One company respondent explained that even if provincial and 
district governments did not really have the right to interfere with company's activities 
(because that company's license had been issued by the central government) they still 
must keep a good relationship with the district heads: the 'Bupati sometimes asks double 
[envelopes] from the company, or they can just say 'We don't care about your work 
permit, you are here [in this district] now, in our area, not in central' (Meeting 35, 22 
March 2011). Given that companies perceived they are dependent on the support of the 
politicians and officials, they must therefore make such payments. In these cases, the 
money is paid continuously without specific activities in mind. For example, a local 
newspaper quoted a district head in another area describing how companies routinely 
asked him for bank details so that they could easily deposit funds into his account 
(Bharatanew.com, 2011). A different company representative, discussing his work in 
another province, described negotiations with one district head over the establishment of 
a development fund—wh\ch the respondent managed to negotiate 'down to 30 billion 
rupiah'—and said that the district head did not want any record of this transfer, or any 
conditions applied to how that money would be used (Meeting 35, 22 March 2011). 
This system of campaign finance and collusive relationships between companies and 
government officials (elected and employed) was frequently mentioned by interviewees in 
Indonesia, but interviewees in PNG described different systems and relationships. Whilst 
there were some respondents who claimed payments were made to secure licenses—for 
example, the quote reported earlier regarding license approval and trips to Hong Kong—a 
direct relationship between elected officials and companies was reported more often: 
many Ministers (of forestry and agriculture) and local members of parliament often have 
direct (part or full) ownership of individual companies. For example, the Minister of 
Forestry—in office at the time of fieldwork for this thesis—reportedly had stakes in two 
logging and one agricultural project in his electorate. In and of itself, such ownership 
constitutes a conflict of interest, which I discuss further below, rather than outright 
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corruption. However, this can more closely resemble corruption, if those elected officials 
use their positions to secure favourable conditions for companies they own or partly own. 
There have been examples of cases where elected officials have used their positions to get 
favourable treatment (Barnett, 1990a; Greenpeace, 2004) and there were reports that the 
Minister during the time of thisfieldwork had also used his power (particularly over the 
operations of the police) to interfere with competing companies in his electorate (ILG 
chairman and village head. Meeting, March 21, 2012). 
6.3.3 Positioning and political Interference 
The third component of this theory has to do with the process of positioning. Positioning 
refers to how different actors sought to position themselves for corrupt exchanges—such 
as recruitment described above. This included both direct recruitment into wet 
departments, but it also refers to positioning to get the authority over specific regulations, 
such as the authority to distribute logging concessions. As I described above, the authority 
to distribute licenses, and the threat of enforcing costly regulations, are key powers that 
government officials use to extract payments from companies. Government actors seek to 
position themselves in order to get these powers and therefore create opportunities for 
corruption. Positioning was particularly evident in the way in which elected officials 
interacted with bureaucrats, specifically how they sought to position themselves to better 
control the bureaucracy. 
In both countries there are rules that seek to limit the amount of political authority and 
interference over the functioning of the bureaucracy (Chapters 3 and 4). Formally, 
Ministers and heads of department have little discretion over licensing or other aspects of 
monitoring companies' activities. In PNG, the Minister is required to approve licenses, but 
only based on the recommendations of the Forest Authority Board (hereafter the Board). 
Indeed the Board was introduced in order to reduce the discretion of elected officials 
(Chapter 4). In Indonesia, (depending on the zoning of the land) the district head provides 
recommendations to the province (for forest estate) or approves a permit (for non-forest 
estate) based on recommendations of the relevant government departments.®' These 
recommendations are made after surveys are conducted and the proposal is assessed 
according to specific criteria.®^ Even though these systems are designed to reduce the 
interference of elected officials, in both countries there were informal systems in place to 
ensure that the interests of elected officials w/ere represented in decision-making. These 
informal systems involved a variety of positioning strategies. 
That is, in both countries participants described systems that either bypass the role of the 
bureaucracy or influence their decision-making to ensure that the outcome matches the 
needs of the elected officials. There are several dimensions to this. Firstly, respondents 
described how elected officials seek to position bureaucrats who support their ideas by 
selective recruitment or appointment. Respondents from NGOs widely cited how the 
heads of departments all change after each election (Meeting 4, 29 November 2010). In 
PNG It was also described as a system where people have to 'fend for themselves' and 
that this is why 'since the department of forest transformed into the forest authority. 
There have been how many Managing Directors now?' (Industry representative. Meeting 
12, 20 May 2011). He meant that whenever a Managing Director was not supportive of 
the interests of the politicians, he would be replaced. One strategy of elected officials to 
better control the bureaucracy in PNG was to keep the appointed heads of departments 
as acting for many years (Researcher. Meeting 5, 9 May 2011). This also worked through 
the whole bureaucracy, where local field officers explained that in relation to the pre-
Barnett era, 'it is from the top, you cannot do much when you are down there. When you 
start making noise, they shift you out.' (Former forestry official, now industry 
representative. Meeting 12, 20 May 2010). Given the conditions above, where elected 
officials rely on companies for campaign support, such strategies are vital to ensure they 
have something to exchange and are necessary to gain access to corrupt payments. 
" Relevant government departments include the Regional Pianning Department (Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Daerah), the Environment Department {Badan Linkungan Hidup) and, depending on the 
activity, the Department of Forestry, Department of Mining and Energy {Departemen Pertambangan dan 
Energi) or the Department of Agriculture {Departemen Pertanian). 
"These criteria include a variety of conditions including features of the landscape such as the gradient of 
any slopes, the presence of any watercourses or the presence of protected species. 
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Another strategy that respondents described was to use other informal powers to bypass 
the responsibility of the bureaucrats. This was particularly described by respondents in 
PNG, who detailed how Ministers and other elected officials had sought to utilise 'residual 
[colonial] powers' (Researcher. Meeting 5, 9 May 2011). This respondent described how 
many of the existing rules in PNG are extensions or amendments to the old administrative 
system that existed under colonial rule. Under this system, much of the power was 
concentrated in the colonial administrator. Whilst there have been many reforms in the 
regulations, some of the residual powers remain. The example provided was a case where 
a logging company in PNG had negotiated a supply contract with a foreign furniture 
producer on the condition that supply would be secured for a minimum of one year. The 
Minister, who, as a result of old colonial authority systems, still has the final responsibility 
of signing export permits, refused to sign enough permits. The company was unable to 
provide security of supply for a year, so the contract fell through. The respondent claimed 
that the Minister's decision was driven by concern for the year-long supply of bribes that 
would have been lost had he approved the conditions of this contract (Meeting 20,10 
February 2012). This arguably constitutes 'an abuse of public office for private gain' and 
works to position the official for future corrupt payments. Not all efforts to position 
others, or to control the bureaucracy, may be tied to corrupt activities; however, different 
respondents described such positioning activities as key to the process of corruption. 
6.3.4 Conflicts of interest, and mismanagement and negligence 
Whilst the three elements described above are all focused on specific corrupt exchanges 
or describing the relationships that support those exchanges, it is important to highlight 
other dimensions that emerged from the data: conflicts of interest, and mismanagement 
and negligence. Despite not involving corruption, these two aspects are nonetheless 
important to understand corruption in the forest sector. Conflicts of interest emerged as a 
core problem underpinning corrupt exchanges. Mismanagement and negligence were 
commonly mistaken for corruption or instances of negligence, but often were also wilfully 
mislabelled corruption to create allegations of corruption as a tool to motivate particular 
actors to conform to, or support specific interests. Together these two aspects are 
important because they highlight wider dimensions to the phenomenon of corruption. Let 
us consider them in detail. 
Conflicts of interest 
Respondents in both countries referred to real and perceived conflicts of interest as a 
problem related to corruption. In Indonesia, conflicts of interest were closely related to 
corruption, as it was most commonly described in relation to the system of mutual 
dependency. That is, the system of recruitment was thought to create conflicts of interest 
between the private needs to collect money and pay for favours, and the public interest of 
doing their job. In contrast, in PNG, conflict of interest was often treated as separate from 
corruption, described as creating a potential for corruption, but not necessarily corrupt 
itself. One of the key examples of this potential was in relation to a company paying 
government expenses, or the 'legitimate fees' I described in section 6.3.1. 
As described above, it is a costly and complex process to establish an FMA and to tender 
the project for a logging company.®^ The areas under FMA are often incredibly remote and 
access is only possible using a helicopter plus several days walk. It may take several 
months to access these areas, travel between the villages, identify relevant landowners, 
verify genealogies, walk the entire boundary of the area to verify the territory, and 
conduct the socialisation necessary to inform consent (Chapter 4). The relevant 
government departments, such as the Forest Authority and the Department of Lands and 
Physical Planning, are unable to fund their staff to go and do these surveys and, as many 
respondents explained, these costs were all born by interested companies (Government 
representative. Meeting 16, 26 May 2011). This pattern goes beyond land surveys and 
applications to integrate landowner groups. Reports from a review in 2004, for example, 
described how in one area the PNGFA project supervisor was housed over 70 km away 
from the project and had no independent means of transport. 'As a consequence the PNG 
FA field staff have had to develop a close relationship with logging company field 
managers with respect to being provided with accommodation, meals, etc.' (Department 
FMA are the main concession iicenses required by companies wishing to log forest in PNG (Chapter 4). 
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of National Planning and Monitoring, 2003, p. 12). Many respondents, including those 
from companies, acknowledged these cash and in-kind payments. Indeed, company 
representatives complained about the cost of this system. For example, when discussing 
the need to pay for landowner group registration, one company respondent explained 
that while the government (Department of Lands and Physical Planning) is meant to 
undertake this, 'but they don't have the money to do it. So we need it. So we have to go 
and do it for them... We need the resource [timber] to continue our operations... We have 
to do their thing. We send the report to the village, we get the names, fill the form, 
submit to lands department to register... It takes long time, a few years, to do it. And you 
pay for all the transport.' (Meeting 12, 20 May 2011). These types of payments, although 
technically illegal,®^ create potential conflicts of interests, rather than necessarily being 
corrupt. As I mentioned earlier, such payments become corrupt if they are demanded by 
government officials in excess of the costs of doing their job, or if the payments result in 
government agents preparing surveys that are fraudulent or biased towards the interests 
of the paying company. 
However, when questioned, government representatives and companies all explained 
that this did not alter the way in which the activities were conducted. For example, when 
asked about the potential conflicts of interest, a lands department official explained that 
the ultimate agreement was between the company and the landowner, 'the department 
goes in neutrally' (Meeting 16, 27 May 2011). Indeed, in discussing the issue of conflicts of 
interests, a local representative of an international development agency explained that 
conflicts of interest may not affect decisions, and therefore may not be a problem 
(Development agency representative. Meeting 13, 24 May 2011). Yet the potential for this 
conflict of interest to alter decisions and become a corrupt exchange was widely discussed 
by other respondents. One former forestry official, now NGO representative, described 
how officials in the field do not actually monitor companies' operations, they just sign any 
document the company needs '... because if you don't, next time your wife gets sick or kid 
needs to be flown out to hospital, you can't.' (NGO representative. Meeting 8,13 May 
' It is illegal for a public servant to accept payments from companies. 
2011). The presence of conflicts of interest then highlights the potential for corruption. 
However, it is nonetheless important to acknowledge that conflicts of interest do not 
necessarily constitute corrupt exchanges themselves. 
Mismanagement and negligence 
The second aspect has to do with the difference between corruption and mismanagement 
and negligence, as it emerged from these data. I noted above that allegations of 
corruption are also tools used to legitimate other activities. This is relevant for 
understanding how allegations of corruption hide other problems—particularly problems 
of negligence and mismanagement. Many respondents, including those outside the public 
sector, explained significant challenges associated with negligence, lack of information 
and mismanagement. One respondent from the timber industry in PNG explained that the 
challenge is not corruption, but in getting the forestry officials to actually 'do their job'. He 
went on to explain that'... the state provides nothing. If you are going to run a timber 
company in PNG, as opposed to say to Australia. You have got to build roads, bridges, 
towns, schools, health facilities... You have got to assume all the roles that government 
would. Because there is no government beyond Waigani.®® It is a free-for-all out there.' 
(Meeting 2, 3 May 2011). In Indonesia, this was particularly tied to questions of capacity, 
where outcomes that people disagreed with were described as corrupt, rather than as 
negligence and mismanagement. Mismanagement and negligence can therefore be linked 
to corruption in a variety of ways, because they can provide a cover for corrupt 
exchanges, or mismanagement and negligence can be mislabelled, or misinterpreted as 
corruption. It is this latter case, particularly, which demonstrates how allegations of 
corruption can be used as a political tool, and demonstrates another dimension of how 
corruption can affect the negotiation over the implementation of laws. 
Walgani is a neighbourhood of Port Moresby where many of the government offices are located. 
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6.4 Discussion 
Let me now integrate the two grounded theories of forest governance (Chapter 5) and 
corruption (presented above), thus situating corruption within the broader process of 
forest governance. Specifically I identify different types of corruption, how they relate to 
the literature on corruption, and how they may affect the process of negotiation over the 
implementation of regulations. 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the process of governance that emerged from the 
data was a process of negotiation over if and how regulations were complied with or 
enforced. There are several ways by which corruption—both specific corrupt exchanges 
and the relationships and systems that emerge to support or demand corrupt 
exchanges—affect this negotiation. Firstly, corruption can affect the process of prioritising 
because corrupt exchanges, or establishing the opportunities for them, become the 
priority. This is particularly the case for government officials. This is not a new idea; 
indeed, the interests associated with private corrupt payments have become so persistent 
in some contexts that authors have re-defined those political regimes accordingly, for 
example, Gellert's 'extractive regimes' (2010). Under this definition, the entire political 
system and the key priority of government officials is the extraction of resources (Gellert, 
2010), an idea that has also been reflected in research describing state-capture (Hellman 
et al., 2003) and rent-seizing government behaviours (Ross, 2001). However, this research 
also shows that in the contexts considered here, corruption was not the only priority. That 
is, corrupt payments were part of the negotiation over other priorities, which could 
surpass the interests associated with corruption. Indeed, this argument has been 
supported in localised studies of corruption that point to complex negotiations over 
amounts of bribes for different activities and different actors (Bobbins, 2000). However, 
unlike Robbins, who described other priorities such as historical social relations, this 
research identifies other priorities including the reputation of both government and 
industry, and factors such as the match between the regulations and the actual 
environmental conditions. 
As well as being a priority in itself, corruption can affect the process of negotiation by 
altering other interests, or changing how they are prioritised. As I discussed in the 
previous chapter, actors can have an interest in avoiding the costs associated with 
complying with regulations, and at the same time, have an interest in complying with 
regulations in order to avoid the risks associated with prosecution and damage to 
reputation. Corrupt exchanges can affect decisions about whether to comply with 
different regulations because corrupt exchanges can reduce the risks associated with lack 
of compliance. That is, corrupt payments can help protect those conducting illegal 
activities from being charged or taken to court and, when corrupt exchanges are made to 
get officials to sign paperwork, corrupt payments provide (albeit fraudulent) legal cover 
for illegal activities. Whilst the latter (being a semblance of legality) was particularly 
important for companies that relied on legality in order to gain market access, overall, the 
idea of a semblance of legality is key to understanding both theories. More broadly, the 
involvement of corrupt payments in a semblance of legality is closely related to 
perceptions of corruption in the literature on illegal logging, in which corruption is most 
commonly described simply as 'facilitating illegal logging' (for example Callister, 1999). 
However, it is also important to note that in some situations, high demands for corrupt 
payments may also result in companies placing a higher priority on legal compliance. For 
example, a quote from a government official in Indonesia reported above describes how 
companies without licenses become cash machines for government officials. These 
companies were in a position where, because of ongoing confusion over the zoning of 
land between the forest estate and the non-forest estate, it was unclear whether they 
required permission®® from the Ministry. This meant that, in the short term, legal 
compliance was impossible. For these companies, the ongoing costs associated with 
paying bribes to government officials could therefore create more incentives for the 
companies to comply with regulations. However, this would only be the case when the 
cost of such bribes is higher than the cost of getting the legal permission from the 
Specifically, whether they required the area that they were already operating in to be formally released 
from the forest estate. 
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Ministry, and if the legal activities are also immune from bribes. However, it has been 
reported, both in this research and the literature, that even companies that fully comply 
with regulations may still be asked for corrupt payments (for example Smith et al., 2003a). 
The point is that under different circumstances, corruption, or demands for corrupt 
payments, can have a variety of impacts on the process of negotiation. 
Secondly, whilst legal compliance, or the appearance of it, is widely considered to be 
important to protect the reputation of companies, a l<ey consideration that emerged from 
the data was the importance of this semblance of legality to protect the reputation of 
government officials. This points to the relationship between state legitimacy and 
corruption, which is another way in which corruption can affect the process of 
governance. That is, corrupt exchanges can affect the legitimacy of different activities, and 
therefore impact upon the negotiation over if and how regulations are enforced and 
complied with. Much of the literature on corruption and legitimacy has focused on the 
negative, but general impact of corruption. That is, corruption is thought to reduce state 
legitimacy, because corruption affects the principles of participation and representation 
associated with democracy and therefore reduces the legitimacy of state operations 
(Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Seligson, 2002). In a theoretical examination of the 
impacts of corruption on democracy. Warren (2004; 2006) argued that corruption had 
specific impacts on openness and inclusion (considered key principles of effective and 
legitimate democracies). So the problem of corruption in a democracy, according to 
Warren, is that it leads to duplicitous exclusion (Warren, 2004, 2006), which reduces the 
legitimacy of the government. Other studies have also pointed to different negative 
impacts, such as how corruption increases distrust of significant political and 
administrative institutions (Hacek et al., 2013), and how corruption can be both the cause 
and consequence of poor government performance leading to lower state legitimacy 
(Delia Porta, 2000), however these impacts are often dependent on other factors, such as 
political allegiances (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). Indeed, this literature points to the 
fact that state legitimacy is affected by the activities and legitimacy of state officials. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that state legitimacy and the legitimacy of 
government officials are different. 
Beyond the broader impacts of corruption on the legitimacy of the state and government 
officials, the idea that corruption reduces legitimacy has also been demonstrated in 
research focusing on the forest sector specifically. Investigating the implementation of 
new forestry laws in Peru, Smith and colleagues (2006) found that the historical pattern of 
corruption was a factor that had reduced the perceived legitimacy of the state. 
Importantly, they argued that corruption and lack of state legitimacy had long-term 
implications for norms of compliance with changing state regulations. For example, the 
perceived historical biases and corrupt practices in the past affected the perception of the 
quality of regulations, which in turn affected the norms of compliance (Smith et al., 2006), 
a pattern which has also been reported in Indonesia (McCarthy, 2004). 
Although there are no doubt negative impacts from corruption on the legitimacy of 
officials and on state legitimacy more broadly, the findings from this grounded theory 
point to the fact that this relationship may be more complex than previously noted in the 
literature, because corruption can have a variety of impacts on legitimacy. This is 
particularly the case when considering corruption and the legitimacy of specific projects. 
For example, there were many cases where corrupt exchanges could provide legitimacy to 
specific activities, by providing a semblance of legality, which arguably protects the 
reputation of both the company and government officials and contributes to the 
legitimacy of the project. Also, it has been shown that enforcing regulations—for example, 
by fining illegal activities—can be important for the reputation of government and 
ultimately lead to higher levels of compliance (Caplan, 2003). Irrespective of the ultimate 
level of compliance, the idea that condoning illegal activities has reputational risks for 
government departments is significant, and it further supports the fact that a semblance 
of legality can be important for state legitimacy. 
That is, whilst there are few studies in the literature that explore the reputational risks 
arising from condoning illegal activities," it is clear that state reputation and legitimacy is, 
in part, built on principles of rule of law. Corrupt payments that lead to fraudulent 
The literature that does exist describes the effects of corruption on issues of legitimacy and distrust of 
public institutions (for exannpie Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). 
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documents and provide the appearance that laws are being enforced can therefore 
benefit state legitimacy. Indeed, the early literature on corruption argued that there were 
some potentially positive benefits from corruption, such as promoting political stability 
(Huntington, 1968; Leys, 1965), arguments that have since been largely discredited 
(Seligson, 2002). However, the benefits of corruption to state legitimacy may only be the 
case when the underlying illegal activity is not exposed, or when the illegal activity itself 
has a broader legitimacy, despite being illegal. For example when the regulations 
themselves are perceived to be poor, or fail to support local interests, activities that 
bypass legal requirements may have a broader legitimacy. Secondly, corrupt payments 
made to key individuals during the process of socialisation can also lead to greater local 
support for a project. Furthermore, legitimacy can affect corruption, when for example 
the legitimacy of a particular idea or project, such as a conservation project, may be more 
legitimate and be a higher priority than activities that provide an opportunity for 
corruption. 
This draws attention to the broader relationships that support and demand corrupt 
exchanges. One of the dominant aspects of this in the literature is the issue of patron-
client relationships and networl<s (Alan et al., 2007; Kolstad and Soreide, 2009; McCarthy, 
2002a; Perera-Mubarak, 2012). As described above, patronage refers to the ways in which 
an official's access to rents is used to secure political power (Kolstad et al., 2008) and has 
been documented at all levels of government, from networks involving presidents and 
national government officials (see Dauvergne, 1997), down to the micro-level politics of 
resource access and benefit distribution within a village (see McCarthy, 2002b). Generally, 
there are three characteristics that are used to identify patron-client relationships: i) 
power is unequal; ii) the relationship is based on reciprocity; and iii) it is based only in 
community norms (Kaufman, 1974, p. 285). Research has shown that the relationships 
developed in patron-client systems can be very resilient, and can form vast networks as a 
patron in one relationship may be a client in other relationships (for examples see the 
contributions to Aspinall and van Klinken, 2011b). 
There are some clear examples from my research of the existence of patron-client 
relationships and systems of patronage. For example, elected officials in both countries 
relied on their authority to award licenses in order to secure finances for election 
campaigns. However, a key feature of the data that emerged from my theory was about 
how the relationship between government officials and companies was built on mutual 
dependency. This is in contrast with Kaufman's assertion that patron-client relationships 
are built on unequal power. That is, the relationship between commercial enterprises and 
government officials that emerged from this research is arguably more equal. Payments 
between different actors are negotiated, demonstrating that both parties have different 
power and legitimacy to demand or pay such bribes, which points more strongly to the 
issue of reciprocity in patron-client relationships. Kauffman's third characteristic of 
patron-client relationships, that they are based only on community norms, however, is 
perhaps more complicated. 
There has been much written about the community norms and social exchange elements 
of corruption (Cartier-Bresson, 1997; Larmour, 2008; Larmour and Wolanin, 2001b). The 
early versions of this were tied to culturally relativistic arguments, debating whether 
culturally appropriate gift-giving could be distinguished from corrupt exchanges. Indeed, 
this literature saw some types of corruption as extensions of the cultural norms of power 
relations (Larmour, 2008). Whilst this cultural relativism has been largely rejected (for 
example see Pope, 2000), cultural aspects have been persistent in the research on 
corruption, particularly in relation to norms of compliance and informal systems of 
interaction. Whilst norms of non-compliance and negotiation over regulations were 
clearly evident in the findings from my research, the systems of mutual dependency 
highlight the important interaction of formal and informal structures that have evolved to 
demand corrupt payments. That is, rather than focusing on issues of long-held cultural 
practices, a dominant driver of corruption from this thesis were the issues of recruitment, 
election and poor quality regulations. 
This idea of the interaction between historical factors, state regulations and social norms 
points to the institutionalised nature of corruption. That is, in contrast to the individualist 
or relationship-focused conceptions of corruption, there has been a growing body of 
literature focused on understanding and analysing the complex institutions that support 
and demand corrupt exchanges (Klooster, 2000; Levin and Satarov, 2000; Robbins, 2000). 
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The key idea of much of this literature is that corruption is a particular type of extra-legal 
institution. However, the findings from this research highlight how legality is a key 
component of the institutions of corruption, as the authority of state institutions provides 
a key value that is exchanged. A similar argument was made by Robbins (2000), who, in 
describing corruption as the institution of natural resource management, argued that the 
imposition of state rules on communal systems is one of the key factors affecting the 
institutions of corruption in natural resource management. Robbins defines corruption in 
natural resources as 'a system of normalized rules, transformed from legal authority, 
patterned around existing inequalities, and cemented through cooperation and trust' 
(Robbins, 2000, p. 424). He goes on to describe how complex and pre-existing social and 
gender structures and legal arrangements affect the institution of corruption in the 
management of a state wildlife sanctuary in Rajasthan, India. He argues that corruption is 
not the absence of rules, but is instead the presence of alternative rules, particularly rules 
that are based on social relationships. Indeed, Robbins' description of a variety of factors 
that affect how formal laws are interpreted and implemented in corrupt conditions is 
supported by the arguments presented in this chapter and the previous one. 
However, there are also aspects of this thesis that provide some qualifications to the 
arguments made by Robbins. Specifically, he states that corruption 'in natural resource 
management is defined as the use or overuse of community (state, village, city, etc.) 
natural resources with the consent of a state agent by those not legally entitled.' (2000, p. 
425). The results of this grounded theory suggest that firstly, although there are types of 
corruption that involve actors who are not legally entitled to access resources, there are 
also many corrupt exchanges that occur while managing natural resources that may 
include actors who are legally entitled to access resources. There is a need to further 
identify and distinguish these different types of corruption in the management of natural 
resources. Secondly, one of the arguments of Robbins' analysis is that corruption results in 
inherently unsustainable resource exploitation. This may be the case in the examples 
provided by Robbins, which focused on village-level corruption and access to protected 
forests. However, by focusing on corruption between commercial operators and state 
officials, the findings of my research suggest that corruption does not always have 
negative impacts upon the process of resource exploitation. That is, where corrupt 
exchanges are made to speed up paperworl<, for example, this may not affect the ultimate 
exploitation of the resource. I return to develop this idea further in the next chapter, but 
here I would like to note that corruption at a commercial level may have a different nature 
and impact than the type of corruption described by Robbins (2000). 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the results of the grounded theory of corruption in Indonesia 
and PNG. The core process of this theory was the same as that presented in the previous 
chapter on forest governance. It is the process of negotiating if and how regulations are 
implemented. The focus of this grounded theory was therefore about how corrupt 
exchanges affect this negotiation. The key processes identified include how corrupt 
exchanges affect the prioritisation of different interests, and how corruption affects the 
relationships between different actors. The focus of the latter was on how broader 
(informal) institutions work to support, and demand, corrupt exchanges. These different 
relationships and prioritisation portray a more integrated conception of corrupt 
exchanges than is offered by disciplinary-specific descriptions of corruption. Furthermore, 
the research demonstrates how corrupt exchanges, and the broader systems that support 
them, operate in the context of forest management. Ultimately, this chapter, and the one 
before it, provide the in-depth understanding of local-level governance and corrupt 
processes, and highlight their complexities. These grounded theories provide a basis to 
analyse if corruption and poor governance contribute to deforestation and forest 
degradation in Indonesia and PNG. This analysis is presented in the next chapter. 
Chapter 7 
Corruption, poor governance and the contribution to 
deforestation and forest degradation 
7.1 Introduction 
Corruption and poor governance are widely cited to be contributing to the failures of 
global forest management and the resultant deforestation and forest degradation (for 
example Saunders and Nussbaum, 2008; World Bank, 2006b; WRI, 2003). Whilst there has 
been considerable research into the impacts of poor governance and natural resource 
exploitation on broader economic development (for example Bulte et a!., 2005; Mauro, 
1995; Sachs and Warner, 2001) and w/ell-documented problems of corruption and poor 
governance in the forest sectors of many countries (Barnett, 1990a; Global Witness, 1995; 
Smith et al., 2003a; World Bank, 2006b), there has been less focus on how/ these 
governance factors impact upon forest resources themselves. This chapter contributes to 
this body of literature by qualitatively analysing the impacts of corruption and poor 
governance on the process of forest management in Indonesia and PNG. Specifically, it 
answ/ers a key research questions of this thesis: Does corruption and poor governance 
contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea? 
And if so, how? 
In order to address these questions, this chapter integrates the findings from the previous 
two grounded theory chapters and the literature on forest corruption and governance and 
applies these ideas to analyse the process of deforestation and forest degradation in 
Indonesia and PNG. Indonesia is the main case for this research. This is because Indonesia 
has one of the highest rates of deforestation globally, and has also had a well-documented 
history of corruption and poor forest governance (for example Barr et al., 2010a; 
Dauvergne, 1994 and see chapter 3 ; McCarthy, 2006; Poffenberger, 1997). The second, 
and smaller case comparison is with PNG. As I explained in Chapter 2, the comparison 
between Indonesia and PNG is not a comparison of the entire country. Rather, specific 
features of the governance process were used as the basis for comparison. 
This chapter begins with a two-part review of the literature. The first part of the review 
focuses on the literature about corruption and poor governance and its impact on the 
environment. Specifically, this review identifies the key gaps in the existing research on 
corruption and poor governance in the forests. The second part of the review focuses on 
describing the problems of deforestation and forest degradation in the literature. By 
incorporating issues of sustainability and environmental justice I develop more nuanced 
criteria for assessing the impacts of corruption and poor governance on the forests. 
Following these reviews, the second section outlines the various mechanisms by which 
corruption and poor governance affect decision-making about forests. Specifically, I 
analyse four stages of forest management (land-use planning, licensing, monitoring and 
enforcing and the distribution of benefits) and identify the different types of corruption or 
problems of governance that might affect decision-making in that stage and how such 
decisions may impact on the forests. The analysis presented here identifies many 
potential and complex mechanisms by which corruption and poor governance may impact 
on forests. However, the exact impact on the forests is often very difficult to determine. 
This is because many of the impacts of corruption and poor governance are indirect, 
dependent on a variety of other conditions or negligible. I argue, however, that rather 
than necessarily contributing to the overall quantity of deforestation and forest 
degradation, there is often a clear impact of corruption and poor governance on the 
quality of the decision-making process, contributing to the wider problems associated 
with deforestation and forest degradation. In the final section I identify several key 
implications of this analysis for the broader literature on forest governance. 
7.2 Governance, and quantity and quality of deforestation and degradation 
7.2.1 Governance and deforestation in the literature 
There are three interrelated streams of research into corruption, poor governance and the 
environment. The first investigates the nature of corruption and the nature of corruption 
in natural resource management. I described the l<ey aspects of this literature in the 
previous chapter, focusing on the difference between economic conceptions of 
corruption, which are based on rational-choice models (Rose-Ackerman, 1975) and the 
institutional perspective, which is based on an understanding of social norms and 
relationships (Robbins, 2000). 
The second stream of research, which is largely an extension of the economics perspective 
above, shows how corruption in the management of natural resources impacts upon the 
economy of a country. Specifically, this stream of research has focused on corruption as 
one factor contributing to the so-called 'resource curse'— the paradoxical phenomenon 
whereby countries with significant natural wealth appear to be growing slower, 
economically, than countries without such natural wealth (Sachs and Warner, 2001). The 
logic of the argument is that natural resources attract corruption (Liete and Weidman, 
1999) and that corruption is linked to lower economic growth (Mauro, 1995), so 
corruption may help explain why countries with abundant natural resources often struggle 
to translate natural wealth to economic growth (Kolstad and S0reide, 2009; Kolstad and 
Wiig, 2009). Although there may be long-term (indirect) impacts of low economic growth 
on the management of forest resources, this stream of research arguably provides few 
insights into if, and how, corruption may impact upon the management of resources 
themselves. 
It is the impact of corruption on the environment itself that is the focus of the third 
stream of research. Higher levels of corruption have been shown to be linked to higher 
levels of a variety of pollutants; corruption also affects the stringency of environmental 
regulations and the implementation of environmental regulations (Barbier et al., 2005; 
Damania et al., 2003; Lopez and Mitra, 2000; Welsch, 2004). The mechanisms identified by 
these studies include direct impacts, where corrupt payments are made to allow 
companies to pollute or to change regulations (for example Bulte et al., 2007; Damania et 
al., 2003). There are also indirect mechanisms, where, for example the impact of 
corruption on emissions was due to its impact on economic growth (for example Welsch, 
2004). Whilst the findings from each of these studies may only be indirectly relevant to 
understanding if and how corruption contributes to deforestation and forest degradation, 
the findings from these studies do highlight the fact that there can be many intervening 
factors w/hich affect w/hether increased corruption leads to more environmental harm. 
The importance of understanding these intervening factors is evident in the research that 
has focused specifically on corruption and poor governance in forests. I have, in the 
previous chapters, introduced several studies that have specifically investigated the 
relationship betw/een corruption and deforestation and forest degradation (including 
Barbier et al., 2005; Bulte et al., 2007). Barbier and colleagues (2005) found that 
corruption increased the rate of resource conversion (deforestation) across middle and 
low income forested countries. The effect of this was dependent on terms of trade 
(Barbier et al., 2005). There are some problems with these findings, specifically that the 
research by Barbier and colleagues potentially suffers from omitted variable bias (Tacconi, 
2011). However, the important point here is how the findings from Barbier and colleagues 
identify several important intervening factors, such as terms of trade. That is, whether 
corruption led to more deforestation was dependent on the terms of trade in that 
country. Other papers presenting cross-country econometric analysis of the relationship 
between corruption and the level of deforestation have supported the main finding of 
Barbier and colleagues, that higher levels of corruption are associated with more 
deforestation, but the intervening factors are different. For example, in a study across 
nine Latin American countries, Bulte and colleagues (2007) found that corruption 
contributed to deforestation through the resulting impact on efficiency in the agricultural 
sector. That is, farmers traded bribes and political contributions for land-use subsidies. In 
order to get a greater share of these subsidies, farmers, particularly large-scale farmers, 
adopted inefficient modes of production that ultimately led to higher rates of conversion 
of forested land to agriculture. I return to analyse these studies in more detail in the next 
' ' This is through the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), that is a proposed inverted U-shaped relationship 
between pollution levels and econonnic growth. Higher levels of corruption lead to lower economic growth, 
which in turn worsens pollution levels following the EKC. 
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section, but it is clear from this that there are a variety of factors that affect how 
corruption may impact upon forests. 
The focus of this chapter is therefore three-fold. Firstly, in contrast to the cross-country 
quantitative studies above, this chapter focuses on identifying and analysing the 
intervening factors at a local scale, in Indonesia and Papua Nevi/ Guinea. Specifically, the 
analysis seeks to identify the conditions under which specific acts of corruption may lead 
to deforestation and forest degradation. Secondly, rather than the broad studies 
described above, I isolate different stages of forest management, to better detail how 
different intervening factors may be involved. The focus is on providing a more nuanced 
analysis of if and how corruption and poor governance contribute to deforestation and 
forest degradation. Finally, this analysis includes consideration of how corruption and 
poor governance contribute to the wider problems associated with deforestation and 
forest degradation. That is, the problem of deforestation and forest degradation is not 
solely about the amount of forestlands converted, as there are many wider problems 
associated with unsustainable forest management or environmental injustices. I focus on 
understanding the mechanisms by which corruption in forest management may also 
contribute to these broader social-developmental problems. 
7.2.2 Quantity and quality of deforestation and forest degradation 
Before analysing the impacts of corruption and poor governance, this section provides a 
more in-depth description of deforestation and forest degradation and includes an 
analysis of the wider problems associated with deforestation and forest degradation. As 
already noted, deforestation generally refers to the permanent conversion of forested 
lands to non-forest uses (Schoene et al., 2007),®' and forest degradation is broadly 
understood to be 'the long-term reduction of the overall potential supply of benefits from 
the forest, which includes carbon, wood, biodiversity and other goods and services' 
(Schoene et al., 2007, p. 10). Whilst these definitions reflect many of the standard 
There are different definitions (see Schoene et al. 2007). These definitions vary dependent on factors such 
as whether the deforestation is caused or maintained by human activity, the time scale of 'permanent' and 
what constitutes alternative land uses. 
features of definitions of deforestation and forest degradation, there are nonetheless 
complex and often competing definitions of these two processes. Definitions vary, for 
example, over whether the conversion must be the result of human activity, or in relation 
to forest degradation whether the 'long term reduction' in one value of forest may be 
traded with the enhancement of other values. For example, maintaining the benefits of 
carbon or timber may come at the expense of biodiversity (Chisholm, 2010). Such 
definitional challenges have implications for understanding how much deforestation and 
forest degradation has occurred and highlights the difficulty in determining what the 
problem(s) of deforestation and forest degradation may be. 
In relation to the first implication, definitional discrepancies contribute to tensions over 
measurements of the amount of deforestation and forest degradation. According to the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), in the decade to 2010, over 19 
million and almost 1.5 million ha of forestlands were converted in Indonesia and PNG 
respectively (Table 7.1). Other sources have reported higher and lower amounts of 
deforestation and forest degradation in both countries. In the case of PNG, for example, 
differences in definitions of deforestation have contributed to debates about the amount 
of deforestation in that country. Shearman and colleagues calculated that since 1970 
almost 8 million ha of PNG's forests had been deforested. However, their findings were 
criticised for, amongst other things, failing to account for the natural regeneration of both 
logged forest and forests that had been cleared for shifting agriculture (Filer et al., 2009). 
As such. Filer and colleagues argued that the rate of deforestation and forest degradation 
in PNG is 'much lower' than that calculated by Shearman and colleagues. In Indonesia, 
definitional issues impact calculations of the amount of deforestation and affect 
considerations of who is causing that deforestation. Similar to the example from PNG, 
including the shifting agricultural practices of communities (where cleared forests are 
often left fallow for extended periods) in the definition of deforestation in Indonesia 
means that the rate of deforestation calculated is higher than if the shifting agricultural 
practices are not seen to be deforestation (Resosudarmo, 2002). And this definition means 
that the activities of communities, rather than commercial operations or governments. 
are driving deforestation. Definitional shifts are also important for understanding who or 
what is considered to be doing the deforestation and forest degradation. 
Table 7.1: Amount and rates of deforestation in Indonesia and PNG 
Country/area 
Forest area (1 000 ha) Annual change rate 
1990 2000 2005 2010 
1990-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
1 000 
ha/yr 
1 000 
ha/yr 
1 000 
ha/yr 
Indonesia 118545 99409 97857 94432 -1914 -1.75 -310 -0.31 -685 -0.71 
Papua New Guinea 31523 30133 29437 28726 -139 -0.45 -139 -0.47 -142 -0.49 
Source: FAO, 2010 
This leads back to the second implication described above, where different definitions 
affect if deforestation and forest degradation are seen as a problem. That is, whether 
deforestation is a problem is, in part, determined by what is driving the changes to the 
forest and what the ultimate wider impacts may be. There are many drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation, including proximate drivers and underlying causes 
(Geist and Lambin, 2002).'° Often a main driver of many activities that lead to 
deforestation is the economic benefits associated with such activities. For example, 
forestry in PNG is frequently justified due to the fact that it is a major contributor to PNG's 
economy, both in terms of foreign exchange and by providing employment to 10 000 
people (PNG FA, 2009). Such economic benefits normally constitute a significant 
justification for continuing the activities that contribute to deforestation and forest 
degradation. The problem of deforestation is therefore not necessarily about the 
deforestation itself; rather, deforestation is seen as a problem due to the many wider 
social and environmental problems associated with forest cover change. 
In relation to the latter, there are many documented negative environmental impacts 
from deforestation and forest degradation. This is because functioning forest ecosystems 
are often sites of high biodiversity (Myers et al., 2000; Wildburger, 2009), and contribute 
to global and local hydrological cycles (Bruijnzeel, 2004; Locatelli and Vignola, 2009), soil 
stabilisation, global and local nutrient and chemical cycles including carbon sequestration 
Proximate causes include agricultural expansion, or urban development. Underlying causes include 
economic and market factors that place higher price on alternative land uses (Geist and Lambin, 2002). 
(Houghton, 2003; Lai, 2005; Thomson et al., 2008) and a great many other valuable 
ecological, economic and social services (Costanza et a!., 1998). Deforestation and forest 
degradation, by definition, result in the damage or loss of many of these important 
environmental services. Indeed, tropical deforestation has been shown to contribute to 
biodiversity loss, soil erosion and greenhouse gas emissions (Fayle et al., 2010; Finn et al., 
2009; Martinez et al., 2009). That is, from an environmental perspective, deforestation 
and forest degradation are a problem because of their contribution to these wider 
environmental problems. 
This is not to say that all deforestation and forest degradation has the same contribution 
to these wider problems. There has been considerable amount of research and practice 
seeking to better manage activities that lead to deforestation and forest degradation to 
enable the economic benefits, but to reduce the wider harm. There have been various 
manifestations of this, such as reduced impact logging (Putz et al., 2008) or establishing 
protected conservation areas. One of the most prominent versions of this is the literature 
on sustainable forest management (SFM). Drawing on the principles of sustainable 
development, the notion of sustainable forest management has come to dominate much 
literature on forest management around the world. 'Sustainable forest management alms 
to ensure that the goods and services derived from the forest meet present-day needs 
while at the same time securing their continued availability and contribution to long-term 
development' (FAO, 2008). Although discussions of sustainability have dominated 
literature on forest management (Dieterle, 2009; Kishor and Belle, 2004; Pearce et al., 
2003; Siry et al., 2005), it remains a contentious idea, and has been difficult to achieve in 
practice (Pearce et al., 2003).'^ Despite the definitional and practical challenges, issues of 
sustainability remain key to understanding the problem of deforestation and forest 
degradation. It is therefore important to understand how corruption and poor governance 
is affecting decision making about forest use, in a way that inhibits achieving sustainable 
outcomes. 
" It is difficult to measure, but the ITTO estimates that until 2010, 30.6 million ha of production permanent 
forest estate was considered to be under SFM, which is an increase of 20% from 2005 (Blaser et al., 2011). 
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There are also wider problems associated with deforestation and forest degradation that, 
more directly, affect humans. Research has pointed to a variety of both positive and 
negative impacts from activities that contribute to deforestation and forest degradation 
(Cerutti and Tacconi, 2008; Forest Trends, 2006b; Mahanty et al., 2013; Tacconi, 2007a; 
Vedeld et al., 2012). The problem of many activities that contribute to deforestation is not 
solely that the deforestation and forest degradation occurs, but that it occurs in a way 
that is not beneficial for locals, or that provides no long-term security of livelihoods. One 
of the key criteria reflecting these ideas has to do with the principles of environmental 
justice. The environmental justice movement and theory emerged in response to 
perceived skewed distribution of goods and risks from environmental activities (Kaswan, 
1997). Because environmental justice deals with illusive concepts such as fairness or 
rights, similar to sustainability, it Is often a normative and subjective concept. The 
integration of the principles of environmental justice and sustainability therefore provides 
a base for developing a framework to evaluate the outcomes of deforestation and forest 
degradation from a more normative perspective. There are two key aspects of 
environmental justice that I use here; the first is distributive justice, the second 
procedural. 
Based on the moral philosophy of the consequentlalists, distributive justice is served if 
goods and risks are distributed according to some definition of equity or fairness 
(Rechtschaffen et al., 2009). In the case of forest management in both Indonesia and PNG, 
there are many examples where activities that lead to deforestation and forest 
degradation have failed to meet conditions of distributive justice (Chapters 3 and 4). 
Generally, many of the costs and benefits of activities that lead to deforestation and forest 
degradation are not born by the same actors. For example, when forest areas are 
degraded through harmful logging practices, the burden of environmental harms, such as 
erosion or damage to watershed is likely to be felt by local communities. The majority of 
the economic benefits accrue to logging company directors and maybe national tax 
revenues (for example see Angelsen and Wunder, 2003; McCarthy, 2006; Smith and 
Scherr, 2003; Vedeld et al., 2012; Wright et al., 2007). Understanding the contribution of 
corruption and poor governance to distributive (in)justice, is therefore important in 
understanding the ultimate impact of deforestation and forest degradation. 
The second and related aspect of justice is procedural environmental justice. Procedural 
justice is the right '...to equal concern and respect In the political decision about how 
these goods and opportunities are to be distributed' (Rechtschaffen et a!., 2009, p. 9). The 
actual outcome of the decision—in terms of who gets what—is not relevant to achieving 
justice, as long as the procedures for decision-making are just. Initially, the distributive 
injustices were seen as a consequence of the failure of the processes of decision-making 
to actively consult and negotiate with those who have a right to be consulted and 
negotiated. Again, in the forest sector this is predominantly a concern for local 
communities in forest areas. Around the world, forest ownership is dominated by states. 
In 2005, it was estimated that 80% of forests worldwide are under state ownership (FAO, 
2010). In the management of state forests, communities have historically been 
disempowered from decision-making (for example Peluso, 1993) and there has been a 
worldwide push to include communities as a means to improve forest management 
(Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Gray et al., 2001; Growing Forest Partnerships, 2011; Reed, 
2008; Zulu, 2008), despite the many challenges of doing so (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; 
Blaikie, 2006). Understanding the processes of decision-making according to principles of 
procedural justice, and how different types of corruption or poor governance may affect 
these principles, is therefore important in order to understand the wider problems 
associated with deforestation and forest degradation. 
By including criteria of sustainability and environmental justice it becomes clear that not 
all deforestation and forest degradation is the same. The next section analyses how 
different types of corruption and poor governance may impact upon different stages of 
forest management. For each stage I focus on understanding if and how corruption and 
poor governance lead to not only more deforestation and forest degradation, in terms of 
area, but also contribute to the wider problems identified here. 
7.3 Poor governance, corruption at different stages of forest management 
The four stages of forest management considered in this section are land-use planning, 
licensing, monitoring and enforcing regulations and the distribution of benefits. Whilst 
there are of course other stages where relevant decisions are made, these fours stages 
cover a variety of decisions that are most relevant to understanding the process of 
deforestation and forest degradation. Each sub-section provides an analysis of the ways in 
which corruption and poor governance affects decision-making, then how this may affect 
forest management, including how corruptions affects sustainability and environmental 
justice. 
7.3.1 Land-use planning 
The process of forming land-use plans involves the negotiation of multiple interests, as 
land-use plans, in principal, determine where forest cover should be protected, where 
timber can be harvested, and where it can be cleared. Zoning restrictions also determine 
what activities can replace forest cover. Land-use plans can need to consider various 
spatial scales, such as protecting local-level community gardens or spiritual places, as well 
as much larger ecological scales, such as those governing watersheds. Considerations for 
both short and long-term needs can also be incorporated in land-use plans; indeed, much 
has been written about the importance of planning for long-term sustainability (Kangas, 
1994; van Lier, 1998) and there have been many projects seeking to develop equitable 
and participatory planning processes—reflecting some of the principles of environmental 
justice (Buchy and Hoverman, 2000; Kangas, 1994; Tokede et al., 2005; Vainikainen et al., 
2008). The process of land-use planning is therefore vital consideration for not only how 
much deforestation occurs, but how the multiple benefits and costs are balanced and 
mitigated. The literature and the results of my research have identified several different 
ways in which corruption and poor governance can affect the process of land-use 
planning. 
Firstly, corrupt payments can result in forested land being re-zoned to alternative uses. 
Whilst there were no specific examples of this from the respondents, there have been 
other cases reported in the media in Indonesia. For example, in 2009 a member of 
Indonesia's national parliament was charged with accepting a bribe in exchange for re-
zoning forest lands to a conversion zone (Rayda, January 28, 2009). Although such direct 
cases exist, the results of the grounded theories presented in the previous chapter suggest 
that the link between corruption and land-use planning is indirect and multifaceted. 
Specifically, corruption and poor governance can influence land-use planning because it 
changes the priorities of those involved in decision-making so that land-use planning 
becomes a tool for positioning. As noted in the previous chapter, actors engage in 
different strategies to position themselves to gain control over certain decisions, and this 
position can be used as a means to extract payments. Positioning to extract future 
payments (those associated with licensing) is one explanation for the current disputes 
over land-use planning in Central Kalimantan. On the one hand is the Ministry of Forestry 
(hereafter, the Ministry), that seeks to maximise the area of land that remains within the 
legal forest estate—regardless of actual forest cover. This is evident in the Ministry's focus 
on the TGHK as land-use plan, where in Central Kalimantan, 11.6 million ha of land is 
within the forest estate. On the other side are the district governments, who want more 
land zoned outside the forest estate where they have greater control. The Provincial Land-
Use Plan {Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi, RTRWP) assigned only 8.4 million ha to 
the forest estate and is preferred by district and provincial governments. There are other 
factors that also affect this negotiation, some of which I identified in Chapter 3. However, 
it is clear that the conflicts over assigning land-uses can be impacted by positioning 
strategies, particularly positioning for future corrupt payments. 
In PNG, the use of land-use plans to establish future opportunities for corrupt exchanges is 
less prominent, partly because of the lack of centralised Ministerial planning. Many of the 
broad land-uses have already been allocated, so the ongoing planning process is more 
localised to within-concession planning. This includes activities like preparing the 
development options study (where alternative land uses are analysed and the results 
(supposedly) presented to landowners), or surveying forest areas to identify sites of high 
biodiversity conservation. Corruption and poor governance can affect both of these 
processes, by preventing officials from conducting such surveys or preparing these plans. 
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Indeed, there is considerable evidence of the failure of officials who are meant to conduct 
the surveys to identify and set aside areas that should technically be conserved (Review 
Team, 2004). There are many reported causes of such failures, including factors such as 
incompetence and mismanagement that are often associated with corruption, and factors 
such as conflicts of interest. These conflicts of interest are the consequence of a lack of 
capacity by the government to financially support officials in the field. This means that In 
order to have funds to conduct the surveys of the land, government officials must rely on 
prospective developers to provide transport, accommodation and food. The extent to 
which this may affect land-use planning is difficult to determine, but there is some 
evidence that this could result in officials failing to adequately survey areas or plan 
potential alternative uses (Review Team, 2004). However, again it is difficult to determine, 
in practice, whether corruption or other challenges such as negligence or lack of skills may 
also contribute to such failings. 
Impact on forests 
The impacts on the forest from this planning process can be difficult to determine, 
because it depends on if and how the plans are implemented. However, assuming that the 
plans are implemented, there are various ways in which corruption and poor governance, 
particularly the issue of positioning, can impact upon the forests. Beyond cases where 
corruption payments directly lead to the re-zoning of forestlands to alternative uses, the 
impact of corruption in land-use planning on forests is often ambiguous. 
Firstly, positioning can affect the amount of land zoned for different activities, and 
thereby contribute to more deforestation and forest degradation. This is clear from the 
situation in Central Kalimantan, where district governments sought to allocate more forest 
area to conversion. However, land-use planning is also important in relation to reducing 
the wider negative impacts of deforestation and forest degradation. Land-use planning 
can work to balance the multiple interests associated with forest use, by allocating land to 
development in a way that maximises economic opportunities but also enables the 
identification of areas that need to be protected. 
Secondly, positioning also affects where the land may be zoned and leads to a 
prioritisation of corrupt interests over the need to balance multiple interests and long-
term considerations. That is, political needs, associated with the need to recover 
campaign finance debt, are prioritised over broader environmental concerns. The 
importance of land-use planning to reduce the wider problems of deforestation and forest 
degradation is that clear land-use planning can work towards balancing multiple interests; 
clear land-use planning allocates land to development in a way that maximises economic 
opportunities but also enables the identification and protection of areas of high 
biodiversity, watershed cover, deep peat and so on. Effective and participatory planning 
processes can help to reduce some of the negative impacts of activities that lead to 
deforestation or forest degradation. However, when interests are dominated by 
corruption the priority is given to establishing opportunities for future bribes. The 
implications of this is that long-term sustainability and environmental quality become less 
of a priority, leading to higher amounts of deforestation and forest degradation and 
contributing to the wider problems associated with such activities. Specifically, the 
concern is not just how much, but where such activities are allowed to occur. And there is 
some evidence that corrupt interests have led to re-zoning areas for development that 
should be conserved. 
In one case of this re-zoning reported in the media, bureaucratic ineffectiveness, corrupt 
interests and overlapping land zoning led to Indonesia's first REDD+ project almost being 
abandoned after 9000 ha of the area of (reportedly) deep peat was allocated to a local oil 
palm company (Fogarty, 2011). Whilst in this case the companies responsible for the 
REDD+ project were eventually able to recover this area and continue with their REDD+ 
project, the example does demonstrate how corruption can lead to many wider problems, 
in this case degradation of peat land and the associated emissions. However, as this case 
also demonstrated, it is often difficult to distinguish the impacts of corruption from the 
much broader governance context, which in the case above included historically 
overlapping plans and Ministerial changes, to name a few. 
It is therefore difficult to determine how corruption and poor governance more generally 
have affected the forests because the corrupt interests also align with other interests and 
174 
challenges. For example, respondents throughout this research focused on the priority of 
development, and Intimated that environmental concerns would be the focus later. Such 
claims support the Idea that the economic benefits of activities that lead to deforestation 
continue to be prioritised over the longer-term environmental costs. Also, it Is Important 
to understand that much of the land-use planning that Is happening now Is retrospective, 
a consequence of decades of poor management and lack of capacity. This means that 
what is happening now is an attempt to reconcile the formal regulations, the Informal 
needs and the existing forest cover and environmental condition. This attempt highlights 
the fact that even though positioning for future corrupt payments is partly a driver of poor 
quality process In planning and has associated negative impacts, it is not sufficient to 
explain all of the problems. 
Finally, one of the key Impacts of this corruption and poor governance In the planning 
stage Is with respect to environmental justice, including participatory justice and 
distributive justice. Firstly, In relation to principles of environmental justice and to some 
degree SFM, there is a focus on the participation of those affected by decisions In planning 
(Oestrelcher et al., 2009). The Idea is that stronger participation can contribute to more 
effective and sustainable management of forest resources. This participation includes 
Issues like identifying the key cultural or spiritual places, but also reflects principles of 
justice In relation to agency and ownership of projects, particularly for conservation 
projects (Kellert et al., 2000; Lele et al., 2010; Oestrelcher et al., 2009). It Is clear from the 
above discussion that corrupt Interests result in a lack of participation by different 
actors—often communities in forest areas. This operates In two ways. Firstly, the lack of 
participation occurs because those who are elected to represent the Interests of the 
community more broadly are In fact beholden to the companies and work harder for 
those interests. Indeed this Idea has been discussed In the literature on the Impacts of 
corruption on democracy (Warren, 2004, 2006). Warren argues that corruption affects 
two main principles of democracy—participation and transparency—and claims that 
corruption In a democracy Is best understood as 'duplicitous exclusion'. Secondly, corrupt 
Interests result In a lack of participation because local communities are not directly 
Involved In the planning process; the political and economic Interests dominate declsion-
making. There are also implications for distributive justice, as the failure to appropriately 
protect significant areas increases the burden of harm on local communities. 
There are, therefore, a variety of different mechanisms by w/hich different types of 
corruption and poor governance impact upon planning activities that contribute to 
deforestation and forest degradation. This can contribute to both increased quantity and 
decreased quality of deforestation and forest degradation. Corruption in the process of 
licensing can increase the area of deforestation and forest degradation because it 
encourages those w/ho benefit to increase the amount of land that is possible to develop. 
It also contributes to wider environmental problems associated with deforestation and 
forest degradation, because the interests associated with licenses tend to be shorter term 
(matching political cycles) and within boundaries that do not reflect ecological boundaries. 
This means that poor governance, conflicts of interest and the capture of decision-making 
by the local elite can lead to increased environmental harm, as areas that should be 
protected are not zoned accordingly. It also creates procedural injustice as communities 
are not consulted. This shows that different types of corruption interact across different 
activities and contribute to both increased amount of area deforested or degraded but 
also to increased injustices. The outcome in terms of the quality of the deforestation and 
forest degradation is also negative. 
7.3.2 Licensing 
Land-use planning is important because it determines where and how different activities 
can (legally) occur. The next stage that can be impacted by corruption and poor 
governance has to do with the process of licensing different activities. In both countries, 
there is a high prevalence of corruption and poor governance in the process of licensing 
(Chapter 6); indeed, corruption in the licensing stage of forest management has been a 
well-documented problem in many countries (Gray, 2002; Kolstad and S0reide, 2009; 
Poffenberger, 1997; Soreide, 2007), Much of the existing research, including the findings 
presented in the previous chapter, has focused on the systems and drivers of corruption in 
licensing, describing systems where licenses are awarded in exchange for support with 
political campaigns. Whilst this is no doubt a key driver of corruption in licensing, the 
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focus of this section is on how corruption in this stage can affect forest resources. Four 
general impacts were identified. First, corruption and poor governance can lead to more 
licenses being awarded, or overlapping licenses. Second, it can lead to preferable 
treatment for one company over another. Third, corruption and poor governance can 
affect the negotiation over conditions of the contract and, finally, it can impact upon the 
speed with which licenses are awarded. 
Corruption can lead to more licenses being distributed because of the interests involved in 
corruption exchanges. Corrupt interests are built on the opportunity to award licenses, as 
these are key areas for recovering debt or repaying favours from campaign contributions. 
In corrupt conditions, the expectation is that more licenses will be awarded and there is 
some evidence of this in the literature. In a detailed study of timber booms across four 
countries, Ross (2001) found that, in the case of Indonesia, the corrupt systems associated 
with the distribution of licenses led to over-allocation of concessions by as much as five 
times the estimated sustainable national yield (Ross, 2001). In the early period following 
decentralisation in Indonesia, with increased competition over the authority to award 
licenses, there were extensive overlaps of concession areas and an explosive increase in 
the amount of logging (McCarthy, 2004; Smith et al., 2003a). The findings from the 
present research do support this idea, that corruption can lead to more or overlapping 
licenses being awarded, but the extreme illegal activities in awarding licenses documented 
during the early decentralisation period were no longer seen as common. The 
respondents instead described a need to have a more solid legal basis, a claim that is 
supported by their efforts to develop their own land-use plans. Allocating more area to 
specific land-uses enables them to justify the licenses they award. This is not to say that 
there are no areas allocated illegally because of corruption, as this is also occurring 
(Chapter 6). Rather, due to the increased scrutiny within government and by outside 
actors, there are stronger interests associated with the appearance of legality. This 
suggests that corrupt interests may encourage officials to award more licenses, but the 
impact on forests is likely to be dependent on other factors such as the land-use plan. 
Secondly, corruption and poor governance can facilitate preferential treatment, so that 
one company is given a concession over another company. The consequence of this 
corruption can be complex, depending on factors such as the relative quality of competing 
companies. Where preferential treatment is for companies of a similar quality, this will 
have a different impact on the forests than where payments lead to concessions being 
awarded to companies that lack experience or capital. However, it is the latter situation 
that is most commonly described in the literature and by respondents in my research. The 
current problem with the allocation of the Special Agriculture and Business Leases (SABL) 
highlights how this operates. That is, despite the SABL concessions being designed to 
promote agricultural development, government officials in the forestry department 
reported how companies with insufficient experience in agriculture were being awarded 
these licenses. These companies were commonly timber companies, and the plans they 
provided as part of the licensing process were plansfor timber operations that failed to 
include planning for the infrastructure necessary for agriculture, such as processing 
facilities (Government representative. Meeting 5,15 May 2012). Other allegations include 
companies receiving licenses despite having insufficient capital, instead relying solely on 
their access to timber in the area to finance their 'proposed' agricultural operations 
(Government representative. Meeting 5,15 May 2012). Yet these companies were seen to 
get preferential treatment because of their (corrupt) relationships with politicians. The 
consequence for forests from this corruption by preferential treatment, however, will be 
determined by the relative quality of the company and other factors, such as the 
monitoring of operations, which are dealt with in the next section. 
Thirdly, corruption and poor governance has been shown to impact the conditions within 
specific license contracts. As detailed in Chapter 4, contractual conditions of licenses-
such as timber licenses—in PNG are developed throughout the process of awarding 
licenses. Within a single proposed forest management area (FMA) all of the registered 
landowner groups, as well as local government departments, are meant to negotiate with 
prospective developers over what type of development the landowners would accept and 
under what circumstances they would accept it. This includes negotiations over some 
royalties, infrastructure and other commitments. In practice, corruption and the capture 
of authority, particularly by landowner company representatives, has led to many 
problems with this process. In the past, this led to unjust contractual conditions. For 
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example, one contract that was signed by landowner company executives made the 
landowner company legally responsible for compliance with all environmental planning 
and regulations, despite the landowner company having no actual activities with respect 
to the logging operations (Barnett, 1990a). Whilst efforts to reduce the discretionary 
power of landowner company executives have been made, these executives still have a 
key role in representing the communities (Filer, 2007), and in negotiating contractual 
conditions. Incidentally, the abuses are also evident in the process of registering ILGs, as 
many ILG applications are prepared by self-appointed representatives, paid for by the 
prospective developer and registered despite the fact that the ILG does not reflect the 
membership of the actual landowner group (PNG Forestry Review Team, 2001b). This has 
led to licenses being awarded to companies without the proper consent of the true 
landowners and with contract conditions that many of the landowners are unsure of. This 
can also lead to overlapping contracts being negotiated. In a current case in West Sepik, 
two logging companies have licenses (under the Private Dealings Act) to operate in the 
same area, because two landowner companies, who claim to represent the people, 
negotiated directly with the developers. There are also claims on both sides that the other 
landowner company does not represent the true landowners, and that they are receiving 
payouts from the respective developer (Interview ILG chairman and village head. March 
21, 2012). Corruption can therefore impact upon the actual contractual conditions of 
licenses, with implications particularly for the distribution of benefits. 
Finally, whilst there have been many documented cases of corruption and poor 
governance in awarding licenses, it is important to note that such payments may be to 
speed up the application process. That is, corrupt payments are made, not to change any 
decisions about whether the license is awarded, or to whom, but to influence when the 
license is awarded. Many company representatives described how they were frequently 
required to pay bribes in order to speed up the formal process (Chapter 6). This highlights 
that corrupt payments can be made for a variety of different reasons in the process of 
licensing, with varied impacts on the forests themselves. 
Impact on forests 
The different types of corruption in the licensing process can have complex impacts on the 
forests, with some contributing to more deforestation and forest degradation and others 
having negligible (direct) impact. Importantly, often the contribution to deforestation and 
forest degradation is dependent on other factors such as the land-use plan, and the 
quality of the monitoring and enforcing. For example, in cases where corruption leads to 
more licenses being distributed, this can lead to more deforestation and forest 
degradation. However, if those licenses are awarded in areas already zoned for 
conversion, or in forest areas that have been cleared already, then the number of licenses 
awarded will not change the ultimate amount of forestlands converted. The contribution 
to deforestation is also dependent on whether the land zoned as forest area is in fact 
forested. For example, as described in Chapter 3, following the development of the Mega 
Rice project in Kalimantan, over 1 million ha of peat forest was cleared and the peat-soil 
drained. When the rice project failed, much of the area was converted to commercial oil 
palm plantations. However, following a court decision in 2006, which found that the lands 
of the ex-mega rice project had never been legally annexed from the forest estate, the 
area was returned to the legal forest estate. At least one of the commercial oil palm 
plantations in the area is known to have paid for the license, and given the reported 
prevalence of the problem, there is little reason to suspect that others had not, which 
means that at least some (if not all) of the oil palm plantations therefore had paid bribes 
to secure licenses in to operate illegally in the forest area. However, given the history of 
land-use, arguably this did not cause the deforestation. This demonstrates that it can be 
very difficult to argue that any specific act of corruption contributes to deforestation and 
forest degradation, as there are likely to be complex intervening factors. 
However, there are also wider impacts, particularly to do with excessive environmental 
damage caused by corruption in the licensing process. Corruption, which leads to poorer 
quality companies being awarded licenses, was reported to have contributed to excessive 
environmental damage. For example, a government respondent described how a timber 
company with tittle experience was awarded a timber concession, but because they did 
not survey the land before building roads, they ended up building a road that led directly 
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to a cliff (Meeting 15, Feb 2012). As well as costing the company 30 000 Kina, the 
government respondent explained that there was also considerable degradation caused 
by such a mistake. Alternatively, such companies may hire cheaper staff, who do not have 
the knowledge to be able to comply with the logging codes, leading to logging practices 
which damage buffer zones and residual timber stands (Forest Revenue Review Team, 
2002). Good quality companies are therefore needed in order to be able to sustainably 
use forests. However, it is nonetheless difficult to determine if the corruption by 
preferential treatment does result in poorer quality companies being awarded licenses 
and therefore contributes to wider problems. That is, competing companies may also have 
had little experience so the payments may have been for preference over a like-quality 
company, or the failings to comply with the logging code can be a problem of corruption 
involved in monitoring and enforcing logging codes. Determining these different 
conditions is therefore necessary in order to be able to say that any specific act of 
corruption has led to environmental damage. 
The third type of corruption above, where corrupt relationships affect the conditions of 
the licenses, may not lead to more deforestation or forest degradation, but it can impact 
on achieving procedural and distributive justice. In the case of PNG described above, 
corrupt relationships between self-appointed landowner representatives and prospective 
developers contributed to procedural injustices, as those with the right to be engaged in 
decision-making were not able to access the negotiations. Corruption also affected the 
conditions for the distribution of benefits, often leading to fewer benefits being allocated 
to communities and fewer responsibilities to the developers (Forest Revenue Review 
Team, 2002; Review Team, 2004). The implications being that those communities 
continue to bear the cost of environmental degradation, with fewer benefits from the 
extraction of the resources. 
Finally, as described above in the example where corrupt payments result in preferential 
treatment for a similarly experienced company, arguably there are few direct impacts on 
the forest from 'speed money' corruption. That is, all else being equal, whether a 
company receives the licenses quickly or in several months is not likely to directly 
contribute to deforestation or forest degradation. These findings highlight that the 
ultimate impacts of different types of corruption in the stage of licensing is therefore 
dependent on the type of corruption as well as the broader conditions; however, there 
can be clearer contributions to injustices caused by corruption in this stage. 
7.3.3 Monitoring and enforcing 
Once the land-uses have been assigned and licenses awarded, the next stage has to do 
with monitoring the logging, mining or agricultural projects to ensure compliance with 
operational regulations. With respect to logging, both countries have regulations and 
codes that specify how logging should occur, including, for example, procedures for 
surveying timber stock, preparing annual harvest plans, and specifying felling direction.®^ 
These codes are designed to 'minimise the deleterious impacts of logging' by requiring 
that the timber harvest is planned and conducted by trained workers (Putz et al., 2008, p. 
1428). Mining and agricultural operations are also monitored for compliance with 
regulations that aim to reduce their impacts on the forests, such as regulations that 
specify protected areas for biodiversity or watershed protection (see Chapters 3 and 4). 
Governance conditions can affect if, and how, these regulations are monitored and 
enforced, with implications for both the amount of deforestation and forest degradation 
and for the wider problems associated with logging, mining and agricultural development. 
Historically, corruption and poor governance has been well-documented problem 
affecting monitoring and enforcement practices. For example, during the Suharto rule in 
Indonesia, there was very little incentive to monitor logging practices, as the military and 
other key political figures benefitted from the profits of illegal logging (Chapter 3). 
Corruption and poor governance have also been linked to failures to monitor regulations 
which restrict harvesting protected species, (EIA/Telapak, 2007; Smith et al., 2003a), those 
which restrict the amount of timber harvested within concession areas, and failure to 
monitor regulations which seek to protect watershed and buffer-zones (Dauvergne, 1994; 
Iskandar et al., 2006; McCarthy, 2002b; Palmer, 2001). These cases show that in the past. 
In Indonesia the conditions of the logging are outlined in the Selective Cutting and Planting System 
{Tebang Pilih Tanom Indonesia, TPTI); in PNG, it is under the logging code of conduct. 
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on one hand, companies' activities were not monitored, because this would decrease the 
value of the patronage associated with the distribution of licenses (Poffenberger, 1997, p. 
456). This is particularly the case where elected officials exchange election support for 
licenses. On the other hand, those tasked with monitoring, such as the forestry police and 
military, also received bribes to not report breaches by companies (Poffenberger, 1997). 
These examples demonstrate that the type of corruption can have different impacts on 
how activities that affect forests are monitored and regulations enforced. 
As well as supporting the evidence above that corruption affects monitoring and 
enforcing, the results of my research also point to how patterns of monitoring and 
enforcement are important for understanding corruption systems. That is, the process of 
monitoring and enforcement is how and why many different components of the 
corruption system happen. This is tied to the issues of semblance of legality, mutual 
dependency and regulatory complexity described in the previous chapters. Firstly, 
government agents have an interest in monitoring and identifying illegal activities because 
it provides them with an opportunity to extract payments, which they can then distribute 
to their bosses to repay recruitment debts or to be considered for promotion. The threat 
of enforcing regulations and punishing any breaches is sometimes sufficient to extract 
payments from companies that are monitored. In cases where the regulations are poor or 
costly, enforcement instead becomes tied to a semblance of legality. That is, rather than 
actually enforce regulations, corrupt payments facilitate a semblance of legality. This 
semblance of legality can be very important for companies, and provide an important part 
of exchange for government agents. In order to get such payments, there must be 
something to offer, which in many cases is the opportunity to bypass complying with more 
costly regulations. The process of monitoring and enforcing therefore is also a critical part 
of the corruption process in that the process of monitoring and enforcing provides the 
opportunity to collect and pay bribes. Equally, my research supports the fact that 
corruption can impact upon monitoring and enforcing, and in turn this corruption often 
facilitates illegal activities. 
There are some differences between the system described above for Indonesia and the 
practice in PNG. This is partly because the relationship of dependency between officials 
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and companies in PNG is based on the conflicts of interest brought on by the fact that 
officials in PNG live on-site at the companies that they monitor. In cases where the 
concession area is remote, officials depend on the company for accommodation, 
transportation and even meals. This leads to conflicts of interests for the officials in 
monitoring and reporting activities of the companies. Even though it is difficult to 
determine how much this conflicts of interest affects decisions about monitoring and 
enforcing regulations, there are nonetheless concerns that this conflicts of interest means 
that companies are allowed to operate illegally (CELCoR and ACF, 2006; ODI, 2007). Five 
reviews produced in collaboration between the government of PNG and the World Bank, 
documented multiple breaches, including failure to prepare areas for harvesting (such as 
clearing vines from trees before harvesting), logging plans not submitted, and a variety of 
other examples of non-compliance that had all been signed off by the officer in charge 
(Forest Trends, 2006a). However, what was more frequently noted by respondents, 
including government, industry and NGOs, was less about this dependency and more 
about other problems, such as negligence and lack of training. 
This highlights the fact that whilst corruption can impact decisions about monitoring and 
enforcing, there are many other factors that also affect these decisions. Two broad 
explanations were identified in each country: the first, problematic regulations, the 
second a lack of capacity and negligence. Perceived problems with the regulations, 
specifically miss-match to local needs and ambiguity, was widely reported to impact on if 
and how regulations were monitored and enforced (Chapter 5). For example, in PNG 
regulations that restricted the amount of timber harvested in an area were perceived by 
some landowners to restrict their ability to benefit from the forests in their area. 
Government agents and company representatives acknowledged that they sometimes 
conducted/allowed illegal activities, because of pressure from the community. One 
government respondent, discussing his time monitoring and enforcing the logging code of 
conduct, described how, 'when you shut the companies [for illegally logging] you have 
your people, nationals coming up to us [saying] "you shut the company, we don't have any 
royalties or whatever to pay school fees'" (Meeting 15, 25 May 2011). This means that 
sometimes companies were allowed to continue operating illegally. In Indonesia, 
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ambiguous regulations were also seen to impact monitoring and enforcement. For 
example, conflicting rules over whether the required 20% smallholder oil palm plantations 
was within or in addition to concession areas (Chapter 3) meant that this regulation was 
rarely enforced. Beyond perceived problems with the regulations, the lack of enforcement 
of regulations was also seen as a consequence of the lack of capacity and skills and indeed 
the negligence of those tasked with monitoring, which has been reported in many studies 
around the world as being a barrier to effective monitoring (Goncalves et al., 2012; World 
Bank, 2006b). This shows that there are many factors that can affect if and how 
monitoring proceeds, with a variety of implications for the forests. 
Impact on forests 
Corruption in the process of monitoring and enforcing regulations has a variety of 
consequences for the amount of deforestation and forest degradation. The most obvious 
impact is that corruption can facilitate illegal activities and increase the amount of 
forestlands cleared or degraded. Indeed, much of the literature has focused on the 
contribution of illegal logging to deforestation and forest degradation (Palmer, 2001; 
Ravenel and Granoff, 2004; Robertson and van Schaik, 2001). There are also indirect 
impacts, where illegal activities degrade forest areas, which damages canopy cover 
leading to increased drying of forest areas, which in turn increases the susceptibility to 
fires. It is suspected that the prevalence of fires in protected areas in Indonesia during the 
1997/1998 El Nino drought period may be due to the rate of unplanned degradation of 
these areas from illegal activity (Tacconi, 2003). The failure to enforce regulations has also 
affected the management of watercourses, particularly when river system buffer zones 
have been cleared or logged, which has been well-documented in PNG (Forest Revenue 
Review Team, 2002). 
This is perhaps the most direct way in which corruption contributes to increased 
deforestation and forest degradation, but ultimately, the contribution of illegal logging or 
other illegal activities to deforestation and forest degradation depends on the exact laws 
that are not being monitored or enforced. Furthermore it is not often clear how much of 
the illegal activities in the forest sector may be due to corruption and how much the illegal 
activities are a consequence of the variety of other problems, such as negligence or poor 
quality regulations. This shows that in practice, there can be complex links betv*/een 
corruption and a failure to monitor, with ambiguous implications for forests cover change. 
Beyond issues of sustainability, there are also some complex links between a failure to 
monitor and enforce regulations and wider problems associated with environmental 
injustices. Corruption can contribute to injustices, as cases reported in this research and in 
the literature have shown. Specifically, organised illegal logging often fails to distribute 
benefits to communities and sustainability. However, it is important to acknowledge that, 
depending on the quality of the regulations, the principles of environmental justice can 
also be served by illegal activities. Much has been written about the fact that often 
communities engage in illegal activities because of the restrictive regulations. For 
example, government officials explained that they did not enforce regulations which 
required artisanal miners to get permission from the Ministry of Forestry, out of concern 
for the livelihoods of the community—as one government respondent explained, 'if we 
shut them down, how will they eat' (Meeting 42,16 June 2011). In instances where 
regulations prohibit community activities or are prohibitively costly to comply with, illegal 
activities represent a more just outcome for communities (Colchester et al., 2006; 
Goncalves et al., 2012; Kaimowitz, 2003). 
This means that whilst no doubt there are impacts from corruption and poor governance 
on the process of monitoring activities, and that this can contribute to deforestation and 
forest degradation, there are also more complex interactions between corruption and 
monitoring and enforcement, as specifications about monitoring and enforcing 
regulations are also key to understanding the system of corruption. These findings 
demonstrate that the overall impact on forests, including issues of sustainability and 
justice, is highly dependent on the content of the regulations. Illegal activities that go 
unpunished can contribute to injustice, but when the regulations are themselves unjust or 
ill suited to the local environment, the impact of corruption to bypass such enforcement 
can contribute to more just outcomes, or can have little impact on the forests. This 
relationship is particularly important for understanding efforts to improve governance and 
reduce deforestation and forest degradation, which I return to in the next chapter of this 
thesis. 
7.3.4 Benefit distribution 
Corruption can also impact on the distribution of the benefits from activities that 
contribute to deforestation and forest degradation. Whilst decisions about how benefits 
are distributed are made after the activities in the forest have occurred, the decisions 
nonetheless can impact upon the long-term quality of forests and on the principles of 
environmental justice. This means that there is no direct contribution from corruption 
involved in the distribution of benefits from mining, for example, because it occurs after 
the forests have been cleared. But there can be indirect impacts on forests from this 
corruption. Understanding the impacts of corruption and poor governance in the 
distribution of benefits is therefore vital to assessing the contribution of corruption and 
poor governance to the wider problems associated with forest use. 
The distribution of benefits is a key aspect to building legitimacy for different activities 
and, as described in Chapter 5, legitimacy is vital to the success of different activities. That 
is, activities that have legitimacy are better able to continue and expand. Projects that are 
unable to build sufficient legitimacy are less likely to happen, or will face other barriers 
during operation—such as the blockades by landowners described in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Although the careful distribution of benefits is a key component of building legitimacy, 
this does not mean that projects that build legitimacy are necessarily good projects. 
Corrupt payments and poor governance can work to build political support for poorer 
quality projects—projects that contribute to wider environmental or social problems. 
Indeed, as described in Chapter 3, the pattern of distribution of profits from logging 
operations to political leaders during Suharto's rule was seen as one of the main factors 
supporting the damaging timber industry (Dauvergne, 1994). Companies providing 
payments to politicians in PNG has also been described in PNG to be a key factor as to why 
there is ongoing political support for companies that have caused unnecessary 
environmental harm (Barnett, 1990a; Greenpeace, 2004; Laurance et al., 2011). This 
shows that in the short term, corruption and politically savvy distribution of profits can 
lead to projects continuing to have support from key actors, despite wider environmental 
and social problems. 
Corruption and abuse in the management and distribution of profits from logging (or 
other) activities can also have long-term consequences for both forest management and 
community development. In relation to forest management, corruption and poor 
governance of reforestation funds has been show n^ to be particularly relevant. Both 
countries have established reforestation funds, into which logging companies contribute a 
percentage of the value of timber harvested.'^ Corruption and mismanagement of these 
funds has been widely documented in both countries. In Indonesia, corruption, theft and 
general mismanagement of the reforestation fund {dana reboisasi) resulted in millions of 
dollars being used to provide (largely politically motivated) subsidies to inefficient and 
unprofitable industries, including the timber plantation and pulp and paper industries 
(Barr et al., 2010a). Since the fall of Suharto (1998), there have been reforms designed to 
improve the management of the reforestation fund, and a major barrier reported by many 
government officials was the fear that use of these funds would been seen as corrupt 
(Government representative. Meeting, 16 August 2011). In PNG also, there has been a 
documented history of abuse of funds designated for reforestation and of the distribution 
of royalties to landowners (Barnett, 1990a). In PNG, rather than being used to support 
unsustainable projects, the funds were often directly stolen, or there is little information 
kept about how much was collected or used. This is an ongoing concern, as one industry 
representative described—'they [the government] have no problem collecting the funds 
and spending them, it is the doing the work in the middle which is difficult' (Meeting 5, 12 
May 2012). These examples demonstrate how context-specific the different types of 
corruption and abuse may be, and how this may impact on the distribution of benefits. 
Fraud and other illegal activities have also impacted on the distribution of benefits 
designated for community development. This includes funds to contribute to local 
infrastructure projects and payments and royalties, which are meant to be paid directly to 
" In PNG the reforestation levy is K2/ m'(Hunt, 2010). In Indonesia, the amount companies pay is dependent 
on speciesof timber and the area from which it is harvested (Barret al., 2010b, p. 9). 
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communities or landowners. This is particularly evident in PNG, where according to the 
landownership regulations in PNG, all logging operations are required to pay a variety of 
fees and royalties to the resource owners.'" Whilst calculating the exact amount of money 
that landowners receive in exchange for their resources is difficult, a review of the 
financial benefits of six logging operations estimated that the direct financial payments to 
landowners was between Kina 10 and 15 million per annum (Review Team, 2004, p. 66). 
There have been many documented cases where corrupt relationships have enabled 
companies to under-report their harvest and therefore under-pay royalties (Review Team, 
2004) (Review Team, 2004). The corruption and embezzlement of timber royalties has 
been a well-documented problem in PNG. For example, a review sponsored, in part, by 
the World Bank reported that landowner company executives had illegally used the funds 
to support overseas travel on a 'marketing exercise'(Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring, 2004a) and to repay private debts of landowner company executives (such as 
travel and food expenses) to the logging companies (Review Team, 2004, p. 32).'^ 
Impact on forests 
The instance of corruption and poor governance in the distribution of benefits from 
resource use has several potential impacts on forests. Firstly, as I mentioned above, there 
can be long-term impacts on the amount of forest that is cleared or converted. Politically 
savvy distribution of logging profits during the Suharto era bought political support for 
logging operations that failed to comply with logging regulations, and contributed to 
excessive environmental harm (Dauvergne, 1994; Palmer, 2001; Poffenberger, 1997). 
Secondly, abuses of funds allocated to support reforestation or the rehabilitation of 
logged areas could also contribute to long-term environmental harm. 
** Mining and other development projects are required to pay royalties to landowners as well, but the 
regulations vary according to the type of resource. This means that, for mining particularly, the royalties to 
landowners are not as high because the resources themselves (anything under 6ft) are owned by the state 
(see Chapter 4 for more details). 
This was associated with landowner advance accounts where landowners—often LOC executives-
borrowed money from logging companies for personal expenses. Logging companies charged high rates of 
interest and used the royalties as collateral. 
The corruption and mismanagement of reforestation funds had two potential mechanisms 
to contribute to deforestation and forest degradation. Firstly, corrupt distributions 
resulted in funds being provided to activities w/hich caused excessive deforestation, or 
that corruption and mismanagement meant that the funds w/ere otherwise wasted and 
logged areas were not rehabilitated. In the case of the former, the reforestation fund in 
Indonesia was used to support the pulp and paper industry, leading to over-capacity of 
timber processing facilities. This over-capacity has continued to drive demand for timber 
from native forests, particularly in Sumatra (Barr, 2000). In Kalimantan, on the other hand, 
the corruption and mismanagement has led to the second situation—where the money is 
not spent to rehabilitate forestlands. As described above, the failure to use reforestation 
funds to effectively rehabilitate logged areas has contributed to the incentive to convert 
forestlands. In PNG also, there has been very little use of the reforestation fund to actually 
rehabilitate logged areas. Specifically, logging was calculated to have contributed to 886 
659 ha of deforestation and 2 919 714 ha of forest degradation, of which only just over 20 
000 ha was reportedly rehabilitated (Shearman et al., 2009 supplementary material 
S3).These figures have been criticised, however, for over-stating the amount of primary 
forest in PNG in 1970 and understating natural regeneration (Filer et al., 2009). The 
amount of deforestation caused by logging (and the failure to rehabilitate logged areas) 
may therefore be substantially less. However, this does demonstrate that despite large 
sums of money being collected in both countries, this has not contributed to reforestation 
in many areas. This failure to rehabilitate logged areas is, however, not all due to the 
impact of corruption and mismanagement of reforestation funds. For example, several 
NGOs and industry representatives in PNG described how landowners did not want their 
areas to be reforested, because they preferred to convert the forest area to alternative, 
more economical uses. Whilst corruption and mismanagement of the distribution of 
benefits and reforestation funds may contribute to more deforestation and forest 
degradation in the long-term, there are also many other factors that affect whether or not 
logged areas are rehabilitated. 
Beyond contributing to the amount of deforestation and forest degradation, corruption in 
the distribution of benefits also contributes to the wider problems of distributive injustice 
190 
associated with deforestation and forest degradation. The pattern of timber royalties 
being captured and embezzled by so-called landowner representatives in PNG is a clear 
example of these injustices. Corruption and poor governance in the distribution of timber 
royalties removes the rights of the real landowners to benefit from the resources 
extracted in their area. This failure to benefit from resource extraction is also evident in 
the fact that conditions for many Papua New Guineans, in terms of health, education and 
infrastructure, conditions remain bad (United Nations Development Program, n.d.). This 
can also have secondary consequences for forest quality, as the lack of such economic 
development can contribute to ongoing demand for secondary commercial activities, such 
as agricultural expansion. Indeed, there have been many studies that point to poverty as 
an important driver of deforestation and forest degradation (Wollenberg et al., 2004; 
Wright et al., 2007), but the relationships between such secondary drivers would require 
more research to determine specific timelines. 
There are therefore several potential indirect mechanisms by which corruption and poor 
governance can impact upon the distribution of benefits from activities that contribute to 
deforestation and forest degradation. This corruption can firstly lead to long-term 
environmental harm, due to lack of rehabilitation of logged areas, or contribute to the 
over-capacity of processing facilities, which has increased demand on native timber in the 
long-term. Secondly, corruption and poor governance can also contribute to wider 
problems of deforestation and forest degradation, such as the lack of true development 
for communities in forest areas. Combined with the stages above, the analysis shows that 
corruption and poor governance does not necessarily directly contribute to deforestation 
and forest degradation, but there are many mechanisms by which it does contribute to 
the wider problems. 
7.4 Discussion 
The analysis in the four stage above directs me to the research questions of the thesis, 
which are at the centre of this chapter: Does corruption and poor governance contribute 
to deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea? And if yes, 
how? The previous section identified the many different ways that different types of 
corruption can impact upon different stages of decision-mal<ing about land uses and 
forestry, monitoring logging activities, or distributing benefits from activities which impact 
on forest cover and function. Hovkrever, it is also clear that there are many factors that 
mitigate this impact, and that negate the impact of corruption and poor governance. This 
section draw/s together the findings from the analysis above and the literature to identify 
key factors that may influence w/hether or not any particular act of corruption or poor 
governance does contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in these two 
countries. 
Firstly, it is clear from the interview data and from the broader literature that under 
certain circumstances corruption and poor governance can contribute to deforestation 
and forest degradation. The literature described in the opening review of this chapter has 
shown that higher levels of corruption seem to be linked to higher amounts of 
deforestation and forest degradation (Barbier et al., 2005; Bulte et al., 2007). These 
studies have identified different factors, such as terms of trade, as being key to 
understanding when higher amounts of corruption will lead to higher rates of 
deforestation (Barbier et al., 2005). Understanding when is important, because even 
though there are, of course, examples where corruption and poor governance contribute 
to higher amounts of deforestation and forest degradation, the broader research also 
supports the argument that there are specific factors that affect the relationship between 
corruption and deforestation and forest degradation. Whilst this literature does support 
the main claim of this research, that the impacts of corruption are dependent on broader 
conditions, these studies have focused on cross-country trends and nationally aggregated 
corruption indices. The circumstances identified in my research however, are focused on 
specific acts of corrupt exchanges and whether or not these contribute to specific 
deforestation and forest degradation. 
The factors that are most relevant from my research include the type of corruption, 
whether the outcome was legal and the match between the regulations and the specific 
environmental conditions in the area. Where corrupt payments were made to illegally 
convert protected areas to alternative uses, or where poor governance enabled 
companies to breach logging codes of conduct, corruption and poor governance may 
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contribute to deforestation and forest degradation. For example, the corruption that 
occurs in the process of licensing in PNG leads to the capture of decision-making by often 
self-appointed elites. Paid by developers, these self-appointed elites falsify claims about 
landowner support and get licenses covering areas that are not legally allowed. Any 
associated deforestation or forest degradation is at least in part a consequence of the 
corrupt payments. However, there are many instances where different types of corruption 
may lead to legal or other types of illegal activities with different consequences for the 
forests, and it is this variation that has been the focus of my analysis. 
The variation means that the actual contribution of corruption and poor governance to 
the quantity of deforestation depends greatly on the legal framework for forestry issues 
as well as whether this framework accurately reflects the environment. That is, where 
corrupt payments are made to ensure preferential treatment, rather than to bypass 
regulations, arguably corruption does not contribute to deforestation and forest 
degradation. For example, if a forest area zoned to be converted to oil palm, corrupt 
payment that ensures one company gains access to the area over another company 
arguably does not contribute to deforestation, as the area is legally zoned for conversion. 
The payments determine who will the activity, not whether it will be done. The type of 
corruption in this case may be speed-money or for preferential treatment, as the 
exchange affects how quickly the activity is done or who does it, rather than affecting 
whether or not the activity happens. Corruption that illegally allows companies to get 
access to areas that are zoned as protection or production forests does not necessarily 
lead to more deforestation either, if the zoning is inappropriate (for example, area 
without forest is inappropriately zoned as forest estate). That is, where corrupt payments 
allow companies to bypass regulations that require release permits from the ministry 
when the area under question was cleared decades ago means that arguably the present-
day corruption did not contribute to deforestation. These cases highlight that there are 
many factors that affect whether corruption does, in fact, contribute to higher amounts of 
deforestation and forest degradation. 
The last example points to the need to also understand the historical context of forest 
conversion and corruption. That is, whilst the specific present-day act of corruption may 
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not contribute directly to deforestation, this is not the same as admitting that corruption 
and poor governance perse did not lead to that area being cleared. Both these countries 
have a history of corruption affecting forest management (Chapters Band 4). For example, 
during Suharto's rule in Indonesia, corruption and patronage in licensing contributed to 
more licenses being aw/arded than w/ere sustainable. Kickbacks to politicians and the 
military also contributed to forest degradation because they enabled logging companies 
to bypass regulations such as those limiting residual damage. There w/ere few (if any) 
efforts to reduce the environmental impact of logging activities. As all royalties were 
collected and managed by the central government, there were few development 
opportunities provided to local communities. The long-term effects of this is that many 
forest areas that were degraded during the Suharto era are now of little economic value, 
which increases the incentive to convert these forest areas to alternative uses. It is 
important, therefore, to distinguish between historical patterns of resource exploitation 
and specific acts of corruption in the present day. Also important is the counterfactual 
question of whether these areas would have retained forest cover if there had been no 
corruption. Such a question is impossible to answer, but these examples do highlight how 
complex the relationship between corruption, poor governance and forest use may be, 
and how important it is to understand the legal framework, the type of corruption and the 
condition of the forests in order to be able to determine if and when corruption may 
contribute to more deforestation and forest degradation. 
Beyond understanding how corruption and poor governance impact on the absolute 
amount of deforestation and forest degradation, the analysis in this chapter also focused 
on the wider problems associated with forest management. Specifically, in the opening 
part I argued that it is not just the absolute amount of deforestation that has driven global 
concern over deforestation and forest degradation. The wider environmental impacts and 
injustices are relevant to assessing the impacts of corruption and poor governance. 
One of the key criteria used in this analysis was drawn from the literature on 
environmental justice. Some studies have analysed the impact of corruption on principles 
of justice (Deflem, 1995; Smith, 2010; Warren, 2006). As already noted, the papers by 
Warren (2004, 2006) highlight the key impact that corruption can have on principles 
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associated with procedural justice. Warren argued that corruption in a democracy results 
in duplicitous exclusion, where those with a right to be engaged in decision-making are 
excluded and that this is duplicitous because it appears to be democracy. Other research 
has also highlighted how social norms of exclusion develop around corrupt networks 
(Bobbins, 2000). Even though Robbins was not explicitly concerned with principles of 
environmental justice, his analysis nonetheless highlights how corrupt systems develop 
and points to clear implications for principles of procedural and distributive environmental 
justices. 
The results from my research support these studies, demonstrating how corruption can 
negatively affect principles of procedural environmental justice. The system of campaign 
finance in Indonesia for example, resulted in elected officials being dependent on the 
favour of companies, rather than on the favour of citizens. In the case of PNG, the impact 
of corruption on procedural justice was also evident when so-called community 
representatives reportedly abused their positions to gain benefits from prospective 
developers. The result of this system was that landowner groups were often not 
consulted, or that the consultations became public relations exercises, rather than 
meaningful engagement. This highlights that even though the impact of corruption and 
poor governance on the amount of deforestation is ambiguous, there are nonetheless 
clear impacts on procedural environmental justice, which contributes to the wider 
problems associated with high rates of deforestation and forest degradation. 
Corruption and poor governance was also shown to impact distributive environmental 
justice, however this impact was arguably not always negative. The failure to 
appropriately monitor and enforcing logging codes of practice, as documented in my 
research, could contribute to a greater environmental burden on communities in the area. 
This burden could come from factors such as river pollution, or flooding resulting from 
land clearing in watersheds. Corruption and poor governance also resulted in communities 
receiving fewer benefits from resource extraction, for example when landowner company 
executives in PNG embezzled timber royalties. And cases such as these have often been 
described in other reports about the PNG forestry industry (see Chapter 4). However, 
there were also some examples of situations where corruption did not negatively impact 
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upon the principles of justice. In cases where the legal framework provided little, or no, 
access to forest areas or royalties from resource extraction, corrupt and illegal activities 
allowed communities to bypass such barriers and still benefit from resources in their 
area.^® The case of artisanal mining documented in my research is one case of this. The 
potentially positive impacts of corruption and illegal activities for community livelihoods 
has also been discussed in the literature, even if it has been less frequently mentioned 
than the negative impacts. The findings from this research therefore demonstrate that 
whilst the impact of corruption and poor governance on environmental justice in part is 
dependent on the content of the regulations, there can also be arguably positive impacts 
from corruption in cases where the regulations may be poor. 
As well as the impacts on environmental justice, corruption and poor governance also had 
predominantly negative and often indirect impacts on the sustainability of resource 
management. Some of these impacts have been described in the literature, where, for 
example. Burgess and colleagues explained that during election periods, unplanned 
(illegal) logging increased(Burgess et al., 2012). Corruption was also shown to result in 
inefficient land-use by agricultural production, as corrupt (and legitimate) lobbying saw 
increased subsidies for agriculture (Bulte et al., 2007). The findings from my research 
extend these arguments to detail specific mechanisms by which corruption and poor 
governance in Indonesia and PNG affect the planning and implementing of measures 
designed to promote sustainable forest management. One of the key examples of this was 
in relation to the process of land-use planning in Indonesia. Specifically, I described the 
indirect process by which corruption in the process of licensing created incentives for 
district governments to try to have more forestlands assigned to conversion. In these 
cases, the political economy of the governance process, including corruption, leads to 
greater concern for political needs in the land-use planning and less consideration of the 
sustainable management of the forests. This can lead to more area being allocated for 
' ' T h i s argument in some ways reflects the economic issues described in the introduction to my thesis, 
where corruption was sometimes argued to have positive impacts of 'greasing the wheels' and thereby 
improving efficiency. This idea has been discredited. What I am arguing here is that, under certain 
circumstances, corruption can have positive impacts on justice, not efficiency. 
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development. It can also lead to greater priority for political and economic interests than 
environmental values, leading to areas such as w/atersheds or high-conservation areas 
being allocated to conversion. Indeed, studies have suggested that corruption restricts 
political interests to short-term concerns (for example see Ascher, 1999; Ross, 2001) 
findings which supports this argument in my research. Other examples from the 
monitoring and enforcing stage show/ that corruption and poor prioritisation enabled 
companies to bypass the regulations which were designed to limit environmental harm, 
such as logging codes of conduct. These examples demonstrate some of the mechanisms 
by which corruption and poor governance affect the sustainability of forest use, and 
contribute to wider problems of deforestation and forest degradation, such as biodiversity 
loss and watershed damage. 
Different types of corruption and poor governance therefore have multifaceted impacts 
on the process of deforestation and forest degradation. That is, whilst the existing 
literature has highlighted several mechanisms by which corruption particularly may 
contribute to deforestation and forest degradation, there is a need to incorporate the 
question of when corruption does not contribute to deforestation and forest degradation. 
The analysis presented in this chapter further highlights the claim that even without 
specific acts of corruption, deforestation and forest degradation and illegal forest 
activities may continue. The analysis also shows that a wider set of criteria is needed to 
accurately assess the impacts of corruption and poor governance on forest areas. This 
argument provides a more nuanced idea for what the aim of improving governance and 
reducing corruption may be, because it is not just about the absolute area of forest lands 
that is cleared or protected, it is about the process and how well the various interests and 
values associated with forest resources are negotiated and traded. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This analysis shows that the contribution of corruption and poor governance to problems 
of deforestation and forest degradation is multifaceted. Corrupt payments can directly 
contribute to deforestation if, for example, corrupt payments are made to re-zone 
conservation area to development. However, few examples demonstrate a direct 
relationship such as this, as there are also many legal and legitimate reasons to clear 
forest areas, or degrade forest ecosystems. This means that good governance can also 
lead to deforestation and forest degradation. Whilst the contribution of corruption and 
poor governance on the absolute amount of deforestation and forest degradation may be 
ambiguous, there are negative impacts on the sustainability of forest management and on 
principles of environmental justice from corruption and poor governance. Corrupt 
exchanges, and the systems that support them, result in actors being ignored, despite 
having a legitimate right to engage in decision-making; these exchanges and systems also 
enable companies to bypass regulations that, for example, restrict harvesting of protected 
species or aim to reduce the impact of logging. Corruption and poor governance therefore 
contribute to poorer outcomes from activities that lead to deforestation and forest 
degradation. Corruption and poor governance may also have little direct impact on forests 
if, for example, corrupt payments are made to speed up the licensing process for an 
otherw/ise legal license. The analysis presented in this chapter therefore demonstrates 
that the relationship betw/een corruption, poor governance and deforestation and forest 
degradation can be complex, unclear and often indirect. These findings therefore have 
important implications for current efforts to improve forest governance and reduce 
deforestation and forest degradation, and it is these implications that will be described in 
more detail in the next chapter. 
Chapter 8 
Improving governance to reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation 
8.1 Introduction 
With ongoing reports that corruption and poor governance are causing deforestation and 
forest degradation in Indonesia and PNG, there has been rising effort to improve 
governance as a means to improve forest management (Brow/n et a!., 2002; Gibson et al., 
2000; Sil<or and Stahl, 2011; World Banl<, 2006b, 2009). Indeed, improving governance has 
not only been a key concept in the academic literature on deforestation and forest 
degradation (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006; McCarthy, 2002b; Palmer and Engel, 2007), 
but also in the broader policy-oriented literature (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002; Daniel et 
al., 2007; World Bank, 2006b, 2009). The need to improve forest governance has become 
increasingly important with the prospects of billions of dollars of financing for efforts to 
reduce deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) being directed towards countries 
with histories of widespread illegal forest activities, corruption and other features of poor 
governance (Global Witness, 2010; Kanowski et al., 2011; Luttrell et al., 2011; Williams et 
al., 2011). Whilst there are no doubt benefits to improving governance itself, it is clear 
from the previous chapters that the relationship between poor governance and 
deforestation is not necessarily clear. That is, even when efforts to improve governance 
(for example by reducing corruption) are successful, this does not necessarily translate to 
a reduction in the amount of deforestation and forest degradation. Having analysed the 
potential mechanisms by which corruption and poor governance does and does not 
contribute to deforestation, this chapter goes on to analyse the implications of the 
findings of the thesis for the current understanding and practice of improving forest 
governance in Indonesia and PNG. 
This chapter begins with a background review of current literature on improving 
governance. Improving governance is a very complex and not necessarily well-defined 
concept, and has been used to cover a variety of different activities (Kishor and Damania, 
2007; World Bank, 2009). Whilst there are many factors associated with improving 
governance, the focus of this review/ is on three areas most relevant to the findings of this 
thesis: specifically, issues of law enforcement, accountability and participation, and finally 
anti-corruption. The main implications of the findings of this thesis for the topic of 
improving governance to reduce deforestation are then outlined, focusing again on the 
three areas of anti-corruption, law enforcement and rule of law, and accountability and 
participation. I analyse firstly how current efforts may actually succeed in improving 
governance and secondly how improving governance may reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation, and reduce the wider problems of deforestation and forest degradation 
described in the previous chapters. 
8.2 The concepts and practice of improving forest governance 
Improving governance has become a ubiquitous concept in much of the current discussion 
about forest management. Improving governance is aimed at achieving good governance, 
which is determined by qualities such as the presence of rule of law, control of corruption, 
regulatory quality, voice and accountability, political stability and freedom from violence 
(Kaufmann et al., 2012a; Kaufmann et al., 2012b). Indeed, the literature on improving the 
governance of forests also points to these qualities of good governance (for example 
Faguet, 2013; Richards et al., 2003; World Bank, 2006b, 2009). This section focuses on 
three of the key factors commonly discussed in the literature that are relevant to the 
findings of this thesis. Firstly, given that a theme of this research has been an explanation 
of aspects of legality and illegality, I focus on issues of law enforcement, rule of law and 
the problem of illegal logging. This includes consideration of regulatory quality. The 
second are of focus is participation and accountability. Finally, I consider the topic of anti-
corruption in the forest sector. 
Improving forest governance to address the problems of illegal activities in the forests has 
received considerable attention from academia, NGOs, national and subnational 
governments and other aid agencies (for example GTZ, 2009; ITTO, 2004; Tacconi, 2007c; 
Wells et al., 2007; World Bank, 2006a). The problems of illegal forest activities have been 
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well-documented and Illegal logging specifically has been widely reported to contribute to 
deforestation and forest degradation (Burgess et al., 2012; Palmer, 2001). Therefore, 
improving governance by strengthening the rule of law and reducing illegal forest 
activities is vital to reducing deforestation and forest degradation (Contreras-Hermosilla, 
2007; Global Witness, 2005; Hansen, 2011; Richards et al., 2003; Tacconi et al., 2003; 
World Bank, 2006b). 
Efforts to strengthen the rule of law and improve forest governance are frequently 
categorised into prevention, detection, and suppression activities (Contreras-Hermosilla, 
2002; FAO and ITTO, 2005). Prevention strategies have included programs such as those 
that promote legal certification and trade conditions (for example Indonesia's involvement 
in the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Goncalves et al., 2012; 
Luttrell et al., 2011), or programs that promote participatory practices for legal reforms 
(Del Gatto, 2003; FAO, 2004). Detection and suppression activities involve more 
traditional law enforcement operations and have also been widely promoted as a means 
to improve forest governance (Cerutti et al., 2013; Del Gatto, 2003; Global Witness, 2005; 
Hansen, 2011; Kaimowitz, 2003). Strategies to improve the detection of illegal activities 
have included periodic 'crack-downs' on illegal activities, or efforts to strengthen the 
monitoring of forest areas. For example, in response to widespread illegal logging in 
Indonesia, the President released Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 4/2006, which was 
accompanied by a national law enforcement program called the joint security sweeps 
(Operas'! Hutan Lestari or OHL, sustainable forest operation) (Chapter 3). NGOs and other 
non-government organisations have also been involved in programs to improve the 
detection (EIA/Telapak, 2007, 2012; Greenpeace, 2004; Raitzer, 2010) and prosecution of 
those who commit forest crimes (for example, PNG's Centre for Environmental Law and 
Community Rights'^). The idea is that these programs will help achieve the rule of law and 
thus improve forest governance. 
" The Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights is a public advocacy group, who also raise funds 
and provide legal support for communities interested in pursuing legal cases, primarily against mining and 
logging operations. 
Whilst efforts to strengthen law enforcement have been a dominant part of programs to 
improve forest governance, there have been mixed results in terms of reducing illegal 
forest activities and in terms of reducing deforestation and forest degradation. For 
example, increased monitoring and suppression in some areas has resulted in illegal 
activities moving to other locations (either within the same country or in other countries) 
where monitoring is less intense (Cerutti and Assembe, 2005).'® Strengthening law 
enforcement has also sometimes focused only on lower-order crimes, such as those 
committed by less-powerful actors (such as chainsaw operators) in the forests themselves 
(for example, see the findings from ICW, 2009b), meaning that strengthening law 
enforcement fails to effectively deal with the broader drivers of illegal activities. Secondly, 
there has been research suggesting that efforts to strengthen law enforcement can lead 
to further injustices, as many livelihood activities of rural forest communities are not 
legally recognised (Downs, 2013; Kaimowitz, 2003). 
There have been several studies seek to explain these, and other types of failures. These 
explanations include the lack of capacity of enforcement agencies, lack of political will, 
poor regulatory quality, market demand and norms of non-compliance (Goncalves et al., 
2012; Jachmann, 2008; Kaimowitz, 2003; Smith et al., 2006; Tacconi, 2007c; World Bank, 
2003, 2006b). Corruption is another key explanation for why efforts to strengthen law 
enforcement have often failed to achieve their goals. That is, high levels of corruption not 
only contribute to illegal activities but corruption can also create barriers to improving 
governance (Goncalves et al., 2012; Kaimowitz, 2003). For example, corrupt networks 
have been shown to provide protection for higher-level actors and reducing the desire of 
government officials to effectively tackle illegal forest activities (for example Poffenberger, 
1997). This means that higher-order actors are not effectively punished for their 
engagement in illegal activities, a fact which has been reported from several countries 
(Cerutti and Tacconi, 2008; Cerutti et al., 2013; ICW, 2009b). There have been some 
efforts to address these failures, particularly efforts to support anti-corruption courts or 
In Cameroon, increased monitoring by international independent monitors reportedly led to an increase 
in illegal activities in the non-forest estate. 
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the use of money-laundering regulation to address the higher-order illegal forest activities 
(for example see GTZ, 2009). However, overall, the experience and research on efforts to 
strengthen law enforcement shows that efforts to improve governance in this way do not 
necessarily contribute to rule of law or improved forest management. 
The second aspect of improving forest governance that is addressed here has to do with 
efforts to improve accountability and participation. Accountability in the literature on 
forest governance is typically associated with issues of transparency and corruption 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Kolstad and S0reide, 2009), and with the discussion 
about the merits and design of decentralisation reforms (Larson and Ribot, 2004; Xu and 
Ribot, 2004). This later perspective of accountability is closely tied to the notion of 
participation, in that the participation of communities and NGOs in decision-making is 
thought to contribute to increased accountability. Both accountability and participation 
have been widely cited as key for good forest governance (Brown et al., 2002; Kaufmann 
et al., 2012b), as the lack of accountability and participation have been considered to be a 
driver of deforestation and contribute to wider problems, specifically contributing to 
environmental injustices. Increasing accountability in the forests has typically focused on 
decentralising forest management, which increases the accountability of governments to 
local electorates (for example in Indonesia Palmer and Engel, 2007; and generally, see 
Tacconi, 2007a). On the other hand, programs to legally recognise the rights of 
communities or increase the participation of communities through community-based 
forest management projects are often promoted in order to increase participation 
(Agrawal et al., 2008; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Coleman and Fleischman, 2012; Palmer 
and Engel, 2007; Tacconi, 2007a). Improving forest governance in this way is widely 
thought to contribute to more sustainable outcomes in the forests, and contribute to 
improved livelihoods particularly for rural populations, because communities have better 
understanding of the local conditions, are likely to be more efficient and to operate 
sustainably due to the fact that they are more directly dependent on forest resources 
(Larson and Ribot, 2004; Ribot, 2002). These programs have been implemented in many 
different countries (Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Gray et al., 2001; Klooster, 1999; Ribot, 
2002). 
Whilst there have been some documented improvements to forest management from 
efforts to increase accountability and participation, research has challenged many of the 
assumptions that underpin the argument that increased accountability and participation 
will protect forest resources. Specifically, there has been little evidence to support the 
claims that decentralised forest management can occur in a democratic way, and thus 
improve downward accountability, and there is little reason to think that local institutions, 
that are accountable, would protect forests (Tacconi, 2007a). Both of these points have 
also been well described in the literature on community-based natural resource 
management, where a range of complex local institutional conditions are needed in order 
for such CBNRM systems to be sustainable (Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Agrawal and 
Gibson, 1999; Mascarenhas and Scarce, 2004), let alone contribute to more sustainable 
resource use (Agrawal, 2001; Larson and Ribot, 2004). This means efforts to improve 
governance do not necessarily translate into improved outcomes for forests. 
The final element of improving governance that is relevant here has to do with control of 
corruption. There has been much written about the need to reduce corruption in order to 
improve governance (Kishorand Damania, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 2004; World Bank, 
2006a, 2007). However, more generally, there is less attention paid academically to the 
issue of anti-corruption (Larmourand Wolanin, 2001a). Controlling corruption is seen as 
important to not only reduce deforestation but to provide more sustainable and just 
management of forests (Contreras-Hermosilla, 1997; Robbins, 2000; Siebert and Elwert, 
2004). The issue of corruption is also important as corruption can be a barrier to wider 
efforts to improve forest management—for example, there are several risks of corruption 
impacting the implementation of REDD+ (Tacconi et al., 2009). 
Different approaches to addressing the problem of corruption are based on different 
conceptions of what corruption is, and what causes it. For example, one perspective on 
corruption, as described in Chapter 6, is that corruption is a consequence of individual 
rational calculations, and influenced by factors such as accountability, monopoly and 
discretion (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1987). Such a conception of corruption 
suggests that efforts to reduce government discretion and monopoly powers would 
reduce corruption; a perspective that proscribes privatising government functions as an 
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important component of any anti-corruption program.'^ Other strategies to reduce the 
risk of corruption, such as that promoted by Transparency International (Tl), involves 
building systems of accountability within the broader function of the government. Tl's 
National Integrity System aims to build systems of monitoring and accountability betw/een 
different arms of government (judicial, legislative and executive) as the w/ay to reduce the 
opportunity for corruption (Pope, 2000). The aim of such programs is to increase the 
likelihood of detection of, and thereby reduce the opportunity for, corruption. And 
programs such as these have been instigated in many countries, including Indonesia and 
PNG. 
As with the previous two strategies for improving governance, strengthening enforcement 
and improving accountability and participation, the outcomes of programs aimed at 
reducing corruption have been mixed. The difference between the anti-corruption 
programs and the programs described above of law enforcement is that the success of 
anti-corruption programs, in relation to the impact on forests, has not been well-studied 
or reported, particularly in the two study countries for my research. Examples from 
outside Indonesia and PNG have reported some success. In Cameroon, for example. 
Independent Monitors were reportedly able to reduce some corruption between 
government officials and commercial timber companies (Cerutti and Assembe, 2005), but 
these successes were confined and not necessarily sustainable; this was made evident by 
the fact that companies reported being asked for bribes whenever the independent 
monitors did not accompany the monitoring mission (Colchester et al., 2006), and there 
has been ongoing high levels of corruption in other aspects of the timber industry in 
Cameroon (Cerutti et al., 2013). There have also been cases where anti-corruption courts 
have successfully prosecuted corrupt cases involving Ministers and licenses (Rayda, 
January 28, 2009). Whether such activities have long-term success in reducing corruption, 
however, has not yet been proven. There have been even fewer claims about how this 
may reduce deforestation and forest degradation and improve forest management. 
' For example, the role of SGS in Papua New Guinea (Chapter 4). 
The literature on improving these three aspects of governance has shown that improving 
forest governance can be complex and multifaceted, particularly as one element of 
governance may impact upon the success of efforts to reform another element of 
governance. For example, efforts to strengthen rule of law may be unsuccessful unless 
they are accompanied by successful efforts to control corruption. Indeed, the affect of 
interacting governance factors leads to one of the main criticisms of the 'good 
governance' agenda: that reforms to one governance factor are often insufficient. That is, 
in order to improve governance nothing short of whole-scale reform, targeting decision-
making structures, administrative systems, human resources and institutions that 'set the 
rules of the game for economic and political interaction' will be sufficient (Grindle, 2007, 
p. 526).'°° The findings from my thesis also show that governance itself is a complex 
process and efforts to improve forest governance will not always contribute to a reduction 
in deforestation and forest degradation. 
8.3 Policy implications 
The key policy implications from this research are discussed below. They are grouped 
around the practice of improving governance itself, and secondly whether improved forest 
governance can contribute to improved outcomes in the forests. 
8.3.1 Rule of law and law enforcement 
Rule of law has been a key feature of the good governance agenda and has been the focus 
of many development programs, as described above. However, the findings from this 
thesis question whether the rule of law can be considered a feature of good governance. 
That is, the idea of what forest governance is, as it emerged from my research, involved a 
process of negotiation over if and how regulations would be enforced. And there were 
many factors that drove the need for this negotiation. In contrast, the principle of the rule 
of law, being full and consistent enforcement of the law, implies that the aim of improving 
governance is to ensure that such a negotiation does not take place. These findings 
" " A related criticism has to do with the whether reforms in any one sector can be introduced without 
addressing the broader governance in a country (Brown et a!., 2002; World Bank, 2009). 
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therefore challenge the notion of rule of law as a key feature of good governance and 
suggest that the quality of governance process is about how/ the negotiation occurs, rather 
than whether any particular outcome is legal. 
This is not to say that no laws should be enforced, as the findings from this research and 
the literature show that forest management could be improved with better enforcement 
of some laws. That is, forest governance could be improved if there were a greater priority 
placed on some of the interests protected in the laws. However, in keeping with some of 
the research above, the findings from my research challenge the common efforts to 
strengthen law enforcement as a means to improve forest governance. One of the key 
elements of the grounded theory of forest governance (Chapter 5) is that government 
officials play an important role in the negotiation over when and how laws are enforced. 
Efforts to strengthen the detection and suppression of illegal activities need to be 
considerate of why government officials choose to prioritise activities that are not legal, 
including corrupt interests, as well as the priorities associated with development 
imperatives and perceived problems with the regulations. The findings of this thesis 
(Chapters 5 and 6) also show how efforts to strengthen government agents' role in law 
enforcement without addressing these other priorities can lead to increased interest in a 
semblance of legality, and a rise in the number of fraudulent documents, without actually 
promoting rule of law or improving forest governance. 
Whilst some of these challenges have been well-documented in the literature, what is 
important here is that even when efforts to strengthen law enforcement are successful, 
this does not necessarily translate into reduced deforestation and forest degradation, 
meaning that improving governance in this way will not necessarily contribute to reduced 
deforestation and forest degradation. This is because, as noted in Chapter 7, there are 
many different illegal activities that arguably do not lead to deforestation and forest 
degradation. For example, illegally awarding plantation licenses within the forest estate in 
Indonesia may not contribute to deforestation if the area under the license did not have 
any forest cover. Other illegal activities were only indirectly tied to increases in 
deforestation: for example, the long-term effects of corruption and fraud in the 
distribution of benefits from logging operations. Efforts to improve governance by 
strengthening the rule of law may not contribute at all to a reduction in deforestation and 
forest degradation, or may have only indirect benefits to forests. Secondly, it is important 
to note that even if there was no illegal activity, this does not necessarily mean that there 
would be an overall reduction in deforestation and forest degradation. Many of the 
respondents from this research described the demand for infrastructure and the other 
economic benefits that were associated with activities such as mining, logging and the 
development of commercial agriculture (Chapter 5). In order to improve forest 
management, efforts to improve governance by strengthening law enforcement must 
therefore seek to target illegal activities that have the greatest contribution to 
deforestation and forest degradation. 
Targeting law enforcement to illegal activities that have the greatest impact on the forests 
could also help improve the sustainability of forest management. As I described in the 
previous chapter, unsustainable forest management has contributed to wider problems 
associated with deforestation, such as the loss of biodiversity and damage to watersheds. 
Respondents in this research, and the literature from both countries, have identified the 
illegal activities that have contributed to these wider environmental problems. These 
illegal activities include the failure to comply with requirements to rehabilitate logged 
areas in Indonesia and the failure to comply with the logging code of conduct in PNG. 
However, as described above, often efforts to address these types of illegal activities focus 
on the lower-order actors, rather than those driving this behaviour. This presents a key 
challenge to improving governance in a way that best contributes to improved forest 
management, in that there is a need to reduce illegal activities that have a direct impact 
on forests. But in order to address those illegal activities, broader reforms, including 
reforms to market dynamics, are needed. Balancing direct interventions and indirect 
reforms is important to ensure short-term improvements and long-term changes. 
As well as improving the management of forests themselves, efforts to strengthen law 
enforcement can also have impacts, both positive and negative, on environmental justice. 
Environmental injustices are commonly associated with activities that lead to 
deforestation and forest degradation. Improving forest governance, by reducing illegal 
activities, can improve procedural j u s t i c e . T h i s is particularly the case in PNG, where 
landowners must be consulted and their approval gained before any activity can proceed. 
In such cases, efforts to strengthen compliance with the laws could improve procedural 
justice. However, as identified in Chapters 4 and 7, there are many reasons, such as the 
remoteness of many landowner groups and limited education of landowners, which affect 
the process of engaging with landowners. Traditional efforts to strengthen law 
enforcement will not address these other barriers to effective procedural justice and rule 
of law. Imposing rule of law may also improve distributive justice, particularly in relation 
to the reduction in damage to forests and better distribution of the benefits. However, as 
described above, efforts to strengthen the detection and prosecution of illegal activities 
have in the past unjustly targeted the illegal activities conducted by lower-powered actors 
(Downs, 2013; Kaimowitz, 2003). This means that efforts to strengthen law enforcement 
can, under some circumstances, reduce the wider problems associated with deforestation 
and forest degradation, but in corrupt conditions, efforts to strengthen law enforcement 
can also lead to increased injustices, particularly for communities in forest areas. 
My research supports, therefore, efforts to reduce illegal activities as a means to improve 
forest management and reduce deforestation and forest degradation. However, there are 
several qualifications to this support. Firstly, this research challenges the idea of the rule 
of law perse as a goal of good governance. Secondly, it is important to acknowledge that 
the current practices of strengthening law enforcement may not lead to increased rule of 
law, particularly where government agents have competing priorities. Furthermore, even 
efforts to improve rule of law may not contribute to reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation or help to mitigate the wider problems associated with deforestation and 
forest degradation. 
where justice is served by the participation of those with the right to participate. 
8.3.2 Participation, accountability and legitimacy 
Increasing participation and improving accountability have also been a focus of efforts to 
improve forest governance in Indonesia and PNG. There are two particular findings from 
my research that have implications for understanding issues of improving governance by 
addressing issues of accountability and participation. Firstly, as described in Chapter 5, 
one particular mechanism of accountability that emerged from this research had to do 
with the expectations of different actors. For example, companies were often held to 
account for whether their activities met the expectations of other actors. These 
expectations are developed through the process of negotiation in socialisation, and in 
PNG, through the process of licensing. These informal accountability systems were rarely 
addressed in efforts to improve forest governance as most of the accountability effort has 
focused on activities within the government. Secondly, and relatedly, the relationships in 
the system of mutual dependency, described in Chapter 6, also work as an informal 
accountability mechanism. That is, government officials and elected representatives are 
dependent on the support of companies to maintain their positions, and thus are 
accountable to those companies for their actions. Equally, companies hold government 
agents to account for their ability to support the company. These more informal 
accountability relationships are related to formal accountability, but are rarely addressed 
by efforts to promote accountability and participation. This suggests that efforts to 
increase accountability need to pay great attention to these informal structures to 
effectively improve governance. Current efforts to improve formal accountability, such as 
through decentralisation reforms, will not necessarily address the informal accountability, 
which, as described above, can be resistant to such reforms. 
Again, this is not to say that there have been no improvements in accountability and 
participation and that this cannot improve forest governance. However, the findings from 
my thesis also point to the complex relationships between increased participation and 
accountability and outcomes in forests. That is, improving accountability and participation 
does not necessarily lead to reduced deforestation and forest degradation. This is evident 
in the fact that respondents from all of the groups identified the relief of poverty and 
economic development—often tied to the activities of logging, mining and agricultural 
companies—as key priorities in the process of negotiation. This means, similarly to other 
authors (Tacconi, 2007a), that there is little evidence from my research to suggest that 
greater participation of communities would necessarily lead to less deforestation and 
forest degradation. There are, of course, instances w/here increased accountability and 
participation may lead to decreased deforestation and forest degradation: for example, 
where community groups do not wish to have such activities go ahead, or if officials are 
held to account according to land-use plans. However, there is little evidence from this 
research to support the claim that increased accountability in general would lead to a 
reduction in the extent of deforestation and forest degradation. 
The impacts of increased accountability and participation also go beyond just the amount 
of deforestation and forest degradation, as improving accountability and participation can 
also contribute to addressing the wider problems of forest management, particularly to do 
with environmental injustice. There are several mechanisms by which efforts to improve 
governance may lead to improved environmental justice. For example, there is a direct 
relationship between improved participation and procedural justice. In practice, however, 
as the experience of PNG shows, efforts to improve participation may not always 
empower the true landowners (Chapters 4 and 7). That is, whether efforts to improve 
governance by improving participation do in fact contribute to improved justice depends 
on the broader conditions in a country. That is, factors such as the level of education and 
access to education may be important determinants of whether improving governance 
will actually promote procedural justice. 
The findings from my research therefore highlight the complexity involved in efforts to 
improve forest governance by improving accountability and participation. Firstly, the 
findings show that informal accountability systems will need to be targeted in order to 
effectively improve accountability and participation. Secondly, such improvements do not 
necessarily contribute to a reduction in the amount of deforestation and forest 
degradation; however, such improvements can contribute to a reduction in the wider 
problems associated with deforestation and forest degradation. That is, some efforts to 
improve accountability and participation may reduce the wider negative impacts of 
deforestation and forest degradation, but they may not necessarily lead to an overall 
reduction in the amount of deforestation and forest degradation. 
8.3.3 Anti-corruption 
Let us now turn to the efforts to reduce corruption in order to address deforestation and 
forest degradation. Earlier, I described the common approaches to anti-corruption: for 
example, through efforts to promote privatisation and increased transparency, which are 
based on the economic rationalist perspectives of corruption. And there are aspects of 
this approach that reflect the concepts of corruption from the grounded theory. That is, 
efforts to decrease the role of government, for example in monitoring activities, can 
reduce the opportunities for corruption, as the threat of enforcement is a main bargaining 
tool for corrupt payments. However, it is clear from this thesis that there are many 
different causes of corruption, which means that promoting transparency may only be 
successful against some types of corrupt exchanges. Furthermore, the system of mutual 
dependency described highlights how entrenched corruption can be, and how difficult it is 
to change, when both parties benefit. This has implications for both how anti-corruption 
programs may affect the corrupt exchanges and secondly, what this means for the forests 
of Indonesia and PNG. 
Firstly, many different factors identified in this research potentially drive corrupt 
exchanges, which may not be addressed by typical anti-corruption approaches. Typically 
anti-corruption approaches focus on similar strategies to general law enforcement: 
prevention, detection and suppression of the specific illegal activities. But such 
approaches may fail to address the broader factors, such as those identified here, which 
also affect and drive corruption. These factors include problems with the regulations,'"^ 
power struggles resulting from historical abuses, the need for a semblance of legality, 
relationships of mutual dependency and norms of non-compliance. Efforts to better 
Whilst clarity of regulations is often cited as important for anti-corruption, there are a variety of 
problems with regulations that were identified in this research that go beyond clarity. That is, the problems 
associated with a mis-match between the content of regulations and the local conditions is also an 
important driver of corrupt exchanges. 
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detect and punish corrupt exchanges will not necessarily improve forest governance 
unless there are corresponding efforts to address some of these broader factors. 
How/ever, the question then becomes w/hether effectively improving governance vi/ould 
require addressing all of the above drivers of corruption, or howf to identify the most 
important in different contexts. Research is needed into the factors that create demand 
and support for corrupt exchanges, and how these factors may interact, in order to more 
effectively address the different drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. 
The second and related implication of this research again points to the question of 
whether anti-corruption efforts in the forest alone can be successful, given the broader 
drivers of corrupt exchanges. This idea reflects part of the debate mentioned above about 
whether improving governance can be achieved at a sectoral level, or if nothing short of 
full reform is necessary. The findings of this research point to both aspects of this debate. 
In Indonesia, for example, I find that the issues of public sector recruitment and political 
campaign financing are key factors driving some corrupt exchanges. Efforts to address 
those exchanges in the forest sector alone are unlikely to be able to effectively reduce 
corruption and improve forest governance. However, reforms do have to start 
somewhere. Efforts to target and reduce corrupt payments associated with licensing could 
contribute to broader anti-corruption efforts by reducing the incentives (for companies) to 
contribute to campaign funds. However, this relationship is indirect and may not 
effectively improve forest management. 
Successful efforts to reduce corruption can, under some circumstances contribute to a 
reduction in deforestation and forest degradation. However, there are several factors that 
will affect whether successful anti-corruption efforts to, in fact, reduce deforestation and 
forest degradation. Chapter 6 demonstrated the complexity of the relationship between 
corruption and deforestation and forest degradation. There were clear examples where 
particular instances of corrupt exchanges could increase the amount of deforestation and 
forest degradation; efforts to reduce that corruption could therefore reduce the resultant 
deforestation and forest degradation. For example, the successful reduction of corruption 
involved in land-use planning could prevent forested areas from being re-zoned to 
conversion. Addressing the conflicts of interest of field officers in PNG could enable them 
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to better monitor and report breaches by logging companies, thereby reducing the 
amount of forest that is degraded by poor logging practices. 
However, in many cases, the impacts are more indirect, and the relationship between 
reducing corruption and reducing deforestation is not clear. For example, the previous 
chapter described the potentially complex interactions between land-use planning, 
concession license allocation, and corruption. Specifically, there has been well-
documented corruption in the process of allocating licenses, but the link from this 
corruption to deforestation and forest degradation is largely dependent on land-use 
planning. This means that efforts to reduce the corruption involved in allocating licenses 
may not contribute to a reduction in deforestation and forest degradation. The effect of 
reducing corruption is dependent on the type of corruption involved, be it speed money, 
preferential treatment, or payments to get illegal access to areas. Successful reduction in 
the latter type of corruption could contribute directly to reduced deforestation and forest 
degradation. Reducing the first two types of corruption would not necessarily lead to 
reduced deforestation and forest degradation. This shows that the successful reduction in 
corruption may not necessarily contribute to a reduction in the extent of deforestation 
and forest degradation. 
Whilst the above examples show that a reduction in some types of corruption may not 
lead to a reduction in deforestation and forest degradation, this does not mean that there 
are no other potential benefits from a reduction in corruption. That is, there are several 
mechanisms by which anti-corruption programs may reduce the wider negative impacts of 
deforestation and forest degradation. Firstly, the successful reduction in some types of 
corruption can lead to improvements in the sustainability of forest management. For 
example, efforts to eradicate the corruption involved in land-use planning in Indonesia 
may have positive impacts on the sustainability of forest management, as areas that 
should be protected are not re-zoned because of corrupt interests. A reduction in some 
types of corruption associated with licensing may also contribute, indirectly, to more 
sustainable forest management due to the potential indirect impact on the process of 
land-use planning. That is, improving governance by reducing some types of corruption 
could improve the process of land-use planning and lead to more sustainable forest 
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management. However, the impacts for forest management are tentative as economic 
interests may continue to dominate decision-mal<ing. Even under conditions of good 
governance, there are obviously still strong interests to continue opening areas to logging, 
mining and agricultural development. 
As vk*ell as environmental benefits, there are also potential improvements to 
environmental justice from successful anti-corruption programs. Generally, as noted in 
Chapter 6, corruption is thought to reduce participation and affect the representativeness 
of elected officials (Warren, 2006). The findings of my research also show that some types 
of corruption do contribute to environmental injustices. This is particularly the case with 
the system of mutual dependency described in Chapter 6, where the power of elected 
officials is dependent on their relationships with the companies who support their 
campaigns. Successful reduction in corruption associated with this mutual dependency 
could improve procedural justice. However, there are also types of corruption that 
arguably facilitate distributive justice when, for example, corrupt exchanges allow unjust 
laws, such as those that restrict access of communities to traditional livelihoods, to be 
bypassed. In such cases, reduction in this type of corruption could have negative impacts 
on communities (for example Kaimowltz, 2003). 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed some of the implications of the findings of my research for 
efforts to improve forest governance in Indonesia and PNG. Focusing on the rule of law, 
accountability and anti-corruption, I discussed how current efforts to improve governance 
actually function in the forests. Specifically, I suggest that current practices to strengthen 
law enforcement, promote participation, and reduce corruption can miss key aspects of 
the governance process that actually take place in the forests. Therefore, those programs 
may fail to actually improve governance. Secondly, I argued that it is very difficult to 
understand if improvements in governance do lead to a reduction in deforestation and 
forest degradation. This is because corruption and poor governance do not always lead to 
more deforestation and forest degradation. In order to improve governance in a way that 
reduces deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and PNG, more research is 
needed on how efforts to improve governance actually function. The next chapter 
highlights other potential areas of future research and concludes the thesis. 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
9.1 Research aim and approach 
High rates of deforestation and forest degradation remain a l<ey global concern, and a 
significant environmental and developmental challenge in Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea (PNG). As forests are cut dow/n and converted there are many w/ider problems, 
such as biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions (Gibbs et al., 2007; Turner, 1996). 
As efforts to reduce this high rate of deforestation and forest degradation and to improve 
forest management continue, there has been an increasing focus on the governance of 
forest resources. Specifically, there is considerable concern that corruption and poor 
governance are contributing to deforestation and forest degradation (Saunders and 
Nussbaum, 2008; Smith et al., 2003b; World Bank, 2006a, b). Whilst there have been 
studies that have provided some support for this claim (Barbier et al., 2005; Bulte et al., 
2007; Smith et al., 2003b), there are nonetheless several gaps in this literature. These gaps 
include a lack of consideration of the local variations in the type and impact of corruption 
and poor governance (Bulte et al., 2007). Where studies have analysed the complex 
localised patterns of corruption, they have rarely analysed the impact on the forests 
(Gupta, 1995; Wollenberg et al., 2006). This thesis contributes to the literature by 
developing tw/o grounded theories, of forest governance and of corruption. The findings of 
these grounded theories were used to analyse the mechanisms by which corruption and 
poor governance may contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in the two case 
study countries. 
In order to build an understanding of local processes of governance and corruption, I 
adopted the methodology of grounded theory, developed by Glaserand Strauss (1967). 
Rather than the logico-deductive approach to theory identification and testing, the 
grounded theory approach involves generating theory from the data as it is collected. A 
key feature of this approach is the integration of traditionally separate stages of research, 
meaning the processes of data collection, analysis, theoretical sampling and writing are 
integrated. For this tliesis, the main process of data collection involved semi-structured 
interview/s conducted w/ith various representatives of government, civil society and 
industry. The interview/ data was analysed using the constant comparison method, which 
guided future sampling on theoretical grounds (Chapter 2). The two grounded theories of 
forest governance and forest corruption were presented in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
The findings of those theories were then used to analyse the ways in which poor 
governance and corruption could affect forest management and contribute to 
deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and PNG. 
9.2 Key findings and implications for theory and practice 
Ongoing and widespread concern about the high rate of deforestation and forest 
degradation, and their wider impacts, make the focus of this thesis significant for 
understanding the drivers of deforestation in Indonesia and PNG. Whilst a considerable 
amount of research has already been conducted into different drivers of deforestation, 
the growing trend to focus on governance and corruption makes this thesis timely, 
particularly for current efforts to improve governance to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). As well as contributing to an important 
policy debate, the findings of this study contribute to current academic literature on 
topics including research methodology for sensitive topics, and theories of forest 
governance and theories of corruption. 
Firstly, although there has been a great deal of discussion about corruption in the forests, 
there has been considerably less qualitative research to understand if and how corruption 
may impact forests. One reason for this lack is the methodological and practical challenges 
of conducting politically sensitive research. In Chapter 2,1 detailed the challenges of this 
kind of sensitive research, such as how to get people to talk about corruption, how to 
analyse the small amount of sometimes conflicting information about corruption, and 
how to present findings from sensitive research. Whilst many of the interviewing 
strategies adopted in my research are common techniques from other areas, particularly 
journalism, they have not yet been well discussed in an academic research context. 
Detailing the data collection process for sensitive research, and reflecting on the impact 
on the results of this research, contributes therefore to the growing body of 
methodological literature for conducting academic research on politically sensitive topics. 
One of the main methodological and ethical challenges faced in conducting my research 
was the challenge of gaining access to participants. This is because, in order to gain access 
to them, I had to identify words that could frighten away potential participants, and I had 
to rephrase proposals and descriptions of research topics in order to avoid those sensitive 
words. For example, it became clear that the word deforestation could be too sensitive for 
some potential participants and had to be rephrased to forest management as a means to 
gain access to specific participants. Learning how and when to rephrase sensitive words 
was a time-consuming process, and created a challenge because of the loss of potential 
participants. Rephrasing proposals also presents potential ethical and legal risks to 
researchers under certain conditions, which I discuss in more detail shortly. Whilst these 
challenges are unlikely to be unique to my research, there has not been much detailed 
description or analysis of such challenges, or the implications for research findings, in the 
literature. 
Secondly, and related to the challenges described above, is the fact that it is difficult to 
plan in advance the types of information that may be available when conducting research 
on sensitive topics like corruption. The information collected Is often from a very small 
number of participants, and it is often conflicting and potentially biased. These challenges 
have important implications for any type of methodology, and yet have not been well 
defined in the literature. In this thesis, I have therefore paid particular attention to 
drawing out the implications of this sensitive topic on the methodology of grounded 
theory. For example, I found that a key challenge to developing a grounded theory was in 
trying to reach what is defined in the literature as theoretical saturation. Describing these 
problems, and how I sought to overcome them, for example describing the criteria I used 
to determine theoretical saturation, is potentially important to further developing the 
literature on grounded theory methodology, and is vital to evaluating grounded theories 
on this type of sensitive topic. 
The findings of the grounded theories (Chapter 5 and 6) contribute to current research on 
corruption and poor governance in the forest sectors of the two countries. Firstly, by 
generating a theory, this research builds on existing governance literature by showing how 
governance factors operate in practice, and by identifying concepts of forest governance 
that were different to those traditionally presented in the governance literature. 
Specifically, a key finding of my grounded theory of forest governance was that the 
process of governance is a negotiation over if and how regulations are implemented. This 
process of negotiation includes balancing priorities, building legitimacy and strategies to 
control the negotiation, which all ultimately impact on if and how regulations are 
implemented. This finding particularly challenges a current focus on the rule of law as a 
dominant characteristic of good governance. I also argue that such findings suggest a need 
to better incorporate compliance theory into the broader governance literature in order 
to better understand the motivations around this negotiation. These findings also point to 
how the interests of government agents are important for understanding when, and if, 
they enforce compliance, a feature of compliance literature that has been under-
researched. 
The findings from the grounded theory of corruption in the forest sector (Chapter 6) 
makes useful contributions to the literature on corruption and forest governance. A main 
finding from this thesis is the importance of understanding the systems that emerge to 
support corrupt exchanges, rather than just focusing on the corruption exchange itself. 
Several systems were identified, including that of mutual dependency, in which corrupt 
actors became dependent on others being corrupt in order to achieve different goals. 
Importantly, the system of mutual dependency incorporates factors outside the forests 
themselves, such as campaign financing. The system of mutual dependency was also 
linked to a system of positioning in anticipation of future corrupt exchanges. Several of 
these issues, such as how campaign financing can be a driver of corrupt exchanges, have 
already been discussed in the literature. However, the details of how these systems work 
in practice to support and demand corrupt exchanges highlights the interactivity between 
different governance conditions. Specifically, the findings of this thesis show how 
individual corrupt exchanges are embedded within broader governance systems, which in 
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turn alter the nature of the corrupt exchange. These findings provide potential insights 
into the drivers of different types of corruption, thereby contributing to the current 
literature on corruption in the forests. 
The findings from this thesis are also relevant to the current policy debate over how to 
improve forest governance and reduce deforestation and forest degradation. The analysis 
presented in Chapter 7, does, to a certain extent, support the claims that corruption and 
poor governance can contribute to deforestation and forest degradation. How/ever, 
overall, I found that the relationship between corruption and deforestation and forest 
degradation can be far more complex, and that not all efforts to reduce corruption will 
help to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. That is, efforts to reduce corrupt 
exchanges in licensing may have little benefit for forests, if that corruption was for the 
preferential treatment of one company over another company. In other cases, the 
relationship is largely indirect, where the expectation of corrupt exchanges encourages 
planners to allocate more land to conversion, or leads to competing authorities for land 
allocation. These findings are significant because not only do they provide a nuanced 
description of the complex impacts of different types of corruption on forest management 
in the two countries considered here, they also contribute to an important policy debate 
arguing that reducing many types of corruption is unlikely to have any direct impact on 
reducing deforestation and forest degradation. 
Finally, in the analysis of the impacts of corruption and poor governance on forests, I focus 
on the contribution not only to actual deforestation, but also to the wider problems 
associated with activities that lead to deforestation and forest degradation. These 
problems include, for example, biodiversity loss, damage to river systems from a failure to 
protect water catchments, and the failure of many deforesting activities to contribute to 
meaningful development for communities. I argue that whilst corruption and poor 
governance do not always result in higher amounts of deforestation, corruption and poor 
governance could exacerbate the wider problems associated with deforestation and forest 
degradation. By specifically analysing these wider problems, the findings of this research 
help to extend existing research by showing that the impacts of corruption and poor 
governance are not solely about the amount of deforestation and forest degradation, but 
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also the wider and associated social and environmental problems. This is important 
because many efforts to improve forest management have done so with the intention of 
reducing these wider problems/"' Research such as this thesis is therefore needed to 
better understand the contribution of poor governance to the wider social and 
environmental problems of failed forest management. 
9.3 Reflection on the limitations of this research 
Like all research, there were limitations to conducting this study that have implications for 
how the research proceeded, how the ultimate findings can be interpreted, and for 
whether this research was conducted ethically. These limitations were caused by a variety 
of factors, primarily associated with the sensitivity of the research topic. 
The first possible limitation of this study has to do with getting access to participants, and 
getting them to talk about the sensitive topic addressed here. As noted in Chapter 2, there 
were many challenges to gaining access to participants, and there were some groups to 
which I was ultimately unable to access, specifically the police. The implication is that 
there were some key actors who were largely left out of the analysis. In order to gain 
access to some other participants, I also had to rephrase the focus of my topic, which has 
ethical implications for the research. This 'rephrasing' my research topic could be seen by 
some to breach the considerations of informed consent, which is a key principle of ethical 
research. However, the principles of ethical research highlight that under certain 
circumstances, such as when the value of the research is high and risks to participants are 
low, the principle of informed consent can be waived (Australian Government, 2013). 
Whilst the University Human Ethics committee approved my research approach, there 
were nonetheless implications for how I conducted the study, and particularly how I 
presented the findings: I excluded information that could identify individual participants. 
For example, the European Union (EU) efforts to reduce illegal forest activities as part of the Forest Law 
Enforcement and Governance and Trade (FLEGT) program argue that promoting a legal and sustainable 
forest sector is important to provide a wide range of benefits, 'such as rural livelihoods, environmental 
services, and sustainable resources on which to build long-term economic development'. 
A second potential limitation is more practical and caused by the difficulties in getting 
people to talk about sensitive topics like corruption, deforestation and forest degradation. 
The findings and analysis of this research were possibly limited by the fact that the 
ultimate results are based on a small number of participants, and possibly skewed 
responses, due to the fact that some types of corruption were less sensitive than others. 
That is, participants who did speak about corruption were possibly able to discuss some 
types of corruption, and not others, which could bias the findings. Drawing on a wider 
range of sources and accepting vague descriptions could help to mitigate such a limitation, 
but whether it could be more successful than the approach adopted here is unclear, as 
some types of corruption may have still remained hidden. 
Accepting vague descriptions (where respondents alluded to aspects of a corrupt 
exchange but were unwilling or unable to provide details of those exchanges) was 
important and points to the potential limitation of corruption research more generally. 
That is, what evidence is sufficient to know that corruption is occurring? This is because 
much of the research on corruption, including the present study, relies on perceptions of 
corruption, or descriptions and stories of corrupt exchanges, and little is based on data 
from direct observations of corrupt exchanges. This has implications for the findings of 
any study on corruption, because as seen from other research, narratives of corruption 
can perform a social function, and may be distinct from actual corrupt exchanges (for 
example see Gupta, 2005). This means that respondents in my research also provided 
descriptions of corruption that possibly reflect the qualities of the social narrative, rather 
than descriptions of experienced corrupt exchanges. This is perhaps why there is an 
under-representation of NGOs in the quotes used in this thesis, as many representatives 
of NGOs were not usually engaged in activities that required much corruption, therefore 
their responses tended to appear to be a narrative of corruption. This idea, of researchers 
interpreting respondents' information in this way, is seen by some as a major limitation of 
the qualitative inductive approach to research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Kelle, 2005; 
Silverman, 2004). 
The challenge of what counts as evidence in academic research also extends to the 
question of evidence about the impacts of corruption. As stated in the introduction to this 
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thesis, one of the main aims of this research is to analyse the processes of governance and 
corruption in the two case study countries, and to identify mechanisms by which this 
contributes to deforestation and forest degradation. However, there was limited 
availability of information about deforestation and forest degradation, which affected the 
identification of the mechanisms by which corruption may impact forest cover. The lacl< of 
available data about the process of deforestation in different areas posed a potentially 
significant limitation to this study, in that it was impossible to link any specific acts of 
corruption with specific changes in land-use. The consequence of this is that the analysis 
became more general, as I sought to identify potential mechanisms by which corruption 
may impact forest cover. Further analysis would be needed in specific areas to assess 
whether such processes were, in fact, occurring. 
A key definition of sensitive research is that the sensitivity of the topic affects the writing 
and publication of material and findings (Leitao, 2010). This presents limitations to how 
the results of sensitive research can be presented, specifically that participants in this 
research could not be identified. This posed specific challenges related to the balance 
between the need for descriptive detail to verify the information, and the need to limit 
such details. That is, detailed description is vital to grounded theory methodology as a 
means to build the depth and validity of the findings, but presenting such details raises 
the potential risk of exposing respondents. This has a variety of implications for how the 
findings are presented, and how the results of the grounded theory can be evaluated. 
Finally, there are possible limitations to applying the findings of this research to policy 
development. This is a widely debated criticism of the inductive research approach: that 
the findings are not transferable to other situations (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). Relatedly, as 
described in Chapter 2, one of the key criteria for evaluating grounded theories is that 
they fit with the empirical situation from which they emerge and work, in that the 
theories 'provide us with relevant predictions, explanations, interpretations and 
applications' (Primmer, 2011, p. 61). And whilst the application of the grounded theory 
approach should achieve theories that fit and work, translating that to practical policy 
advice is difficult. Indeed, the results of this thesis, and the policy implications described in 
the previous chapter, highlight how context-specific governance factors may be, and the 
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many different ways in which different aspects of governance may interact. This approach 
was therefore arguably limited in the ability to inform policy in other countries and 
instead can be used to guide further research on policy-specific factors. 
9.4 Future research 
Given the importance of efforts to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, globally 
and in Indonesia and PNG particularly, there are several findings of this thesis that point to 
existing gaps in our understanding about the impacts of corruption and poor governance 
on forests. Firstly, as I described throughout this thesis, the focus of this research was on 
the implementation of regulations. More research into the process of governance 
involved in forming regulations could contribute to greater understanding of the whole 
governance process, particularly given the importance of the perceived quality of 
regulations to the process of negotiation discussed in this study. This thesis' findings could 
also be extended to look at the process of land-use planning, and how governance and the 
broader political economy affect the process of land-use planning in both countries. 
A second direction for future research would be towards understanding the actual 
practices of improving governance and how these impact upon forest resources. Many 
studies have sought to identify how programs aimed at improving governance actually 
operate, identifying constraints and successes for such programs (for example with 
decentralisation Barr et al., 2006; Larson, 2004). However, the results from this thesis 
suggest that there can still be a disconnect between current practices to improve 
governance and the potential positive outcomes for forests—specifically that efforts to 
improve governance do not necessarily focus on the aspects of governance that are most 
detrimental to forest management. More research to analyse the actual practices 
associated with improving governance would help to fill this gap in knowledge, and 
develop further understanding of the nature of good forest governance. 
This research could also be extended to look at the practices associated with anti-
corruption. As I stated in previous chapters, there has been far less research into anti-
corruption, what it is and how it has been implemented (Larmour and Wolanin, 2001a). 
This is not to say that there has been no research into anti-corruption, rather that 
corruption research has focused on analysing specific aspects of corruption, which then 
implies certain anti-corruption solutions (for example Klitgaard, 1988). Previous research 
has typically focused on the political dimension, concerned with political will and 
perceptions of corruption (Bracking, 2007; Harrison, 2006). More research focused on the 
types of corruption that are addressed by different anti-corruption programs could 
provide new insights into how efforts to reduce corruption may impact upon forest 
management. 
9.5 Conclusion 
Deforestation and forest degradation is one of the most significant processes of global 
environmental change and has attracted concern for many decades. Importantly, the 
concern is not just about deforestation itself, as some deforestation may be necessary and 
even beneficial. Rather, concern about deforestation and forest degradation is driven by 
the many wider problems associated with this process, such as biodiversity loss and 
greenhouse gas emissions. As efforts to improve governance to reduce deforestation 
continue, more research is needed to understand what the specific forest governance 
processes are and how these affect forests. This research sought to contribute to this 
body of literature by developing two grounded theories, firstly of forest governance and 
secondly of corruption. These were then linked to current understanding about the 
process of deforestation and forest degradation to understand if and how corruption and 
poor governance were contributing to deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia 
and PNG. 
There are several findings from this thesis that contribute to the existing literature on 
corruption and poor governance in the forests of Indonesia and PNG. Firstly, the results of 
this thesis challenge the concept of rule of law in good governance. The core process of 
forest governance that emerged from this data was the negotiation over if and how 
regulations were implemented. This process is therefore in opposition to the idea that full 
and consistent application of the law reflects good governance. My findings suggest that 
the focus of quality of governance research is better targeted towards the process of 
negotiation, rather than any outcomes. In relation to corruption, the findings from this 
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research suggest that it is not just the corrupt exchanges themselves, but the broader 
systems that emerge to support and demand corrupt exchanges that also cause significant 
problems. Finally, I analysed the many potential mechanisms by which corruption and 
poor governance contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and 
PNG. The findings greatly complicate the current practice of improving governance to 
reduce deforestation and forest degradation—particularly given the fact that many 
relationships between governance and deforestation and forest degradation were indirect 
or negligible. However, a key point is that although corruption and poor governance do 
not necessarily lead to more deforestation and forest degradation, they can exacerbate 
the wider problems associated with deforestation as they affect the ability to plan 
sustainably, and to follow the principles of environmental justice. Finally, whilst no doubt 
there are many potential challenges and limitations to doing qualitative research on 
sensitive topics like corruption, the findings here identify the need for ongoing research 
into the issues of corruption in the forests of Indonesia and PNG, as well as other 
countries with significant areas of forest. 
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Appendix 1. Information sheet provided to potential participants 
Title of Project 
Improving governance to ovoid deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea 
Period of Investigation 
July 2010-July 2010 
Investigator 
Fiona Dow/ns, Natural Resource IVIanagement Program, Crawrford School of Economics and 
Government, Australian National University Canberra Australia. This research is being conducted 
toward a Doctor of Philosophy degree and is conducted independently by the researcher. 
Supervisor 
Associate Professor Luca Tacconi, Natural Resource Management Program, Crawford School of 
Economics and Government, Australian National University Canberra Australia. 
The goal of this study is to gain a better understanding of the impacts of different governance 
factors on the process of forest management in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Improving 
governance has become a dominant agenda for international, national and local organisations and 
is considered to be necessary to reduce the rate of deforestation and forest degradation. Poor 
governance is lil<ely to become a greater concern as efforts to reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation as a means to address global greenhouse emissions bring renewed attention, and 
financial support, to countries with high rates of deforestation and forest degradation. This 
research seeks to understand whether and how poor governance may be contributing to 
deforestation and forest degradation. It also seeks to identify what governance related policies 
could be introduced that could bring about a reduction of deforestation and forest degradation. 
The study focuses on the perceptions and experiences of people involved in forest governance 
including participants from government, the private sector, communities and non-government 
organisations. The research involves conducting semi-structured interviews with these people. 
It is hoped that the analysis of these findings will provide information to policy makers and 
communities that will assist in efforts to avoid deforestation and forest degradation. 
Key questions that that the research asks are: 
- Does poor governance contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea? If so, how? 
- What policies could be introduced which would improve governance and reduce the rate of 
deforestation and forest degradation? 
- What impacts might the governance context have on the design and implementation of 
programs aimed at reducing deforestation and forest degradation for climate change reasons? 
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Invitation to Participate and Consent Statement 
1 would lil<e to invite you to participate in tiie research. Your involvement w/ouid consist of an 
interview of up to two hours duration. The interview will be conducted in Indonesian with an 
interpreter to assist me. The interview will draw on your knowledge and experience of forest 
management in Indonesia and on your understanding of the governance context of forest 
management. 
Participation 
Participation is completely voluntary, and no payments or other direct or in-kind payments can be 
made for your participation. If you do agree to participate, you can withdraw at any time. If you 
withdraw from the research, you do not have to explain why, and all records of your involvement 
will be destroyed. Participation or refusal to participate will not impair any existing relationship 
between participants and any other institutions or people involved. You are welcome to request a 
copy of the summary notes from the interview. If you are agreeable I would like to audio-tape the 
discussion, but this is not essential 
Data protection 
The data from the interview will be recorded in a notebook and/or on audio-tape (as you prefer) 
and this will be transcribed onto computer. All responses provided will be confidential. Your name 
will not appear on the material, which will be securely stored by the researcher and the primary 
researcher will have sole access to this data. After analysis these materials will be stored at the 
Australian National University for five years, and will then be destroyed. 
Use of data 
The material from the interview will be analysed, and will be presented in summary in a thesis. It 
may also be used in the preparation of other publications so that the findings of the research are 
available to others. Unless you specifically request to be identified, neither your name nor other 
identifying data will be published. However, others may be able to recognise you through the type 
of information you provide. If information you provide is to be quoted, you will be given the 
opportunity to veryify the quote before the information is published. 
Questions about the research 
Any questions about this project may be directed to the investigator, Fiona Downs, of the 
Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University. My telephone 
number is +62 81 269 14 918 or email fiona.downs@anu.edu.au. 
You may also contact my supervisor in Indonesia, Dr. Krystof Obidzinski, Center for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR) Forest and Governance Programme on +6281317375823 or email: 
k.obidzinski(acgiar.org. 
If you have complaints or queries that I, or Dr Obidzinski, cannot answer to your satisfaction, you 
may contact the research supervisor. Associate Professor Luca Tacconi, Crawford School of 
Economics and Government, Australian National University, on +61 2 6125 8448 or email: 
luca.tacconi(S)anu.edu.au. 
If you have any concerns or complaints regarding the conduct of this research you may also 
contact: 
The Secretary, Human Ethics Research Committee 
Research Office, Australian National University 
ACT 0200 Australia 
Phone: +61 (2) 6125 7945, 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
Appendix 2. Breakdown of participants 
Indonesia 
Government Community 
District Provincial National NGO representatives Industry Other* 
12 7 5 19 10 11 8 72 
Papua New Guinea 
Government Community 
District National NGO representatives Industry Other 
2 6 5 2 3 4 22 
* Includes Interviewees from universities, other research institutes and representatives 
from international organisations, such as the World Bank. 
Appendix 3. Interview design and questions 
Given the semi-structured and flexible interview approach, the questions listed below/ are 
indicative only. Broadly, the focus of my intervievi/s was to understand the role of the 
participant and their organisation/department in the process of managing forest 
resources; the problems with this process as they saw it, and any potential impacts of 
those problems. The aim of the interviews was also to investigate the process and 
perceptions of corruption in the forest sector of the two countries. 
Introductory questions 
Interviews would begin an introduction of my research, an opportunity for the participant 
to ask any questions, and a confirmation that the individual was willing to participate in 
my research. 
The formal interview would begin with several introductory style questions, designed to 
ease the participant into a discussion and to begin identifying key issues and future 
questions. 
• What is the main focus of this (department/NGO)? 
• What is the main work that you do? 
• How long have you been working here? 
• How many mines/plantations are in this district/under your authority? (for district 
government mining and agricultural departments) 
• What is your main aim, the goal of your organisation/department? 
• Who or what departments do you work most closely with? 
For example 
Interview with district government planning officer, Indonesia 
What is the role of district planning division in the planning process? (Meeting 29,17 
March 2011). 
Interview with representative from national governance NGO, Indonesia 
How long has this organisation followed issues in forestry? And why have you focused 
on this? (Meeting 26 2 March, 2011) 
Interview with representative from a forestry company, Indonesia 
Could we begin with you describing your operations here, how long have you been 
operating and how many hectares? (Meeting 36, 24 March 2011) 
Main questions and discussion 
These main questions were used to further examine information provided in earlier 
questions and to gain greater insight into the variety of different issues that affected 
participants. These followed a very conversation approach, but often started as: 
• What are the main problems you face in conducting your work? 
• What are the main challenges in managing this (forest/mineral etc.) resource? 
• Why have you chosen to focus on that? 
• You mentioned the problem of , can you explain this in more detail? 
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For example 
Interview with district planning officer, Indonesia. Following an answer where the 
respondent mentioned a lack of coordination between districts for watershed 
management 
What do you think are the barriers to improving this, improving the quality of 
coordination? (Meeting 29,17 March, 2011) 
Interview with a representative from a provincial NGO. 
Q: You said that the numbers suggest illegal logging is reducing in this province, and 
that this is because there is less illegal logging or because there is not much forest 
left. So which do you think is more likely? 
A: That is a question for the government. They are very proud that illegal logging has 
gone down and the actors that do the illegal logging are in jail, but the question for 
them is why has it gone down?... 
Q: Has legal logging also gone down? 
A: .... (Meeting 4, September 2010) 
Interview with representative from an international organisation, Indonesia. 
If, as you said, companies are operating without a release permit, what, do you think 
are the reasons for this? Why don't companies get a legal release permit? (Meeting 16, 
November 2010) 
Interview with a representative from a national NGO, Indonesia. Following an answer 
where the participant described how illegal logging licenses were a main focus of their 
campaign. 
Perhaps you could describe the formal, legal, process for getting a license?., and then, 
what do you think is actually happening in the process for distributing licenses. 
(Meeting 7, October 10) 
Interview with representative from district planning department, Indonesia. 
With matching the plan with what is actually happening in the field, what monitoring is 
done to make sure what is happening matches with what is planned? (Meeting 29,17 
March 11) 
Interview with forestry official, PNG. 
So what are the sorts of issues the technical group are focusing on now? 
What do you mean by policy development? 
Interview with a representative from a plantation company, Indonesia. This is a series of 
questions following the participants' description of complaints by the community towards 
a company. 
Q: In situations like that, what does your company do? 
Q: How do you ensure that you have evidence of this (evidence of land ownership by 
community members)? 
Q: Is that compensation paid to the heads of villages or to individuals? 
Interview with an industry representative, PNG, 
You said that monitoring and enforcing is the big one. (the big challenge in PNG). In 
what way is this a big challenge? (Meeting 2 3 May, 2011) 
Interview with forestry company representative. 
Q: What do you think are the main challenges to operating in this area? 
A: I would say the main challenge at the moment is changing regulations, they are 
always different... 
Q: Changing in what way? Can you give me an example? 
A: ... 
Q: Why do you think they keep changing the regulations like that? (Meeting 36, 24 
March 2011) 
Focus questions 
These questions were used to examine more specific concepts and categories to collect 
data on different participants understanding of concepts that were emerging. These focus 
questions were also used to introduce and examine the more sensitive topics like 
corruption. 
Interview with a mining company representative, Indonesia on the topic of expectations. 
Q: You have mentioned the interaction with different government departments, have 
you noticed any difference in expectations from the different levels/departments 
of government? 
A: ... 
Q: What do you do to deal with these different expectations? (Meeting 51,14 July 
2011). 
Interview with representative from district planning department trying to introduce the 
topic of corruption. 
So in the past, there were many problems with 'envelopes' (euphemism for corrupt 
payments), and reported in the early decentralisation period. Do you think that this is 
still occurring? (Meeting 29,17 March, 2011) 
Interview with industry representative, PNG. Following a discussion about the lack of 
monitoring by government. 
Q: What is their excuse for not monitoring? 
A: ... 
Q: Is it also that the people in the field are being paid off, by companies, not to 
monitor their activities? (Meeting 2 3 May, 2011) 
Interview with a representative from a provincial NGO, Indonesia where we discussed the 
issue of overlapping licenses in the forest zone. 
A: Almost all the mining licenses (and palm oil) released because of collusion 
between the governments. 
Q: Collusion in what way? Between which governments? (Meeting 4, September 
2010) 
Appendix 4. Examples of theoretical memos 
Whilst Corbin and Strauss identified many different types of theoretical memos, in 
practice, my memos resembled Glaser's description of memos that simply capture the 
'meaning and ideas for one's growing theory the moment they occur' (1998, p. 178). My 
memos varied from single sentences to several paragraphs or pages that explored 
emerging links betw/een concepts. Many included comments or ideas for recoding or 
future interview questions. 
Below I provide several examples of raw memos with some description of the 
conversations or conditions in which I wrote the memo. These memos are direct copies 
from my research notes, and as such are not polished ideas. They are meant to provide 
examples of how concepts emerged, how codes and characteristics of codes varied over 
the process of constant comparison method and my thinking about the links between 
codes. 
Example theoretical memos 
Discussions with district level forestry official (Meeting 34, 21 March 2011). This was an 
early memo about the code relationships, which did not feature in the final theory. 
However, this memo does demonstrate how, through the process of constant comparison 
method (CCM), some ideas in one code merged into other codes (in this case the codes 
relating to legitimacy and prioritizing). 
Maybe this code about 'relationships' needs to involve both vertical and 
horizontal components. It seems there is difference in the way people talk about 
their relationships with vertical organisations (ie. Geographical: national, 
provincial to district etc.) and with similar level, or horizontal organisations. So 
NCOS or other departments operating at the same level (be that district, 
provincial, national)...When [this respondent] discussed how national level 'don't 
understand' our condition, 'how they just come in' 'I can only report'. This is 
about different priorities and perceived levels of control over their own decisions. 
It was different when he talking about others at the district level. This was all 
about consensus and he described a lot of the discussion process for planning, and 
how those departments asked for advice on the forestry. Showed that the 
conditions of the relationships and the types of interact are different. So this 
difference is about control and negotiation. Where with the lower levels talking 
about upper levels discussed the interference and control they exhibit. [Which 
also breeds an element of resistance from the community - and this idea that 
they are told what to do in Jakarta creates some support for them doing things 
illegally?] So, the stuff about Jakarta 'not understanding' might just be effort to 
justify this districts using different land plans and some of the deforestation (e.g 
for the airport). Might need to check more about this understanding and what 
they see as examples of this.. 
The following memo is one of the earliest memos where I identified the core variable for 
the grounded theories. It was written on 18 June, 2011 after a few day of interviews (none 
of which had been coded at the time of writing this memo). 
Having met with government, politicians and NGOs over the last few day the 
overwhelming thing that seemed to come out was that these actors/agencies 
etc. have really different priorities.. Not even just that they are different across 
the actors (e.g. NGO to plantation company). But that within each of these 
groups of actors, there are also a lot of competing priorities. So when [NGO 
representative] was discussing how they have to work with community who 
need jobs etc., but at the same time they (this NGO) really trying to work against 
the plantation companies. Same with the government, there are the priorities 
like yesterday with the need for payments to secure positions etc., so these 
private systems. But also interests in following the procedures, helping the 
development of the people. So the [government representative] discussed the 
need to follow procedures because it is what governments do. (I think this was 
related to his point about how people expect the government to do the surveys 
and award licenses). There are a lot of different interests involved in their 
decisions and the outcome of these negotiations about different priorities. There 
are also issues about whether there is a pattern or consistent way of organizing 
these priorities., particularly when they compete. 
In developing the idea of semblance of legality from a discussion with a forest industry 
representative in Port Moresby (Meeting 2, 3 May 2011). 
There seems to be a value associated with legal and the legitimacy of that. Some 
of this is normal - about the importance of being legal for markets etc. But there 
was a strong element from [this respondent] about the impracticality of actually 
being legal. How hard it was to get people to check, how the rules don't match, 
how they are overly complicated etc. But at the end of the day, [this 
respondent] said that still need the paper. So it is about the appearance of being 
legal, rather than the actual benefit to management/environment etc. of being 
legal. 
This might be one side of the negotiation process, or have to do with balancing 
out the authority of businesses. 
The following memo (2 June, 2011) records some later thinking about the code of 
managing expectations and how it fits to the higher-level codes of legitimacy and control. 
This memo demonstrates the kind of links that I sought to just get down on paper so that 
they could then guide future data collection and coding. 
This idea of managing expectations may actually be best described as a controlling 
strategy, rather than just about legitimacy. The way [this respondent] described 
socialization by this company to the communities, seemed more like control for 
the negotiation. The bit about how they (the community) think that the company 
will do everything and this person has to explain to them that they (company) may 
help, but not going to do things like that. How from the beginning he said needed 
to explain to communities that the company isn't going to provide anything and 
the community must work. This is to try to limit the expectation of community 
and reduce the burden on company. He described it as important so that then 
they can limit what they expected to do for the community, but also better 
negotiate what is important for community and for company so that in better 
position to negotiate. Might need to relool< at those early codes on expectations 
and see if this interview is different in the control element. 
The following memo (Meeting 5, 9 May 2011) recorded a key idea about political 
interference and corruption in PNG. Following this memo, I rechecked the existing 
interviews to code for this idea and the issue of political interference became one of the 
key elements of the grounded theory on corruption. 
The description about keeping MD (managing director of PNG Forest Authority) as 
acting was interesting. This is about how politicians can bypass the rules about 
interference and manage to get the actual bureaucrats etc. dependent on them. 
In PNG, this acting thing works well. Will have to check the Indonesian data to see 
if there are other strategies that are used to interfere for corrupt/private benefits. 
I think it has components related to setting up condition to facilitate future 
corrupt opportunities. This could be linked to the whole argument about not just 
focusing on the corrupt exchange but the problems associated with facilitating 
conditions and people messing with the system so that they can position 
themselves for future corruption. 
Appendix 5. Land-use plans for Central Kalimantan 
Name of Land Use Plan Ministry/regions 
Fixed forest area (hutan 
tetap seluas) 
Conversion forest 
area {Hutan Konversi 
seluas) 
Non-forest area {Non 
Kawasan hutan seluas) 
Ha % Ha % Ha % 
Forest Land use agreement (1982) 
Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan (TGHK) 
1982 
Ministry 11017919 71.89 4302181 28.11 
- -
Regional regulation Numbers. 1993 
Perda No. STahun 1993 
Region 1114914S 72.6 
- -
42072SS 27.4 
Governors Decision Classify Provincial land 
use plan (2003) with the Forest Land use 
agreement (1982) 
KepGUP Tahun 1999 (paduserasi RTRWP-
TGHK) 
Region 10440111 66.08 
- -
S3S8248.24 33.92 
Regional Regulation Number 8, 2003 
PERDA No. 8 Tahun 2003 
Region 10294880 67.04 
- -
S061846.46 32.96 
Proposed Provincial land use plan, 2007 
Usulan RTRWP Tahun 2007 
Region 846S220.6 S4.93 
- -
694S291.65 4S.07 
TGHK Update 
Ministry 10795936 69.81 32901SS 21.27 1379S42 8.92 
Result of Integrated Team 
HasilTimTerpadu 
Integrated 1010SS49 66.28 2S39729 16.6S 2603S04 17.07 
Source: Provincial forestry planning department. June 2011. 
